Leave was granted in this case to appeal an order of the Court of Appeals. The order affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Ingham county circuit court. We affirm.
The litigation is in the nature of a suit for declaratory judgment against some 13 defendants. The plaintiff-appellant is the commissioner of the corporation and securities commission. Thirteen corporations were named as defendants. Decision in this case is limited to Detroit Edison Company, appellee herein.
Appellee’s legal posture is distinguishable from the other named defendants in that it is a public utility and thus subject to accounting procedures prescribed by the Michigan public service commission. It is further distinguishable by reason of prior litigation which reached this Court and was decided by a 3-2 vote, 3 Justices not participating.
The subject matter of this suit is the annual franchise fee of appellee corporation for the years 1957, and 1959 through 1966, both inclusive. The franchise fee for 1958 was the vehicle for the determination of appellee’s legal rights in the prior action. The question here presented is the extent to which the decision of this Court in Detroit Edison Com*535pany v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 367 Mich 104, renders the issues in the suit against 13 corporations instituted February 10, 1964, res judicata as to this defendant-appellee.
It is of little worth to bench and bar to recite again a long and detailed factual background. In simple substance, the issue is whether amounts designated “reserve for deferred Federal income taxes” can be included in this corporation’s “surplus” for the computation of its annual franchise fee. The fee is computed by multiplying the corporation’s paid-up capital and surplus by the statutory2 millage rate (at the time involved in the prior case, 4 mills).
Originally, appellee included the reserve item above mentioned in its surplus. The Michigan public service commission by an order which is set out in the Court of Appeals opinion,3 provided in part:
“ ‘The current Federal income tax reductions of the Detroit Edison Company resulting from such special amortization are subject to liability for the larger future Federal income taxes * * * and are not available for addition to surplus.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Obediently, appellee omitted the item from its “surplus.” The corporation and securities commission, however, did not deem itself bound by this determination. It withheld the requisite authority of appellee to exercise its corporate rights and. privileges in this State, for failure to include the reserve in surplus.
The Ingham county circuit court in granting the summary judgment followed the holding in Detroit *536Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 367 Mich 104. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
We rest our decision in this case on the doctrine' of estoppel by judgment. We quote with approval the statement and supporting authority therefor in the reply brief of appellee:
“It is the prior adjudication (judgment) between the same parties on this same question which binds the parties.
“‘2 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed), § 708, pp 1494-1496, discusses this question as follows:
“ ‘ “Estoppel includes both law and fact. — The estoppel of a judgment is not confined to matters purely of fact or of mixed law and fact, but extends to a decision of the legal rights of the parties on a state of facts common to both suits, although the causes of action are different. ‘The claim that a mere conclusion of law announced by one court with reference to a matter before it is not binding in a subsequent suit between the same parties involving the same matter is plausible only under a superficial conception of the principle of res judicata. It is not the finding of facts which constitutes an adjudication, but it is the conclusion of the court as to the effect of those facts determined as matter of law. It is the determination of the issues presented which constitutes the adjudication. That determination may consist principally of findings of fact which lead to the result reached on rules of law which are not disputed as between the parties, or it may consist of conclusions as to disputed questions of law as 'applied to facts about which there is no controversy leading to the result announced. Every judgment necessarily involves the application of principles of law to the facts of the case. The dispute between the parties may he as to the facts, or as to the law, or as to both, but the judgment is conclusive as to the entire matter involved, that is, as to the case pre-¡ sented, and not simply as to the particular question *537ill regard to which the parties are in controversy.’ Where the causes of action are the same the judgment is conclusive as to every matter of law or fact involved in the claim whether urged or not.
“ ‘ “An adjudication in a proceeding appropriate for that purpose, such as a taxpayer’s suit, as to the validity of municipal bonds, is conclusive that the city has the legal right to incur a debt of the amount and for the purpose indicated, that the assent ,of the qualified voters has been obtained as required by law, and as to all other questions which the constitution and laws require to be determined before authority is conferred on a municipality to incur a debt. So a judgment against a municipal corporation and a writ of mandamus directing the levy of a tax to satisfy it conclusively determines that the levy is not in excess of the limits imposed by statute.” ’ ” (Citation and footnotes omitted.)
We would make abidingly clear that absent an express overruling of Detroit Edison Company v. Corporation & Securities Commission, supra, it is binding precedent as to issue decided therein, namely, the reserve for deferred Federal income taxes is not includible in this corporation’s surplus for the computation of its annual franchise fee. Nor should it be necessary for appellee to seek our writ of superintending control to enforce the holding. We have reviewed appellant’s plethora of authority and the rationale of his argument seeking to include appellee within the ambit of whatever decision may ultimately result in the cases of other named defendants in the instant suit and find it inapposite. As to any other party individually or the balance of the parties collectively, we express no opinion.
The order of the Court of Appeals affirming the order for summary judgment of the circuit court for Ingham county is affirmed.
*538Under the circumstances of this case, appellee is authorized to tax the costs of all courts.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, T. M. Kavanagh, Souris, Adams, and Brennan, JJ., concurred with O’Hara, J.PA 1921, No 85, § 4, as amended by PA 1954, No 144 (CLS 1956, § 450.304 [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp .§ 21.205]). Currently PA 1963, No 63, § 4 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 21.205).
4 Mich App 65, 67.