I concur in the reasoning and result of the majority’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that the starting point of analysis in special assessment tax challenges is that there is a presumption that the assessment is reasonably proportionate to the benefits received and is, therefore, valid. Plaintiff subsequently bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. Auditor General v Maier, 95 Mich 127, 131; 54 NW 640 (1893); Crampton v Royal Oak, 362 Mich 503, 514; 108 NW2d 16 (1961). Where there has been no showing of fraud, mistake, discrimination, or a clear absence of benefits claimed, courts should hesitate to interfere with a legislative determination of the existence or value of the benefit. Such decisions are best made by the legislative bodies charged with levying those assessments. Frischkorn Investment Co v Detroit, 257 Mich 546, 552-553; 241 NW 903 (1932).
The opinions issued today do not reach the issue whether Dixon Rd Group v Novi, 426 Mich 390; 395 NW2d 211 (1986), should be applied retroactively because this case involves a finding of special benefits as enunciated by the Court of Appeals panel in Soncoff v Inkster, 22 Mich App 358, 361; 177 NW2d 243 (1970), and clarified by this Court in Dixon Rd, that the increase in the value of the land was sufficient to justify the special assessment. However, we would be presented with a different situation altogether if the presumption of validity for a spécial assessment rested solely on a special benefit arising either from (1) the relief from some burden to the land, or (2) the creation *509of a special adaptability of the land, Soncoff at 361. In that instance, we would be confronted with the question whether Dixon Rd announced a new rule for determining the validity of special assessments utilizing those approaches and, if so, whether it should be applied retroactively or prospectively.
In all other respects, I concur with the majority.