(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s holding that osha preempts this criminal prosecution under state law. The federal osha has no language in it that expressly or impliedly preempts state criminal law. Section 667 of osha provides in part:
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title.
(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any occúpational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated under section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement.
*70In the absence of express language, preemption may occur where there is a conflict between federal and state regulations making compliance with both an impossibility. Where there is no such conflict, four factors are used to determine whether preemptive intent is implied. Those factors are: (1) the statute and its legislative history; (2) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme as authorized and directed by the statute and as executed by the federal administrative agency; (3) the nature of the subject matter regulated and the extent uniformity of regulation is required; and (4) whether, in a particular case, the state law represents an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress’ objectives in enacting the federal law. Marshall v Consumers Power Co, 65 Mich App 237; 237 NW2d 266 (1975), lv den 397 Mich 822 (1976), citing Northern States Power Co v Minnesota, 447 F2d 1143, 1146-1147 (CA 8, 1971), aff'd by memorandum decision 405 US 1035; 92 S Ct 1307; 31 L Ed 2d 576 (1972).
The present prosecution does not involve a conflict between federal and state regulations where compliance with both would be an impossibility. Moreover, none of the factors indicate an implied intent by Congress to preempt state criminal law. The federal osha is regulatory rather than punitive. Beall Construction Co v Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm, 507 F2d 1041 (CA 8, 1974). In addition, the federal regulatory scheme is not as pervasive as the majority characterizes it. For example, it has been held that state law requiring disclosure of information about hazardous substances in the workplace is not entirely preempted by the federal osha. See New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v Hughey, 774 F2d 587 (CA 3, 1985); Manufacturers Ass’n of Tri-County v Knepper, 801 F2d 130 (CA 3, 1986), cert *71den — US —; 108 S Ct 66; 98 L Ed 2d 30 (1987). Moreover, states have traditionally been permitted considerable latitude to regulate public health and safety pursuant to their police power. Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Massachusetts, 471 US 724, 756-757; 105 S Ct 2380; 85 L Ed 2d 728 (1985).
The uniformity of regulation factor also indicates that preemption was not intended in the present case. Congress’ motivation in passing osha was not to achieve consistency of regulation in all states, but, rather, to achieve worker safety in all states. Thus, státes may exceed federal standards by enacting stricter regulations or imposing stricter enforcement. See 29 USC 667(c). The present prosecution would utilize federally approved state standards as evidence of criminal negligence. The fact that the state criminal penalty would be harsher than the federal or state regulatory penalties does not interfere with uniformity of regulation or represent an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ objectives.
I also do not believe that the Michigan Legislature submitted miosha for federal approval with the intent that it would preclude criminal prosecutions for offenses committed in the workplace. The most severe penalty under miosha for a first violation that results in the death of an employee is a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. A second violation resulting in the death of an employee subjects the violator to a $20,000 fine or three years in prison, or both. MCL 408.1035(5); MSA 17.50(35)(5). In contrast, the penalty for a first-time offender convicted of manslaughter is a maximum of fifteen years in prison or a fine of $7,500, or both. MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553. The maximum sentence may be increased one and one-half times for a second offender. MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. Had the Michigan Legisla*72ture wanted to abrogate manslaughter prosecutions with its state occupational safety and health plan, it would have provided for a greater maximum penalty than one year in prison for a first offender. It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to punish manslaughter that occurs in the workplace with one year in prison while punishing manslaughter occurring outside the workplace with a maximum of fifteen years in prison.
I would hold that the federal osha does not preempt the prosecution and I would reach the issue of whether the magistrate abused his discretion in binding over defendant on the charge of involuntary manslaughter.