(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the policy’s “other owned vehicle” exclusion does not bar recovery of uninsured motorist coverage under the circumstances of the present case. I conclude that the policy is unambiguous and that a motorcycle is included within the meaning of the term “motor vehicle” as that term is used throughout the policy. The majority has read ambiguity into the policy by improperly relying on the policy’s definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” to define the term “motor vehicle.” In doing so, the majority has overstepped its duty to inteipret the policy under its ordinary and plain meaning. Bianchi v Automobile Club of Michigan, 437 Mich 65, 71, n 1; 467 NW2d 17 (1991); Royce v Citizens Ins Co, 219 Mich App 537, 542; 557 NW2d 144 (1996). The express exclusion of motorcycles from the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” is not dispositive or relevant to the meaning of the term “motor vehicle.” Nothing within the definition of the term “uninsured motor vehicle” supports the conclusion that it was also intended to define the meaning of “motor vehicle” as that term is used throughout the policy. I would, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and grant summary disposition for defendant.
The “other owned vehicle” exclusion directly at issue in this case states:
*321A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorist Coverage for “bodily ii\jury” sustained by any insured:
1. While “occupying,” or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any “family member” which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle.
This policy language unambiguously excludes coverage in the present case. At the time of the collision with the uninsured motorist, plaintiff was driving a motorcycle that he owned that was not insured under the policy issued by defendant. The dispositive issue in this case is whether a motorcycle is a “motor vehicle.” The term “motor vehicle” is not defined in the policy. In the absence of a specific policy definition, the terms of an insurance policy are given their commonly used meanings, in context. Henderson v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 460 Mich 348, 354; 596 NW2d 190 (1999); Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Nikkel, 460 Mich 558, 568; 596 NW2d 915 (1999). Our Supreme Court has stated, “[a] motorcycle is a motor vehicle in both the common sense and the dictionary sense of the term, it is operated on land, and it is required to be registered.” Bianchi, supra at 71, citing MCL 257.216; MSA 9.1916.1 “Motorcycle” is commonly defined as, “a motor vehicle resembling a bicycle but larger and heavier . . . .” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997) (emphasis added). The conclusion that a motorcycle is a “motor vehicle” under the policy is further supported by the policy’s *322general definition of the term “occupying.” That term is defined as, “in, upon, or while getting into or getting out of.” The fact that the policy envisioned that an individual may be “occupying” a motor vehicle by sitting “upon” it strongly suggests that a motorcycle is to be construed as a “motor vehicle.”
The majority contends that the exclusion of motorcycles from the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle,” without indication regarding whether a motorcycle is to be considered a “motor vehicle,” causes ambiguity that must be strictly construed against defendant. However, the limits placed on the meaning of “uninsured motor vehicle” within the policy do not have any bearing on the determination of the meaning of “motor vehicle” as that term is used in the policy. No Michigan case interpreting insurance contracts has held that it is permissible or appropriate to parse the words of a specifically defined phrase and use the policy definition of the phrase to provide meaning to the parsed words.2 A court “may not read ambiguity into a policy where none exists.” Farm Bureau, supra at 568, citing Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co v Bronson Plating Co, 445 Mich 558, 567; 519 NW2d 864 (1994). In my opinion, even strictly construing the “other owned vehicle” exclusionary language against defendant, Fire Ins Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 687; 545 NW2d 602 (1996), the policy fairly admits of only one interpretation, under which *323plaintiff is barred from recovering uninsured motorist benefits, see Bianchi, supra at 70.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I recognize Bianchi’s holding, that the other owned vehicle exclusion within the automobile insurance policy at issue applied to preclude the plaintiff’s recovery of uninsured motorist benefits, was limited to the specific policy language at issue in that case, Bianchi, supra at 73, and I do not rely on Bianchi as wholly dispositive of the present issue on appeal.
Plaintiff concedes that the policy’s exclusion of motorcycles from its definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” was intended to limit the coverage provided by the broad-based uninsured motorist coverage, depending on the type of uninsured motor vehicle involved in the collision. Clearly, had the uninsured motorist been operating a motorcycle, plaintiff would have been precluded recovery of uninsured motorist benefits.