(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
i
While I agree with the majority that no nonconforming use was established by defendants’ construction, I would also hold that defendants did not possess a nonconforming use because the citizens of the municipality, by filing a petition and reversing the zoning designation pursuant to MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12), precluded the establishment of the property expectations and good faith necessary to constitute a nonconforming use. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the statute by permitting developers to circumvent its requirements by quickly engaging in construction sufficient to establish a nonconforming use before a referendum pursuant to the act may be held.
ii
A
In Michigan, the nonconforming use doctrine *449permits a citizen to utilize property in contradiction of a zoning ordinance if the property was utilized for that purpose before the enactment of the ordinance. Dusdal v City of Warren, 387 Mich 354, 359-360; 196 NW2d 778 (1972). The citizens of Heath Township, through referendum, certainly possessed the right to reject the zoning ordinance in question, "but this right was subject to vested property interests . . . .” City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 396; 225 NW 500 (1929).1 This must be so because the revocation of a zoning " 'ordinance requiring immediate cessation of a nonconforming use may be held to be unconstitutional because it brings about a deprivation of property rights out of proportion to the public benefit obtained ....”’ Gackler Land Co, Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 427 Mich 562, 574; 398 NW2d 393 (1986), quoting Austin v Older, 283 Mich 667, 676; 278 NW 727 (1938).2
However, because the existence of nonconforming uses undermines the goals of zoning legislation —i.e., the uniform utilization of land to promote economic development, maintenance of property values, and high standards of living3 — the right is *450strictly construed.4 In fact, this Court has recognized that the aim of public policy is the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses. South Central Improvement Ass’n v St Clair Shores, 348 Mich 153, 158; 82 NW2d 453 (1957).5
Michigan has codified the doctrine of nonconforming uses in MCL 125.216(1); MSA 5.2961(16)(1), which mandates:
The lawful use of a building or structure and of land or a premise [sic] as existing and lawful at the time of enactment of a zoning ordinance, or in the case of an amendment of an ordinance, then at the time of the amendment, may be continued although that use does not conform with the provisions of the zoning ordinance or amendment.[6]
Not only are the zoning decisions of municipalities modified by the doctrine of nonconforming uses, MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) mandates a popular check upon those decisions:
Within 30 days following the passage of the zoning ordinance, a petition signed by a number of qualified and registered voters residing in the portion of the township outside the limits of cities and villages equal to not less than 8% of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor, at the last preceding general election at which a gover*451nor was elected, in the township may be filed with the township clerk requesting the submission of an ordinance or part of an ordinance to the electors residing in the portion of the township outside the limits of cities and villages for their approval. Upon the filing of the petition, an ordinance or part of an ordinance passed by the township board shall not be invalidated until it is rejected by a majority of the registered voters ....
Through the mechanism of the popular referendum, the Legislature has placed the resolution of zoning decisions in unincorporated municipal areas directly to the will of the people.7 The referendum, therefore, is " 'entitled to respect and should not be abridged by withdrawal from [its] processes of matter with which [it is] intended to deal.’ ” Stadle v Battle Creek Twp, 346 Mich 64, 69; 77 NW2d 329 (1956), quoting 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (rev 3d ed), § 16.48, p 241.
B
At issue in the instant case is the ancient contention between the protection of individuals’ property rights and society’s power to regulate property. More concisely, this case presents the interaction between individuals’ property rights as protected by the nonconforming use doctrine and the citizenry’s right to reverse unpopular zoning decisions. Although evoking monumental questions involving the fundamental basis of our government,*4528 the specific inquiry is very narrow: was a nonconforming use created either within the thirty-day petition period of MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12), or after the filing of a petition and before the referendum?
The purpose of the nonconforming use doctrine is to protect the property expectations of the prior user and to avoid imposition of hardship upon the owners of property. Penning v Owens, 340 Mich 355, 365; 65 NW2d 831 (1954). Hence, MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) should preclude such expectations because when a township rezones a parcel of property the owner is presumed to understand that a petition might be filed within thirty days that could lead to a referendum reversing the township’s decision. Even apart from this presumption, in the instant case the majority recognizes that "defendants understood as early as October 13, 1986, that a referendum was possible, if not likely. In fact, less than one month later, they knew that petitions were being circulated to initiate a referendum.” Ante at 441. Hence, defendants understood that the favorable zoning desig*453nation was subject to revocation, and any expectation that defendants possessed of maintaining the desired zoning was merely wishful thinking. No nonconforming use, therefore, could be established because defendants were continuously aware of the possibility of a quick revision in zoning because of the filing of the petition and the impending referendum. Cf. Harding v Bd of Zoning Appeals, 159 W Va 73, 87; 219 SE2d 324 (1975); State ex rel Re-Lu, Inc v City of Kenner, 284 So 2d 866, 868 (La App, 1973).9
*454Similarly, defendants did not possess a nonconforming use because they lacked the good faith necessary for such a finding. "It is only to avoid injustice that zoning ordinances generally except existing nonconforming uses.” 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (rev 3d ed), § 25.183, p 22 (citations omitted). Hence, "[rjeliance upon official conduct will not establish a right to nonconforming use unless the landowner relies [upon that conduct] in good faith.” 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, 3d, § 6.13, p 478 (citations omitted). A finding of good faith, however, is seriously undermined if a landowner is on notice "of a proposed change in the zoning ordinance . . . .” Id. at 480. Indeed, "[t]he requisite good faith is lacking if a landowner proceeds with improvements which will be proscribed by the adoption of an ordinance which he knows or should know is pending.” Id. (citations omitted). In fact, if developers begin or continue construction after they have notice that zoning changes have been proposed, they merely undertake a " 'calculated risk’ in proceeding with their construction and [are] not relying in good faith on the absence or non-adoption of the ordinance.” Biggs v Town of Sandwich, 124 NH 421, 427; 470 A2d 928 (1984).10 In the instant case, *455defendants were well aware that their newly won zoning designation was at risk of quick revocation. Hence, defendants lacked the prerequisite good faith, and no nonconforming use may be recognized. Biggs, supra at 426-427; Kenner, supra at 868.11
Furthermore, the majority eviscerates the statute by encouraging developers to engage in quick construction before a referendum can occur. The majority concludes that "construction between October 13, 1986, and February 2, 1987, the date the referendum invalidated the R-3 zoning, is germane to the current inquiry.” Ante at 441-442. This analysis clearly circumvents the statute by potentially finding that a prior nonconforming use was created during the period either before the expiration of the thirty-day petition filing period or after the filing of petition but before the holding of a referendum. The statute, therefore, becomes moot if a developer is clever enough to quickly undertake sufficient construction to meet the general nonconforming use doctrine. Contrary to its assertion, the majority opinion will almost certainly "encourage a frantic race toward an arbitrary percentage of completion” by developers to the denigration of the democratic process. Ante at 448, n 17. Indeed, if in the instant case defendants had simply completed more construction in a *456shorter time, the majority would have found a nonconforming use; such a result circumvents the intent of the Legislature. Hence, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that "[t]he zoning restriction’s enactment date is the critical point in determining when a nonconforming use vests,”12 ante at 441, and would hold instead that no nonconforming use could vest until after the thirty-day petition period had expired (if no petition was filed) or after a referendum (if a petition was filed).13
Such a holding could have the unfortunate effect of delaying development or improvements upon newly zoned properties. Developers often would wait thirty days before beginning construction, and those awaiting a referendum would be required to postpone construction even further.14 The *457wisdom of this policy, of course, is not for this honorable Court to debate, but for the Legislature.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J.See also Dusdal, supra at 359-360.
See also 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (rev 3d ed, 1992 Cum Supp), § 25.180, p 2 (citations omitted).
Uses of land which do not conform to the comprehensive zoning ordinances of the community have been a source of concern to legislators and planners since the first such ordinance was enacted by the city of New York. These nonconforming uses limit the effectiveness of land-use controls and share responsibility for the blight which has infected some urban areas. Municipal attorneys, urban planners, and law review commentators agree that nonconforming uses imperil the success of the community plan and injure property values. [1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, 3d, § 6.02, p 450. Citations omitted.]
The Supreme Court of Maine enunciated a widely shared view when it said: ["]Nonconforming uses are a thorn' in the side of proper zoning and should not be perpetuated any longer than necessary. The policy of zoning is to abolish nonconforming uses as speedily as justice will permit.” [Anderson, n 3 supra, § 6.07, pp 465-466, quoting Windham v Sprague, 219 A2d 548, 552-553 (Me, 1966).]
The consensus of jurisdictions concur. See 8A McQuillin, n 2 supra, § 25.183, p 22; Anderson, n 3 supra, § 6.07, pp 464-465.
See also MCL 125.583a; MSA 5.2933(1).
Stadle v Battle Creek Twp, 346 Mich 64, 69; 77 NW2d 329 (1956), quoting 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (rev 3d ed), § 16.48, p 241 (" '[t]he initiative and referendum are recognized as instruments of democratic government, widely used and of great value’ ”); Lanphear v Antwerp Twp, 50 Mich App 641, 645; 214 NW2d 66 (1973) (the statute "provides the inhabitants of unincorporated areas the final say whether to accept or reject a proposed zoning ordinance for unincorporated township lands”).
Although a case of first impression, the basic issue faced by this Court is simply another version of the historical struggle between individual liberty and democratic rule in America. Indeed, this dilemma was expressly recognized at the time of our Founding Fathers. The protection of individual property rights was one of the major forces undergirding the adoption of the federal constitution. Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No 1, Kramnick, ed (England: Penguin Books, 1987 [originally published in 1788]) at 90 (noting that the constitution was motivated, in part, to protect the rights of property). Yet, the establishment of a republican form of government, guided by the will of the majority, was also paramount in the drafting of. our fundamental law. Madison, The Federalist Papers, Nos 39-40, supra at 254-265 (noting that the constitution was founded on republican principles). James Madison recognized the fundamental issue: "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of . . . faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.” Id., No 10 at 125. Fortunately, the struggle in the instant case is resolved by the inherent limitations of the nonconforming use doctrine.
In Harding, supra at 87, the court held that developers were not deprived of a vested right by the revocation of a building permit following an appeal, even though they had begun construction in reliance on the issued permit:
The appellants knew or should have known that anyone aggrieved by a decision by the Board of Zoning Appeals could appeal by writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court. The appellants were well aware of the appeal taken and yet chose to go forward with the construction to convert their two-apartment building into four apartments. . . . Appellants proceeded at their own peril in incurring expenditures in reliance on the challenged permit.
In the instant case, of course, defendants did not act during an administrative appeal; however, they did act while on notice that MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) could quickly be utilized to reverse the township’s zoning designation. In essence, the statute permits the citizens of a township to appeal their officials’ zoning decisions; hence, the reasoning of Harding is dispositive.
Likewise, in Kenner the court rejected a developer’s attempt to apply equitable estoppel to prohibit a municipality from enforcing a newly enacted zoning ordinance. The developer claimed that he had relied upon an official’s assurance, before the ordinance was enacted, that it would not affect his zoning designation. The court found his reliance unjustified:
[H]e was aware that a new ordinance had been proposed and was under consideration .... He knew, or certainly reasonably should have known, that the new ordinance might or might not be adopted as proposed and that it was quite possible it would be adopted after changes which could include deletion of the provision [preserving the favored zoning designation]. [Id. at 868.]
Similarly, defendants knew or should have known that a referen*454dum was possible that could have led to a reversion of the zoning designation to its prior status; therefore, any expectation of maintaining the preferred zoning designation was unjustified.
Moreover, generally "a zoning ordinance remains suspended after a petition for a referendum is duly filed until decision by the electorate on the issue.” 8A McQuillin, supra, § 25.246, p 249 (citations omitted). See also Jackson v Denver Producing & Refining Co, 96 F2d 457, 460 (CA 10, 1938); 101A CJS, Zoning and Land Planning, § 92, p 347, citing, inter alia, W B Gibson Co v Warren Metropolitan Housing Authority, 65 Ohio App 84; 29 NE2d 236 (1940); 1 Anderson, supra, § 4.25, p 282. Accordingly, if the referendum suspended the new zoning ordinance, not only was any construction by defendants after the filing of the petition invalid, any expectation of utilizing the favorable zoning was inappropriate. MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12), however, mandates that an ordinance "shall not be invalidated until *455it is rejected by a majority of the registered voters . . . .” Whether this clause nullifies the general rule is open to question, but need not be resolved for the proper disposition of the instant controversy.
Nor does this analysis violate the due process rights of defendants. "[Wjhere the classification of a zoning measure is held to be a legislative act, it may be subject to enactment by initiative or approval by referendum and such action does not violate the property owner’s due process rights.” 8A McQuillin, supra, §25.246, pp 248-249, citing, inter alia, Eastlake v Forest City Enterprises, Inc, 426 US 668; 96 S Ct 2358; 49 L Ed 2d 132 (1976). "In such a case, the property owner still retains the right to seek administrative review and to seek judicial relief to declare the ordinance invalid.” Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
The authorities cited for this proposition, Dingeman Advertising, Inc v Algoma Twp, 393 Mich 89; 223 NW2d 689 (1974), and Dawley, supra at 396-397, do not involve the application of MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12).
By its very nature this analysis is very narrow and applies only to the specific interplay between MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) and MCL 125.216(1); MSA 5.2961(16)(1). Unlike nearly every other nonconforming use situation, defendants in the instant case at no time possessed reasonable expectations that the preferred zoning ordinance was not subject to change in the immediate future. If defendants utilized land in accordance with a then-existing zoning designation, which was not subject to MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12), and the zoning designation was subsequently altered, then any prior nonconforming use would most likely be vested because defendants would have possessed a reasonable expectation that the use would continue. For example, an industrial manufacturer operating a plant in conformity with the then-existing zoning designation that was not subject to MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) would have a vested nonconforming use if the city then altered the zoning designation to residential. On the other hand, if a developer began to construct a subdivision on the property, and voters filed a petition pursuant to MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12), and subsequently rejected the rezoning, the developer would not have established a prior nonconforming use because the property expectations and good faith necessary for the valid application of the doctrine would be nonextant.
Assuming MCL 125.282; MSA 5.2963(12) does not suspend a new zoning designation, developers could proceed with improvements or construction pursuant to the new designation, but such work would be at their risk.