dissenting.
I do not agree that Grotte v. N.D. Wkrs’ Comp. Bureau, 489 N.W.2d 875 (N.D.1992) is distinguishable because “Grotte’s supervisor ‘adamantly denied that he did anything to discourage Grotte from filing a claim' ” and that a “failure to recall is very different from an adamant denial.” In using such a basis to distinguish this case from Grotte, the majority is weighing evidence, not determining whether or not a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the factual conclusions were proven by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. Grotte, supra. It is within the Bureau’s province to weigh the credibility of the evidence presented, id., and the Bureau has the responsibility and duty to pass on the credibility of witnesses before it, including the claimant, and to weigh the evidence and make findings on disputed questions of fact. Id.
I am even more skeptical about applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the State in this case than I was in Blocker Drilling Canada, Ltd. v. Conrad, 354 N.W.2d 912, 922 (N.D.1984) [VandeWalle, J., concurring specially]. Here the actions which are used to create the estoppel against the State, the Bureau, are not the actions of its employees or agents, but the actions of a private employer.
Nor can I accept the majority’s reliance on Senske v. Fairmont & Waseca Canning Co., 232 Minn. 350, 45 N.W.2d 640 (1951) as a reason for concluding that es-toppel does not apply against the State. That case did not involve estoppel. The statement from Senske quoted in the majority opinion was made in the context of *535answering the question of whether or not the Minnesota State Treasurer as Custodian of the Special Compensation Fund had any discretionary control over the payment of disability benefits from the Fund, and whether the Attorney General could compromise and settle a claim against the Special Compensation Fund. The Minnesota Court concluded neither the State Treasurer nor Attorney General had any discretionary control over the Fund. That responsibility was with the Minnesota Industrial Commission which, by statute, was to direct the distribution of the Fund. Senske and the rhetoric quoted therefrom is inap-posite to a decision of whether equitable estoppel is applicable against the Fund.
Although the Court has not had occasion to consider a case of equitable estoppel in which the employer, through insurance or other means, has compensated an employee for an injury at a rate equal to or greater than the worker’s compensation benefit which would be payable, the majority in Grotte quoted from the Montana Supreme Court decision in Frost v. Anaconda Co., 198 Mont. 216, 645 P.2d 419, 452 (1982):
“Compensation, in order to toll the statute of limitations, must consist of benefits substantially comparable to or greater than the benefits available to the same employee under the Worker’s Compensation Act.
******
“Compensation, to toll the statute, must be sufficient to convince the recipient that he is receiving such a large percentage of workers’ compensation benefits available to him that to seek further benefits would be a wasted effort.”
Grotte, supra, 489 N.W.2d at 880.
Here, it is conceded that under the insurance policy Linnertz was required to and did pay 20% of the medical costs which he incurred as a result of his injury.1 This fact alone mitigates against Linnertz’s contention that he believed filing a claim would be wasted effort or unnecessary to protect his rights to full benefits. Nor is the Bureau’s finding that Linnertz’s employer “discourages employees from filing Worker’s Compensation Claims and encourages them instead to file under a general health carrier” — a finding with which the majority does not and cannot take issue— contrary to the Bureau’s conclusion that such facts are not sufficient to estop the Bureau from applying the statute of limitations. I would require a stronger showing than a “general pattern of employee confusion” to justify estoppel. We have held in other instances that we will not adopt a “per se” confusion rule. See Hammeren v. North Dakota State Highway Com’r, 315 N.W.2d 679 (N.D.1982). Although there may have been confusion, as the Bureau finds, the Bureau also found no reliance on the part of Linnertz and concluded that the facts were not sufficient to justify estoppel. That conclusion is sustained by the findings.
Finally, if the employer did mislead Lin-nertz, I would conclude that the appropriate remedy is not estoppel against the Bureau, for that remedy affects more than the devious employer — it can affect all employers in the same classification. See NDCC §§ 65-04-04; 65-04-04.2. See also NDCC § 65-04-17.
A better remedy would be to estop the employer from raising the exclusive-remedy provision of section 65-01-08, NDCC, in the instance where the employee was injured as a result of the employer’s negligence; or where, as here, it appears that the injuries are not due to the employer’s negligence but to the employer’s alleged misrepresentation, the exclusive-remedy provision should be set aside to permit the employee tp seek damages for the employer’s deceit. Such a remedy, in addition to compensating the employee, would more likely prevent any deceit or purposeful con*536fusion by employers and would, I believe, prompt employers to carefully inform their employees of the right to file a claim with the Bureau.
Because I would affirm the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Bureau, I respectfully dissent.
. The requirement in the Montana cases is that the employee receive a benefit substantially comparable to or greater than the benefit available to the same employee under Workers’ Compensation Act also distinguishes Jaeger v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 198 Mont. 263, 645 P.2d 942 (1982), in which the Montana Court held that the employer’s payment of claimant’s full salary tolled the statute. It seems doubtful Montana would reach the same conclusion as the majority based on the record in this case.