(dissenting).
When Shawn Schuster was repeatedly denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and compelled to make incriminating statements against himself, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, antagonists Nulle and Evans were not performing new methods of crime solving or protecting the public during their quest to investigate a rape claim. Rather, their actions were the type of old-fashioned police work that Miranda and Edwards sought to prevent. These experienced law enforcement officials knew better. Every bit of evidence used to incriminate Schuster was obtained in violation of his Constitutional rights. Due to this degradation of rights, I dissent.
“No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Thus, the salient evidence extracted from Schuster was, by all means, tantamount to a compelled confession.
In a prime example of why the exclusionary rule exists, during a two- to four-hour interrogation, Officer Nulle ignored Schus-ter’s request for an attorney on at least 12 occasions. His blatant disregard for Schuster’s Constitutional rights was clearly evident when he testified.
Q: [Attorney]: In any event, it was clear in your mind that he wanted an attorney ... ?
A: [Nulle]: Yes, it was.
Q: And you wouldn’t let him have one. You wouldn’t let him make that phone call.
A: Nope.
Nulle further coerced incriminating statements through violence and intimidation as especially exemplified when he forcibly threw Schuster down into a chair. If the police initiate interrogation without the presence of counsel and without a valid waiver by the accused, the accused’s statements are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-476, 86 S.Ct. at 1628-29; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1980). When Schuster invoked his right to an attorney, all interrogation was supposed to cease until counsel was present. Id. The trial court was most proper in refusing to admit the unconstitutionally obtained statements.
Following Nulle’s interrogation, Deputy Sheriff Evans took custody of Schuster for purposes of obtaining hair and clothing samples. Schuster maintains that he repeated his demands for an attorney but was again denied. At trial, Evans admitted telling Schuster that if he did not consent, the police would obtain a court order anyway; whereupon, Schuster “consented” to the hair and clothing samples. During the interrogation that ensued, he admitted to attempting vaginal intercourse, could not recall if he had penetrated the girl with his fingers, and stated that D.T. had pulled down his pants and performed oral sex on him. Without the aid of counsel, Schuster was compelled to admit to sexual penetration, a key element in the crime of rape. In these circumstances, the fact that he made such statements is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. Under the auspices of Miranda, his admissions to the actions essentially amount to a confession to part of the offense.
Although Evans could not recall if Schus-ter had requested an attorney, his recollection is irrelevant. First, Nulle’s actions had already created a coercive atmosphere and any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel must constitute a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of that right. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85; Cody at 444. As no such proof of valid waiver has been shown by State, Schuster’s incriminating statements are inadmissible. Second, this Edwards rule continues to apply for each subsequent law enforcement officer who continues the questioning, Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), and serves to prevent police from badgering a suspect into waiving his previously *573asserted rights. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). Constitutional violations do not dissipate as they are passed down the line.
The tendered majority opinion, while recognizing the violative nature of Evans actions, sweeps such a glaring Constitutional violation under the proverbial rug of harmless error. Certainly, a Constitutional error can be harmless if it had no likelihood of changing the result, however, such a determination must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 819 (S.D.1987). To ensure that its dictates concerning the rights of the accused were followed, the United States Supreme Court declared that statements taken in violation of the principles established by Miranda and Edwards may not be used as substantive evidence against the defendant at trial.
However, the Supreme Court has found on one occasion that the use of statements obtained in violation of an accused’s constitutional rights could be declared “harmless.” In Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972), after the defendant had been indicted and had obtained counsel, a police officer posed as a fellow prisoner confined to the same cell. In the subsequent trial, the officer testified to incriminating statements made by the defendant while in jail. Milton asserted that his statements to the officer were obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
“Assuming, arguendo, that the challenged testimony should have been excluded” the Supreme Court began, “the record clearly reveals that any error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Milton, 407 U.S. at 372, 92 S.Ct. at 2175. In addition to the undercover officer’s testimony, the Milton jury was presented with overwhelming evidence of Milton’s guilt in the form of three full confessions made prior to indictment — sufficient in the Supreme Court’s view to proclaim the incriminating statements as harmless error.
Only two years ago, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), citing Milton for the proposition that a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment may be admitted if found to be harmless error, held that the same analysis applies to coerced confessions. While in prison for one crime, Fulminante, who was abused by other prisoners, confessed another crime to a fellow inmate in exchange for protection. The fellow inmate, a paid FBI informant, passed the information to the authorities who subsequently indicted Fulminante for the crime. However, the Court found that absent the unconstitutional confession, the physical evidence would have been insufficient, and the jury was less likely to believe the testimony of an alleged second confession. 499 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1258-59.
Instanter, according to the admissible testimony, D.T. was with Schuster at the dam on the night of the alleged rape. (“Alleged” because the rape kit was never introduced into evidence.) D.T. was later found half-naked, upset, and stated that she had been raped by Schuster. Two medical experts testified that she exhibited signs of post-traumatic stress syndrome. That was the extent of the medical testimony. At the end of the State’s case, Schus-ter’s motion for acquittal was denied. Where is the “overwhelming evidence” as in Milton? What evidence establishes guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt”? Where is the “plethora of forceful evidence” or the “sufficient evidence to sustain” the verdict as proclaimed by the majority opinion?
Without Schuster’s inadmissible statements, no such support for the verdict existed in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. In fact, as the rape kit was not admitted (nor was any forensic evidence), no actual proof of any sexual contact exists. No, the only medical evidence presented came from two psychologists and a psychiatrist. At least in State v. Forcier, 420 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.1988), relied on by the majority *574writing, physical medical evidence linked the defendant to that crime. Here, there was no physical medical evidence connecting Schuster with a rape. Fulminante contained substantially more incriminating evidence than here, yet was deemed reversible error.
In Fulminante, Justice White’s analysis noted that the admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1257. Certainly, Schuster’s inadmissible statements had “a profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.” Id.
Despite the majority’s claim of sufficient evidence, Schuster’s statements were the product of constitutionally impermissible methods of inducement. We do not decide the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, that is for the jury to decide in a new trial free of constitutional infirmity, which this Court is at liberty to order. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). Reasonable doubt? Absolutely. Here, no jury could find Schuster guilty because the State never introduced any Constitutional evidence whatsoever connecting him to a crime.
State has admitted there was Constitutional error and with that I agree. However, I strongly disagree that such atrocities constitute harmless error.