(concurring). This writer agrees completely with the result called for in the majority opinion, however, is constrained to respectfully disagree with the reasoning upon which that opinion is based. The factual background therein appears to be correctly stated and only other pertinent facts will be added in this concurring opinion.
The trial court based its opinion requiring the plaintiff to cover residual liability under Gloria Carlson’s insurance policy on the applicable provisions of the Michigan no-fault insurance act. MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq.
Specifically, MCL 500.3101 requires insurance coverage as follows:
"(1) The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance. Security shall be in effect continuously during the period of registration of the motor vehicle.
*780"(3) Security may be provided under a policy issued by an insurer duly authorized to transact business in this state which affords insurance for the payment of such benefits. A policy of insurance represented or sold as providing security shall be deemed to provide insurance for the payment of the benefits.”
Residual liability, the main concern in this case, is provided for in MCL 500.3131; MSA 24.13131:
"Residual liability insurance shall cover bodily injury and property damage which occurs within the United States, its territories and possessions or in Canada. This insurance shall afford coverage equivalent to that required as evidence of automobile liability insurance under the financial responsibility laws of the place in which the injury or damage occurs. In this state this insurance shall afford coverage for automobile liability retained by section 3135.”
MCL 500.3135;. MSA 24.13135 is relied on to determine the scope of residual liability coverage required by law.
"(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court, relying on these provisions, concluded that any policy purporting to comply with the requisites of no-fault must provide coverage for residual liability arising from the use of another automobile and that the non-owned exclusion in this policy which acted to diminish the coverage was void.
In this connection it is pointed out that in this case there are two automobile insurance policies *781issued by plaintiff under the laws of our state. The one insuring Arvid Carlson and his automobile, and the other insuring Gloria Carlson, Arvid Carlson’s daughter, and her automobile. Both paid the requisite premiums for their respective policies. Plaintiff admits it is liable under the policy issued to Arvid Carlson for the serious bodily injuries to Dale Ruuska. Gloria Carlson is likewise liable under the residual provision of the statute for the serious injuries to Dale Ruuska because she was the driver (user) of a motor vehicle — the tortfeasor at the time of the accident.
Such is the case because the no-fault statute requires residual liability coverage insurance in MCL 500.3131, specifically as follows: "In this state this insurance shall afford coverage for automobile liability retained by section 3135”. (Emphasis added.) Section 3135 set forth hereinabove provides that "A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. ” (Emphasis added.)
Reading these sections of the statute together mandates that in addition to the motor vehicle being insured, the owner likewise is insured against residual liability when he or she is using a motor vehicle legally. There is no question Gloria Carlson was using her father’s motor vehicle legally at the time of the accident.
Therefore this writer finds that the trial court was correct in its ruling and in citing the subject statute as the basis for its decision.
However, this writer also finds there is still another premise upon which this result can legally be reached — in fact mandated by our law.
In 1971 our Legislature in its wisdom amended the Insurance Code of 1956 and added 1971 PA *782210, which has been placed in MCL as 500.3009 and MSA 24.13009, which reads as follows:
"(1) An automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for property damage, bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall not be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless such liability coverage as is provided therein is subject to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than $20,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death of 1 person in any one accident, and, subject to said limit for 1 person, to a limit of not less than $40,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death of 2 or more persons in any one accident, and to a limit of not less than $10,000.00 because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any accident.
"(2) When authorized by the insured, automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage may be excluded when a vehicle is operated by a named person. Such exclusion shall not be valid unless the following notice is on the face of the policy or the declaration page or certificate of the policy and on the certificate of insurance referred to in subsection (3) of section 4 of Act No. 198 of the Public Acts of 1965, as amended, being section 257.1104 of the Compiled Laws of 1948: Warning — when a named excluded person operates a vehicle all liability coverage is void — no one is insured. Owners of the vehicle and others legally responsible for the acts of the named excluded person remain fully personally liable.”
The plaintiff argues this statute was prompted by our decision in the case of Allstate Ins Co v Motor State Ins Co, 33 Mich App 469; 190 NW2d 352 (1971), and our Supreme Court’s denial of leave to appeal, 386 Mich 760 (1971), which denied the insurance company therein from excluding liability where a named person was driving the *783motor vehicle. Further, plaintiff argues that the Courts’ previous rulings limiting other exclusions in motor vehicle liability insurance policies were set aside by the statute and plaintiff was permitted to legally incorporate the present subject exclusion in Gloria Carlson’s insurance policy thus relieving it of any liability.
Even assuming that the Legislature was prompted to enact said amendment by reason of our decision in the Allstate case, which may or may not be the complete reason, the result claimed thereby by plaintiff cannot and does not follow.
The defendant asserts that the canons of statutory construction and subsequent case law indicated that MCL 500.3009; MSA 24.13009, was to be exclusive as to permissible exclusions. This writer agrees.
It is a general rule of statutory construction that the inclusion of a thing by specific mention excludes that which is not mentioned. Van Sweden v Van Sweden, 250 Mich 238, 241; 230 NW 191 (1930). The very grant of specific powers under restrictions is an exclusion of other powers in reference to the same subject matter not granted by the legislation. Sebewaing Industries, Inc v Sebewaing, 337 Mich 530, 546; 60 NW2d 444 (1953). Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich 119, 133; 191 NW2d 355 (1971).
The great majority of case authority appears to support the exclusive nature of MCL 500.3009; MSA 24.13009. In Citizens Mutual Ins Co v Central National Ins Co, 65 Mich App 349, 353; 237 NW2d 322 (1975), this Court found that the basic provision of Allstate had not been affected by the subsequent legislative action, in the following language:
*784"Citizens, to a large extent, relies on Allstate Ins Co v Motor State Ins Co, 33 Mich App 469; 190 NW2d 352 (1971), and other decisions of this Court construing the former statute and in effect argues that the 1971 amendment of §2 (d) did not work a change in the public policy of this state as enunciated in those decisions. We agree with this position.”
In that case, this Court voided an attempt to exclude passengers on motorcycles from coverage. Also see, Gurwin v Alcodray, 77 Mich App 97; 257 NW2d 665 (1977).
The recent case of Allstate Ins Co v DeFrain, 81 Mich App 503, 506-508; 265 NW2d 392 (1978), deals properly with the issue before this Court in the instant case, wherein it is stated:
"MCLA 500.3009(2); MSA 24.13009(2) allows the exclusion of liability coverage when a vehicle is operated by a named person, not where, as here, the exclusionary clause is designed to avoid liability when certain persons involved in the operation of the motor vehicle (such as the wife in the instant case) are injured.
"Plaintiff argues that the Legislature intended to exclude members of an insured’s household from residual liability coverage by its enactment of § 3114 of the no-fault act (MCLA 500.3114; MSA 24.13114), providing for personal protection insurance for members of the insured’s household. We disagree. The statutory amendment as to coverage, MCLA 257.520(b)(2); MSA 9.2220(b)(2), allows an exclusion only where a named person operates the automobile and such exclusion is authorized by the insured. The statute does not provide for any exclusion such as the one in this case.
"In determining the legislative intent, we must examine the pertinent statutes. MCLA 500.3009(1); MSA 24.13009(1) provides for setting the minimum limits for coverage under a liability policy which insures against loss resulting 'from liability imposed by law for * * * bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising *785out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle’. * * *
"MCLA 500.3131; MSA 24.13131 of no-fault provides that '[r]esidual liability insurance shall cover bodily injury and property damage * * * [and that the] insurance shall afford coverage equivalent to that required as evidence of automobile liability insurance under the financial responsibility laws of the place in which the injury or damage occurs * * *. In this state this insurance shall afford coverage for automobile liability retained by section 3135’ of the act. These statutes being in pari materia must be construed together and a reasonable construction at preserving the force and effect of each is to be sought. Palmer v State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628; 8 NW2d 664 (1943), Moyer v Wayne County Road Commission, 52 Mich App 285; 217 NW2d 53 (1974), People v Martin, 59 Mich App 471; 229 NW2d 809 (1975).
"We conclude that the exclusionary clause here in question is invalid. It is neither authorized by statute, nor in harmony with the legislative purpose to provide insurance coverage for bodily injuries as set forth in the above-cited statutes.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Also see, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Taylor, 83 Mich App 603; 269 NW2d 242 (1978).
The more recent case of Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange v Van Slyke, 82 Mich App 237, 241; 266 NW2d 771 (1978), is also authority for the same ruling, wherein it is stated:
"We turn now to appellant’s contention that an exclusionary clause which denies coverage to an insured for claims brought against him by a third person, defined by the policy as a 'named insured’, violates public policy and is therefore void.
"On September 2nd, 1973, when the policy involved in the case at bar was issued, persons who owned or operated motor vehicles on Michigan highways were required to have an insurance policy in effect with liability coverage as specified in MCLA 500.3009; MSA *78624.13009. That statute provides that no automobile liability policy shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state unless it provides liability coverage of specified minima. The statute provides for only one exclusion, clearly inapplicable here. The exclusion contained in the policy before this Court is not authorized by the statute.” (Emphasis added.) (Footnotes omitted.)
The proper construction and application of the legislative purpose and intent in enacting MCL 500.3009; MSA 24.13009 calls for limiting instead of expanding permissible exclusions in motor vehicle liability insurance policies to be issued thereunder and is in harmony with the public policy of our state.
Affirming the trial court’s ruling based upon the construction of the statute, MCL 500.3009; MSA 24.3009, as contained in this concurring opinion permits the respective provisions under the Michigan no-fault automobile insurance act, requiring liability insurance for owners and operators of motor vehicles, to be given effect and is compatible with the liability of both owners and operators of motor vehicles recognized under the pertinent portion of the Michigan Vehicle Code. MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101.
For the reasons herein stated this writer also votes for affirmance of the trial court.