(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I believe the majority misconceives the nature of a manufacturer’s duty under the theory of products liability. In my opinion, the result reached by the majority, for all practical purposes, makes the manufacturer an absolute insurer.
This court has adopted the principle of strict liability set forth in section 402A of the Restatement, 2 Torts 2d 347, 348.1 That principle applies to any product which *115is in a “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous” to the user. From one or both of these requirements there arises a fundamental limitation upon the liability of a manufacturer. This qualification was recognized in Comment h to section 402A, p. 351, which reads in part:
“h. A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, . . . the seller is not liable. . .
In other words, a manufacturer is generally required to provide a product which is safe for its normal or intended uses. Where the manufacturer has reason to foresee danger from an abnormal use, he may have the additional duty to give adequate warning of the danger. Comment h, supra.
This further duty to warn does not extend to patent dangers, however. As we said in Vincer v. Esther Wms. All-Alum. S. Pool Co., 69 Wis.2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) :
“. . . If the average consumer would reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition of the product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it would not be unreasonably dangerous and defective. . . .”
Thus it would be superfluous to require a general warning of danger on a sharp knife, Note, Foreseeability In Product Design And Duty To Warn Cases — Distinctions And Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 228, 235, and the manufacturer of a Volkswagen is under no duty to warn a consumer that the size of a “beetle” renders it less safe in an accident than a larger car. See: Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis.2d 551, 557, 225 N.W,2d 431 (1975). *116For the manufacturer to have a duty, either to make the product more safe or to warn of its hazards, “. . . The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. . . .” See: Restatement 2 Torts 2d, sec. 402A, Comment i, p. 352. In sum, then, a manufacturer’s duty is to provide a product which is not defective or unreasonably dangerous for its intended or normal use, and to warn of foreseeable hazards in any other anticipated uses, if the hazards are not apparent.
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear to me that General Motors is not liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. It could not be seriously contended that the accident occurred while the Corvair was being used in the normal or intended manner, and the hazard implicit in reckless misuse was plain to all.
The driver, Gutmann, gained entry to the Bronco Beer Bar with a false identification card. There he had from four to six beers, “ehugalugging” four glasses just before leaving. He had quarreled with his girl friend, Ms. Quartullo, and was angry when they left. In the parking lot, he nearly backed into Ms. Beaton and tossed his beer bottle out the window. As the car left the tavern, gravel flew, the tires squealed, and the car “fishtailed.”
As they sped down the highway, various passengers pleaded with Gutmann to slow down; asked to be let out of the car; and urged Gutmann to consider the safety of the others. Penny Chart warned him twice that they were nearing the intersection and instructed him to slow down. The intersection was marked by a warning sign with a posted speed of twenty miles per hour. Passenger Renn Karl observed shortly before they reached the intersection that the speedometer indicated a speed in excess of seventy miles per hour.
*117Karl estimated that Gutmann’s speed remained near seventy miles per hour until the car was two hundred feet from the intersection. Even plaintiffs’ experts put Gutmann’s speed at forty to fifty-five miles per hour. General Motors demonstrated that a comparable Corvair could negotiate the corner at thirty-five miles per hour.
On this evidence it cannot be contended that Gut-mann’s attempted negotiation of the curve was within the normal or intended use of the auto, or that the manufacturer must warn that such misuse is dangerous. While a manufacturer can foresee that some drivers will attempt maneuvers at excessive speeds, just as it can foresee that some cars will be employed in drag races or high-speed getaways, the danger of such misuse is fully apparent to the driver.
The trial court refused to admit evidence that the Cor-vair had limits of control equal to or better than other American cars, and the majority upholds this decision. The court recognizes that such evidence is generally admissible, although it may be excluded in the discretion of the trial court where the evidence would involve undue distraction, undue consumption of time, or entirely collateral issues. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis.2d 641, 656, 657, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973). None of these dangers existed in the present case. Concern for consumption of time carries little weight in a six-week trial. Most important, the issue was not collateral or a distraction; it was the heart of the case. The evidence should therefore have been admitted.
In upholding the trial court’s decision, the majority says that:
“. . . the point of comparison which was relevant to plaintiff’s theory of liability was not the limits of control, but rather, the handling characteristics of the automobile once that limit was reached.”
*118This seriously muddies an already confused area of the law. The relevant question was not how well a Corvair compares with other cars when recklessly thrown into an uncontrollable skid or spin. The question was whether the car was safe for its normal and intended uses and whether it had any nonapparent feature which made it dangerous in some other foreseeable use which, but for the defect, would have been harmless.
Many, if not most, products have “limits of control,” or performance or tolerance. Beyond those limits, the product may become dangerous. What happens beyond the product’s limits is irrelevant, however, where those limits are sufficiently high that the product is safe for its intended uses, and where the danger of a use which ignores those limits is manifest.
By the majority’s reasoning, the pertinent factor is what happens to a product when it is overloaded, misused or tampered with. An elevator might be perfectly safe under any reasonable load; by the court’s reasoning, the manufacturer could still be held liable if the elevator had poor “handling characteristics” when recklessly overloaded. Under sufficient pressure, a tire will burst. If a grossly overinflated tire exploded, the majority’s test would not ask whether the overinflation was reasonable or involved a patent danger, but would ask only whether this brand of tire exploded more dangerously than did other brands. I believe this approach is misguided.
A manufacturer is under no duty to make an automobile or any other product accident-proof or foolproof; nor must he render it “more” safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all. Evans v. General Motors Corp. (7th Cir. 1966), 359 Fed.2d 822, 824. An auto manufacturer knows that its vehicles will occasionally be driven into bodies of water, but it has no duty to equip them with pontoons, or to inform owners that the vehicles do not float. Evans v. General Motors Corp., supra, 825. *119For the same reasons, vehicles need not be designed to be driven on racetracks, over cliffs, or, I submit, around corners at two, three or four times the posted speed.
The plaintiff does not assert that the driver could not negotiate a posted twenty mile per hour curve at twenty miles per hour because of the design of the automobile. The manufacturer had a duty to test its automobile only to ensure that it was reasonably safe for its intended purpose, and this intended purpose was not to safely execute curves at speeds in excess of twice the posted speed limit. The manufacturer is simply not under a duty to render the vehicle more safe when the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut recently considered a product liability action brought by a driver against a tire manufacturer after the driver failed to negotiate a sharp highway curve. Recovery was held to be precluded by the driver’s contributory negligence in traveling into the curve at a speed between seventy and eighty miles per hour, where the speed limit was fifty-five miles per hour. The court said:
“. . . A manufacturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal use of his product and we see no good reason why the doctrine of strict liability in tort [sec. 402A Restatement, 2 Torts 2d] should be extended to negate that expectation. . . .” Hoelter v. Mohawk Service, Inc., 170 Conn. 495, 365 Atl.2d 1064, 1069 (1976).
The court approved the trial court’s jury instructions which provided in part that the plaintiff-driver :
“. . . ‘had the duty not to misuse the studded tires or to use them in an abnormal way. He had the duty of using the tires in a way that a reasonably prudent person, under all the circumstances such [sic] he knew, would use the tires by driving at a reasonable speed under the circumstances and by keeping the car under reasonable control.’ . . .” Hoelter v. Mohawk Service, Inc., supra, 1070.
*120Although Hoelter v. Mohawk Service, Inc., supra, was decided under the contributory negligence doctrine, I believe the rationale of this decision is sound and applicable to the instant case. Auto manufacturers should not be made absolute insurers against misuse of their products, nor penalized for failure to devise a car which is so crashproof as to be “safe at any speed.”
Two other aspects of the majority opinion are disturbing. The first is the approval of the admission of evidence of subsequent design changes in product liability cases. It is not clear how the majority has surmounted the provision of Rule 904.07, Stats., that such evidence is admissible to prove “feasibility of precautionary measures if controverted, . . (Emphasis added.) The manufacturer did not dispute the technological feasibility of alternative suspension systems.
The majority relies in part on Sutkowski v. Universal Manon Corp., 5 Ill. App.3d 316, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972). That decision holds design change evidence admissible as proof of feasibility of alternative designs. In Wisconsin, under Rule 904.07, Stats., evidence of feasibility is admissible only when the issue is controverted. If a defendant admits the feasibility of precautionary measures or alternative designs, evidence of subsequent changes is inadmissible. See: 1 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, sec. 12.04, pp. 865, 378.
The majority rests its holding principally on the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.3d 113, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 528 Pac.2d 1148 (1974), to the effect that evidence of design changes may safely be admitted because admissibility will not deter manufacturers from making design improvements. The California approach to strict liability is far different from that of this court, however. California has entirely abandoned the “unreasonable danger” element of such actions, to avoid any vestige of traditional negligence or “reasonable man” concepts. *121See: Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 Pac.2d 1153 (1972), discussed in Vineer v. Esther Wms. All-Alum. S. Pool Co., supra, 334, 335 (WILKIE, C. J. dissenting).
Because we have retained the unreasonable danger requirement, the policy calculation here is different. Admissibility of evidence of design changes would have little deterrent effect in California, where the manufacturer will be liable even if the danger was “reasonable.” In Wisconsin, design modifications may be decisive on the essential element of unreasonable danger, and may mean the difference between liability and no liability. The deterrent effect of admissibility may therefore be substantial.
The majority concludes that the manufacturer’s potential liability for continued production of defective products will compel him to make design changes, even though, by making the changes, he increases the probability that he will be held liable for injuries caused by those products already on the market. I do not know how the majority makes this calculation. I am not convinced that admissibility will not tend to discourage improvements.
Finally, the majority states that “Gutmann did testify that he was not speeding.” I do not understand this to refer to Gutmann’s testimony that he entered the curve at a speed in excess of forty miles per hour.
The opinion of the court should not be construed as an oblique endorsement of plaintiffs’ contention that the posted speed of twenty miles per hour was merely “advisory.” It is difficult for me to believe that the majority intends to hold that the legal rate of speed on such a corner is not twenty but rather fifty-five miles per hour. I am not prepared to accept such a contention.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice HANLEY and Mr. Justice ROBERT W. HANSEN join in this dissent.
That section provides:
“403A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
"(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
“(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
“(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
*115“(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
“ (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.”