(dissenting). I would affirm.
It is true that the prosecutor argued that the photograph depicting a weight scale was evidence of the possible motive for the extreme force and violence visited on the victim. The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant was angry because the victim refused to take him to a place where he could buy drugs. Because the victim refused defendant’s request, defendant had a motive to assault him. Such a motive for these criminal acts was more believable than the defendant’s theory that Mitchell merely refused to drive him to a place where he could cash his check. Defendant did in fact cash his check long before the altercation.
MRE 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crime, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the crime charged.
*702See People v Cramer, 97 Mich App 148, 155; 293 NW2d 744 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 862 (1981); People v Fisher, 77 Mich App 6, 11; 257 NW2d 250 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 811 (1977).
In essence, to admit evidence under the so-called "similar acts” doctrine it is necessary that the evidence of the defendant’s other bad acts be substantial, relevant, and not unduly prejudicial to a matter which is material and in controversy in the case. [Cramer, supra, p 156.]
Here, the photograph of the scale was repetitive of testimony that the photograph depicted a weight scale found in a bedroom. However, it appears that the photograph showed the jury the exact type of scale, information which was not given by the witness. The implication that the scale was used in drug use or apportioning was probative of defendant’s motive. For that reason I find no error in admitting the photograph of the scale under MRE 404(b).
I also find the majority’s analysis of the trial judge’s decision not to allow a late arriving witness to testify in error. Counsel had already agreed that a character evidence jury instruction was not warranted under the testimony of defendant’s character witness who had testified, and there is no reason to presume that the late-arriving witness would have done better or that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to reopen the proofs.
Finally, I find no error in the judge’s attempt to inject some levity during the voir dire of Robert Mitchell, a criminal defense attorney who was presumably well known to all court personnel including defense counsel and which drew no ob*703jection from opposing counsel. We have sanctioned the seating of judges and lawyers as jurors and I find no abuse of discretion as to the trial judge’s decision on this juror’s impartiality. The jury was not tainted by the trial judge’s questions and comments to Mr. Mitchell. Defendant was not denied a fair trial by impartial jury.
I would affirm.