The facts of this case are fully set forth in the dissenting opinion.
This case involves the fundamental right of freedom of association, and governmental restriction upon that right cannot be tolerated absent *3justification by a "compelling state interest”. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1972). Further, despite the existence of such a concern, the regulation fails to pass constitutional muster if that interest can be achieved by a "less drastic alternative”. Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479; 81 S Ct 247; 5 L Ed 2d 231 (1960).
There is no doubt that the state’s interest in curbing the illegal use and trafficking of drugs is a compelling one. However, that interest was not achieved through the most narrow means in the case at bar. We reject the assumption that mere knowledge of the presence of narcotics paraphernalia is always detrimental to the public good. Under such "knowledge” standard, persons with acceptable or laudable reasons for being knowingly present where paraphernalia and/or drugs are allegedly located could be prosecuted, under the ordinance. Counselors, religious advisors, or other persons seeking to work with drug users on their own ground would be covered. Family members, aware that a person was using drugs in the home, but not wishing to sever ties, could likewise be convicted.
As there exists a less drastic way of seeking to curb drug abuse, i.e., the requirement of an intent to participate in the unlawful activity, see People v Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333; 253 NE2d 202; 305 NYS2d 484 (1969), we find the ordinance at issue unconstitutional, and affirm the lower court’s decision to quash the information.
D. C. Riley, P.J., concurred.