Defendant, charged with possession and attempted use of heroin, was arrested in a motel room as a result of a motel switchboard operator’s divulgence to police of the contents of an intentionally intercepted telephone conversation. Defendant was neither shown to be a party to that conversation, nor present when it took place, and the police did not know or have reason to know that the interception was illegal.
Defendant in this Court contends that, under Michigan and Federal law, testimony of the woman who intercepted the message as well as testimony of police officers as to what they saw and heard outside the motel room should be suppressed along with the narcotics seized in the warrantless search of that room. He contends that the primary illegality was the intentional interception of the phone call, and that this precluded that testimony from being used in court and tainted the subsequent police action outside of and in the motel room.
As fall-back, defendant contends that even if the police did not know or have reason to know that the information given them at the time of search was illegal, they did know it at the time of the rehearing on the motion to suppress and therefore could not divulge it. Further defendant contends he has standing to invoke 18 USC 2518(10)(a)(i) because "circumstantial. evidence * * * indicates that [he] was” a party to the conversation and *196therefore an "aggrieved person” within the meaning of the Federal statute.
The prosecution claims that defendant does not have standing to challenge the illegal telephone interception, that there was no tainted nexus between the illegal intercept and the police raid and that there was probable cause for arrest for a felony being committed in the officers’ presence, and for the seizure of the narcotics in connection therewith, and that there was not reasonable time to secure a warrant.
We hold that under Michigan and Federal statutory law, the interception of the telephone message was illegal, but defendant lacks standing to suppress it, and under Federal law, defendant lacks standing to challenge the divulgence and evidence resulting therefrom. We further hold that, although defendant has standing under Michigan law to challenge the resulting evidence based on lack of probable cause and failure to obtain a warrant, these challenges fail on the facts. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
I — Facts
Louise Auslander, co-manager of Motel 6, in connecting from the switchboard an outside call to room 235, registered to Nancy Witherspoon, overheard a female voice say, "I’ve got drugs”, followed by the voice of the male caller.
Mrs. Auslander immediately called the Lansing police. When Sergeant Baylis arrived at the motel she advised him of overhearing the telephone call and that Nancy Witherspoon had been making and receiving numerous calls. Sergeant Baylis then called the prosecutor’s office and reported what Mrs. Auslander had said. He was advised *197that due to the noon hour there was not time to get a warrant but that it "would be legally okay to go to the room and enter without the search warrant and seize the materials”. Sergeant Baylis then called for uniformed police to assist him.
Sergeant Baylis subsequently got a pass key from Mrs. Auslander, walked past room 235 and let himself into room 231. As he did so, he saw Nancy Witherspoon admit defendant Warner into room 235. Although he had known Ms. Wither-spoon through prior encounters, he had not seen her for over a year and did not recognize her at the time.
We adopt the Court of Appeals description of the facts from this point:
"The manager of the motel permitted Sergeant Baylis and three other officers to occupy room 231. Through the partially opened door of room 231, Sergeant Baylis saw a male person stop at room 235. The person rapped and was admitted. The police stationed themselves near the door of room 235 and they overheard conversation emanating therefrom concerning 'bags’ or 'bindles’, the price of a 'quarter’ and the effect of a 'hit’. Water was heard running and they smelled something that smelled like something burning. These observations indicated to Sergeant Baylis that something related to drug traffic was going on in the room and he decided to enter.
"Sergeant Baylis inserted a passkey in the door of room 235 but before he turned it, he heard a female voice within say she had to go downstairs. Thereupon Sergeant Baylis stepped away from the door without turning the key and the door partially opened. It was immediately closed again and an officer said, 'Police, open up’ and he kicked the door. Shortly, a voice within said 'I’ll open the door’. It was opened and the officers entered.
"Inside, Officer Cross saw the bathroom door open partially and he saw a male person (later identified as *198defendant) peek out. Officer Cross approached the bathroom door; it closed and he forced it open. He observed defendant standing in front of the sink holding a syringe, a bottle cap and some tinfoil in his right hand. Defendant threw these articles toward the toilet and the syringe went into the toilet, but the bottle cap and tinfoil fell on the floor. Officer Cross retrieved all of the articles, and later the syringe proved to contain heroin. In plain view on a table, there was a small wooden box with the lid open. In it were visible small tinfoil packets which later proved to contain heroin.
"At the preliminary examination, defendant contested the admission in evidence of Mrs. Auslander’s recitation of what she overheard of the telephone conversation between Nancy Witherspoon and the male caller and the subsequent use of that information by Sergeant Baylis. It was and is defendant’s position that by monitoring that call Mrs. Auslander violated the Federal and state eavesdropping statutes, 18 USC 2510 et seq.; MCLA 750.539 et seq.; MSA 28.807 et seq. Thus, defendant argues, the illegally obtained information was inadmissible, and under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, Sergeant Baylis could not legally use that information. If this evidence and the use thereof by Sergeant Baylis was barred, defendant contended there was no probable cause for the police to enter room 235, arrest defendant and seize the evidence in question.
"The district judge held that defendant was not an 'aggrieved person’, as defined in 18 USC 2510(11), and that under the limitation found in 18 USC 2518(10)(a) defendant had no standing to raise the issue. The district judge further held that Mrs. Auslander overheard 'I’ve got drugs’ accidentally and that MCLA 750.539e; MSA 28.807(5) did not bar the admission of that portion of the telephone conversation overheard by Mrs. Auslander. The balance of what Mrs. Auslander overheard was barred by the district judge under the state statute last referred to. The district judge found probable cause for the officers to enter room 235 and to arrest defendant and to seize the evidence in question which was received in evidence.
"At the conclusion of the first hearing on the motions *199to suppress and to quash, the trial judge affirmed the district judge on the issue of defendant not being an 'aggrieved person’ under the Federal statute. Although expressing some doubts that Mrs. Auslander overheard any of the telephone conversation accidentally, the trial judge affirmed the district judge on the finding that 'I’ve got drugs’ was overheard accidentally. This affirmance was based on the district judge’s opportunity to see and hear the witness. For the foregoing reasons, the trial judge denied the motions to suppress and to quash.
"At the first session on rehearing, two former employees of Motel 6 testified that Mrs. Auslander had admitted to them that she had on occasion deliberately listened to telephone conversations between guests and outside callers. At the second session held June 13, 1974, the prosecuting attorney conceded that Mrs. Auslander had deliberately monitored the outside call to Nancy Witherspoon for reasons which Mrs. Auslander and the prosecuting attorney believed to be legitimate. The information which led to this concession was learned by the prosecutor that day. On the strength of this concession, the trial judge held that the evidence obtained from the monitored telephone conversation was illegally obtained and it was inadmissible. Without the evidence there was no probable cause to enter room 235 and to arrest defendant and to seize the evidence in question. The motions to suppress that evidence and to quash the information were granted.” People v Warner, 65 Mich App 267, 270-273; 237 NW2d 284 (1975).
The people appealed this decision and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. That Court, relying on MCLA 750.539e; MSA 28.807(5), found that Sergeant Baylis did not know or reasonably should know that Mrs. Auslander had illegally overheard "I’ve got drugs”. The Court found that, prior to Mrs. Auslander advising the prosecuting attorney on June 13, 1974 that she had deliberately eavesdropped, there was nothing in the record indicating that what she did was other than an accidental and legal occurrence. As a result of *200this Sergeant Baylis had probable cause to proceed to room 235 for further investigation. The Court of Appeals further found that what was heard and observed outside room 235 established probable cause to enter the room and what they saw there in plain view was sufficient to justify the arrest and seizure of evidence.
II — Issues
The first question before us is whether, admitting the intentional interception by Mrs. Auslander was illegal, evidence of the contents of that conversation can be suppressed by defendant.
The second question is whether the illegality of the interception is a basis upon which defendant can challenge the evidence subsequently acquired by the police on the afternoon in question.
Ill — Illegality and Admissibility of Intercepted Telephone Call
It is clear that Mrs. Auslander’s intentional eavesdropping violated both Michigan and Federal law. MCLA 750.539c; MSA 28.807(3) provides:
"Any person who * * * wilfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the consent of all parties thereto * * * is guilty of a felony * * * ”.1
18 USC 2511(l)(a) provides:
"any person who * * * willfully intercepts * * * any wire or oral communication * * * shall be fined * * * or imprisoned * * * ”.
*201In divulging what she overheard Mrs. Auslander violated MCLA 750.539e; MSA 28.807(5) ("Any person who uses or divulges”) and 18 USC 2511(l)(c) ("wilfully discloses”). More specifically, by testifying in court, Mrs. Auslander would violate 18 USC 2515:
"Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted * * * no evidence derived therefrom may be received in any trial * * * if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.”
18 USC 2515 applies to evidence in a state as well as Federal trial. In Lee v Florida, 392 US 378; 88 S Ct 2096; 20 L Ed 2d 1166 (1968), city police wiretapped Lee’s telephone and used the evidence obtained to convict him and two colleagues. "In affirming the convictions, the state appellate court said that 'there were no state or federal statutes applicable in Florida which would make wiretapping illegal and inadmissible in evidence * * * ’.” 392 US 378, 380. However, speaking of an earlier and much less specific statute,2 the Supreme Court said:
"We disagree. There clearly is a federal statute, applicable in Florida and every other State, that made illegal the conduct of the Orlando authorities in this case. And that statute, we hold today, also made the recordings of the petitioners’ telephone conversations inadmissible as evidence in the Florida court.” 392 US 378, 380.
To the same effect, see People v Tebo, 37 Mich App 141; 194 NW2d 517 (1971). We hold, therefore, *202that at least as to the exclusion of evidence which is specifically covered by the Federal statute but not the Michigan statute, Congress has pre-empted the field.
However, in determining who can claim the exclusion of intercepted telephone conversation evidence, reference must be made not only to 18 USC 2515, but to 18 USC 2518(10)(a) and 18 USC 2510(11). Section 2518(10)(a) provides that "[a]ny aggrieved person in any trial * * * may move to suppress * * * ”. Section 2510(11) reads " 'aggrieved person’ means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed”.
The normal rule of statutory construction requires that parts of a statute bearing on the same subject should be construed together. Furthermore, the legislative history of this statute confirms that 18 USC 2518(10)(a) and 18 USC 2510(11) were intended by the Congress to be considered together.
S Rep No. 1097, 90th Cong, 2d Sess (1968); 2 United States Code Cong & Admin News (1968), p 2185 states in this regard:
"The provision [§ 2515] must, of course, be read in light of section 2518(10)(a) discussed belpw, which defines the class entitled to make a motion to suppress. It largely reflects existing law. It applies to suppress evidence directly (Nardone v United States, 302 US 379; 58 S Ct 275 [82 L Ed 314] [1937]) or indirectly obtained in violation of the chapter. (Nardone v United States, 308 US 338; 60 S Ct 266 [84 L Ed 307] [1939]). There is, however, no intention to change the attenuation rule. See Nardone v United States, 127 F2d 521 (CA 2), cert den, 316 US 698 (1942); Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407 [9 L Ed 2d 441] (1963). Nor *203generally to press the scope of the suppression rule beyond present search and seizure law.”
See United States v Bynum, 513 F2d 533, 535 (CA 2, 1975).
This reading of the code is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. As the United States Supreme Court said in Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 171-172; 89 S Ct 961; 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969):
"The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Co-conspirators and codefendants have been accorded no special standing.”
The right to suppression is personal to the one whose right to privacy was violated.
There is no testimony that defendant participated in the intercepted telephone call. The defendant’s brief on appeal does not allege it in its statement of facts, saying only "Mrs. Auslander * * * received an outside call from a male caller * * * ”, and the people’s brief charges defendant "would have this Court so infer without his having ever voiced' or supported the claim below, and without specñlcally averring the same now”.
Defendant nonetheless argues the fact that circumstantial evidence shows he was the male caller. He says "the male allegedly responded that he would be there (at the motel) in 15 minutes” in response to the female voice saying she had drugs and that Sergeant Baylis testified he was outside room 235 about 15 minutes. But there are two problems with this argument. First, it does not *204appear that what the male said is on the record. Second, a Greg Bailey was also in the room and he might have been the caller — Sergeant Baylis did not arrive immediately on the termination of the call. Finally, the trial court from its closer vantage after sympathetic review ruled defendant was not an aggrieved person and, in fact, had "not put himself in a position of admitting that he was a party to that intercepted telephone call”.
Without opining whether or not the Federal statute pre-empts Michigan law as to the specific issue of standing, we find that the Michigan statute’s silence on the subject cannot be presumed to obviate the necessity therefor. It must be assumed that the rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal controls. United States v Hodge, 539 F2d 898, 902 (CA 6, 1976); People v Joshua, 32 Mich App 581, 585; 189 NW2d 105 (1971). Therefore, the Michigan statute too can be asserted in favor of any person, even if indirectly affected by a violation, but only if his or her right to privacy has been invaded. We hold that these are the same individuals as those termed "aggrieved” under the Federal statute; defendant is not such a person.
In short, defendant’s case on the record fails as to any proof that he was the male caller. The cases he cites relative to the standing of home owners and persons present have no relevance to the telephone call which, according to dfefendant, occurred before his presence in the room.
We must conclude that while Mrs. Auslander illegally intercepted a call, defendant had no standing to request the suppression of the message because there was no evidence that he was a party to that call and his rights to privacy therefore were not shown to be violated. The answer to the first question consequently is that the "I’ve got *205drugs” telephone message overheard by Mrs. Auslander was admissible into evidence.
IV — Admissibility op Evidence Obtained Prior to and During the Search and Seizure in Room
235
In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence obtained subsequent to and as a result of the interception, as a matter of Federal law, we find that defendant Warner cannot attack indirectly that which he has no standing to attack directly. Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 174; 89 S Ct 961; 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969).
Beginning with the initial interception and throughout the subsequent course of events, the only illegalities were in the intentional eavesdropping and divulgence of the intercepted message. Defendant does not become a person whose right to privacy was violated by these illegalities solely by the subsequent seizure from and introduction of evidence against him. Alderman v United States, supra, 171-172.
The second illegality, divulgence of the "I’ve got drugs” interception to the police, was more nearly a proximate cause of the evidence sought to be suppressed than the interception itself, and the divulgence too was a crime, 18 USC 2511(l)(a) (willfully intercepts); 18 USC 2511(l)(c) (willfully discloses). However, this analysis does not obviate the fact that while the statute provides that the person who willfully discloses an illegal intercept is equally guilty with the person who willfully makes the interception, it specifically provides for the suppression only in favor of an aggrieved person. 18 USC 2518(10)(a) provides:
"Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or pro*206ceeding in or before any court * * * may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom on the grounds that—
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted ¡it Sj! * »
As we have already indicated, an aggrieved person "means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed”. 18 USC 2510(11). The illegality violated no personal right of defendant and he is not an "aggrieved” person; removal of the activity a step beyond the actual interception does not give him standing.
Defendant cites Jones v United States, 362 US 257; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960), for two tests regarding standing to challenge the legality of police action; namely, whether the search was conducted in the presence of the accused and whether the accused was charged with a possessory offense. The Jones Court held that one who was on the premises and had a right to be there had standing to attack the lack of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
We do not question the correctness of that decision, and if there were some infirmity in the police action as it related to defendant Warner, there is no doubt that he would be in a position to attack it.
In relying on Jones, however, defendant ignores the fact that there was probable cause to conduct the search in the instant case. This probable cause is found not only in the substance of the message conveyed to Officer Baylis by Mrs. Auslander, which defendant had no standing to challenge, but also in the corroborating evidence adduced by *207Officer Baylis as he listened to the conversation from the room adjacent to room 235, see Draper v United States, 358 US 307; 79 S Ct 329; 3 L Ed 2d 327 (1959).
In the instant case, the illegalities were ones which did not negate the adequacy of probable cause as to defendant because the illegalities were not personal to him. This can be demonstrated by three recent cases in which warrants were deemed invalid because of basic infirmities as to one defendant. Searches pursuant to these invalid warrants, however, uncovered either evidence directly against a second defendant or led to evidence which established probable cause for warrants against a second defendant. In each case the court held that the second defendant had no standing to suppress the evidence against him because he personally had no standing to challenge the initial illegality. See United States v Wright, 524 F2d 1100 (CA 2, 1975); United States v Scasino, 513 F2d 47 (CA 5, 1975), and Haina v State, 30 Md App 295; 352 A2d 874 (1976). Defendant Warner is in the identical position to the second defendants in these cases.
Defendant does, of course, in addition to having standing to question probable cause, have standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the validity of the search as warrantless. This challenge, however, fails on the facts. The urgency of the situation, the transfer of possession and potential use of drugs being one which could and apparently did occur within 15 to 30 minutes from the time the police were originally called, in addition to the nature and potential destructibility of drugs, make this the type of case presenting sufficient exigent circumstances to obviate the necessity for a warrant. Compelling a search warrant in *208cases such as this would so hinder the police as to preclude successful investigation.
Defendant argues that whatever the Federal law may be, under Michigan law the evidence secured in room 235 should be suppressed in a Michigan court. The argument is first that Mrs. Auslander made an illegal intercept; second that Officer Baylis in receiving information from her knew or should have known that it was illegally obtained; and third that, without the illegally received information, Officer Baylis and his colleagues would not have been outside room 235 in a position to hear the information on which they based their entry and gathering of the evidence in question.
We have already discussed the first part of the argument. The critical part is the second, for, if it is factually correct, it is arguable that Officer Baylis illegally received information that tainted his subsequent action. However, there is no evidence on the record that Mrs. Auslander told Sergeant Baylis that she had received her information illegally or that Sergeant Baylis had reason to so believe. Any such inference would be strongly rebutted by the fact she did not admit to the prosecution until during the rehearing on the motion to suppress the evidence and to quash the information that she had eavesdropped intentionally and the district judge had found Mrs. Auslander had overheard the "I’ve got drugs” accidentally and the circuit court had affirmed this before the prosecutor introduced Mrs. Auslander’s belated admission. Consequently we find that Officer Baylis received Mrs. Auslander’s information legally.3 Further, the fact that the prosecutor knew *209at the time of the rehearing that the message was intentionally and therefore illegally obtained is not knowledge which would so taint the evidence as to warrant suppression, because it was too late to have in any way aifected the action of the police in acquiring the evidence.
Under these circumstances, there is no reason to exclude the evidence in question. Examination of the exclusionary rule dictates this result. The exclusionary rule has a dual purpose: (1) protection of the right to privacy, and (2) deterrence of police misconduct. Neither of these purposes would be served by extension of the rule in this case. First, as fully discussed, defendant on the record has shown no invasion of his right to privacy. Second, the deterrent aim of the rule would in no way be served by holding it applicable to this particular case. The most obvious reason for this is that the illegality was purely private and there was no police misconduct to deter. See People v Livingston, 64 Mich App 247, 255; 236 NW2d 63 (1975); People v Harry James Smith, 31 Mich App 366, 374; 188 NW2d 16 (1971). Officer Baylis, in fact, relied in good faith on information from a source he had no reason to question. Further, he took the additional precaution of calling the prosecutor to inquire about the necessity for a warrant.4
*210Since an analysis of the Michigan law on this phase of the matter reaches the same result as the Federal law, there is no occasion to consider whether the Federal law in this area pre-empts the Michigan law.
V — Conclusion
Mrs. Auslander violated 18 USC 2511(l)(a) and MCLA 750.539c; MSA 28.807(3) in willfully eavesdropping on the conversation between Nancy Witherspoon in room 235 and an outside caller. But defendant was not shown to be a party to the telephone call and hence, under 18 USC 2518(10)(a) and 18 USC 2510(11), has no standing to suppress evidence of it. We hold that the Federal statute here is pre-emptive but in any event Michigan law provides for no right of suppression. Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
The police raid as a consequence of the communication of the "I’ve got drugs” message is not illegal as to defendant and the seized evidence is admissible.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
We are not impressed with prosecutor’s argument that a telephone switchboard is not included in "any device”.
47 USC 605:
"[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge * * * such intercepted communication to any person * * * .”
Because of the facts of this case, we are not required to consider whether art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 applies. Art 1, § 11, relative to search and seizure, provides in pertinent part:
"The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from *209evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug * * * seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.”
Of course, reliance on this section of the Constitution is unnecessary, because, as already indicated, the evidence is admissible without it under general Michigan law.
Because of the facts of this case we need here consider neither the argument of the California Supreme Court [People v Martin, 45 Cal 2d 755; 290 P2d 855 (1933)] that permission to use evidence against a party that was illegally obtained from third parties invites police invasion of the rights of third parties (see concurring opinion of then Judge Levin, People v Joshua, 32 Mich App 581, 588, 590; 189 NW2d 105 [1971]) nor the argument for limiting the exclusionary rule in that it is a unique procedural safeguard that precludes admission of *210evidence which is neither unreliable nor lacking in probative value as to the guilt of defendant and hence should not be extended (see dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 US 388, 411; 91 S Ct 1999; 29 L Ed 2d 619 [1971], and authorities therein cited; and Stone v Powell, 428 US 465; 96 S Ct 3037; 49 L Ed 2d 1067 [1976], holding evidence admitted in state trials contrary to the Fourth Amendment no longer reviewable on Federal habeas corpus). See also Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title III, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 St John’s L Rev 41, 66-77 (1976), arguing that, under Federal law, evidence innocently or intentionally obtained by private parties should not be excluded.