¶ 52. (concurring). I agree with the majority that under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a), Steve Stone's oral statements to Chief Stone are admissible because they are not hearsay. I part ways with the majority, however, because it misapplies that rule of evidence by ignoring an essential part of the text. Rather, applying the plain words of the entire text, I conclude that the statements are admissible because Steve Stone testified at trial and the defendant chose to rest on a record that is insufficiently developed to show any subsequent unavailability.
¶ 53. I also write separately because the majority needlessly addresses the constitutional issue of whether Nelis had the opportunity to cross-examine Steve Stone for the purposes of Nelis' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Because there is no showing of unavailability, Crawford is not implicated in this case. Nevertheless, in the course of its unwarranted analysis, the majority takes an expansive view of when a defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine, thereby having the effect of narrowing the constitutional right to confrontation afforded under Crawford. This case can be, and should be, decided on the rules of evidence alone.
HH
¶ 54. Section 908.01(4) excludes several categories of statements from the definition of "hearsay." Among those exclusions are some prior statements by witnesses. The rule provides in relevant part:
908.01(4) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(a) Prior statement by witness. The declarant tes*437tifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is:
1. Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony ....
¶ 55. The majority maintains that Steve Stone's oral statements to Chief Stone are not hearsay under § 908.01(4)(a), for three reasons: (1) because Steve Stone "testified at trial concerning his statements to police on the night in question"; (2) "because he was subject to cross-examination"; and (3) "because the prior oral statements were inconsistent with his testimony at trial." Majority op., ¶ 33.
¶ 56. It is correct that Steve Stone testified about some of his statements to police and was subject to cross-examination. It is also true that Steve Stone's statements to Chief Stone were inconsistent with his trial testimony. However, the requirement under § 908.01(4) is not simply that the witness be "subject to cross-examination." Rather, it demands that the witness be "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" (emphasis added).
¶ 57. The fact that Steve Stone was subject to cross-examination about some statements he made to police does not automatically suffice to show that he was "subject to cross-examination concerning" his oral statements to Chief Stone. Here, Nelis did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him regarding his statements to Chief Stone. Nelis had no indication that Steve Stone had made oral statements to Chief Stone, and that the State would seek to introduce such statements at trial.
¶ 58. The majority maintains that Nelis was "on notice of the fact that there would be trial testimony about what Steve Stone saw and heard in regard to the *438alleged sexual assault incident." Majority op., ¶ 38. However, the question is whether Steve Stone was subject to cross-examination concerning his statements to Chief Stone. Knowing that there would be trial testimony regarding some of Steve Stone's statements does not provide notice of the particular oral statements to Chief Stone that are at issue here, and does not thereby create the opportunity for cross-examination on those statements.
¶ 59. It is important to note that the majority's conclusion that Steve Stone was subject to cross-examination concerning the statements is not based on Nelis having notice that the statements would be introduced. At oral argument, the State acknowledged that the notice argument was not of sufficient strength that it could not "hang its hat" on that argument. Apparently the majority agrees with the State and likewise does not ultimately "hang its hat" on any notice argument.
¶ 60. Instead, the majority bases its conclusion on the facts that (1) Steve Stone "testified at trial concerning his statements to police on the night in question"; (2) Steve Stone "was subject to cross-examination"; and (3) his "prior oral statements were inconsistent with his testimony at trial." Majority op., ¶ 33. Such an analysis totally ignores an essential part of the text of § 908.04(1) that the declarant must be subject to cross-examination "concerning the statement" to Chief Stone.
¶ 61. Being subject to cross-examination concerning just any statements to just any police officer does not comport with the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1). I conclude that when Steve Stone was on the witness stand, he was not subject to cross-examination concerning his statements to Chief Stone.
¶ 62. This conclusion is buttressed by an examination of the rules of evidence that address how a *439witness is to be examined concerning a prior statement under Wis. Stat. § 906.13(2)(a). That rule provides that a witness must be given the opportunity, while testifying, to explain or to deny the statement:
906.13 Prior statements of witnesses.
(2) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of a witnesses.
(a) Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless any of the following is applicable:
1. The witness was so examined while testifying as to give the witness an opportunity to explain or deny the statement.
2. The witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action.
3. The interests of justice otherwise require.
¶ 63. I am not alone in rejecting the analysis of the majority. Contemplating the fact situation before us, a leading treatise on Wisconsin evidence concludes that for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1), a witness is not subject to cross-examination "where the prior statement is never mentioned during the examination of the witness, the witness is then excused from testifying, and the statement is later proffered through extrinsic evidence (i.e., another witness or a document)." 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence 544 (2d ed. 2001). This conclusion by such sound authority further underscores why I cannot embrace the majority's analysis.
*440J-H 1-H
¶ 64. Nevertheless, I think that the majority is correct that Steve Stone's oral statements to Chief Stone are not hearsay, and that they are therefore admissible. I conclude that the statements are admissible because Steve Stone testified at trial and the defendant chose to rest on a record that is insufficiently developed to show any subsequent unavailability.
¶ 65. In addressing whether Steve Stone was subject to cross-examination concerning his statements to Chief Stone after Chief Stone's testimony, Nelis now simply asserts that Steve Stone was unavailable, and that Nelis had no prior opportunity to cross-examine him on those statements. Precluding the statements, however, requires more than the mere assertion that the declarant is unavailable, as Nelis does here.
¶ 66. At trial, the only objection raised by Nelis regarding unavailability was based on an assertion that Steve Stone was unavailable due to his lack of memory. Apparently he was unable to recall some of the details of his statements given to the police. Now, however, Nelis raises the argument that Steve Stone was unavailable due to his absence from the trial.
¶ 67. Wis. Stat. § 908.04 sets forth what the record must reflect in order to show "unavailability" for the purpose of admitting out-of-court statements into evidence. It provides in relevant part:
908.04. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable; definition of unavailability.
(1) "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(a) Is exempted by ruling of the judge on the *441ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the judge to do so; or
(c) Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(d) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(e) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means.
¶ 68. Typically, the party invoking the concept of unavailability will be the proponent of the evidence. This, however, is no typical case. Here the proponent of the statements did not assert unavailability because the prosecution did not believe the witness was unavailable. The statements were offered by the prosecution as prior inconsistent statements, a category that relies on availability. Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a).
¶ 69. Under the circumstances of this case, it appears illogical that the burden of developing the record on unavailability is on the party that asserts Stone was available. Rather, I conclude that it is the burden of the defense to make a specific enough objection to allow the record to be developed.
¶ 70. Here, there is an evidentiary vacuum. There is no indication in the record that Steve Stone was unavailable for further cross-examination after finishing his testimony, or that any efforts were made to recall him. The record is utterly silent as to where Steve *442Stone was after the circuit court told him that he could step down. We note that there is no indication that he was excused from testifying. We do not know if he remained in the courtroom, if he went home and stayed there such that he might have been readily recalled to the stand, or if he disappeared from the face of the earth, making him unavailable.
¶ 71. Likewise, there is no indication in the record that Nelis made any attempt to procure Steve Stone's attendance. Nelis makes no argument that Steve Stone is exempted by privilege, that he would refuse to testify on the subject matter of his statements to Chief Stone, or that he would testify as to lack of knowledge of the subject matter of his statements to Chief Stone. See Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1).
¶ 72. We are left with a record that on its face indicates availability. The contention that Steve Stone was not subject to cross-examination concerning his statements to Chief Stone after Chief Stone testified must rest upon the claim that Steve Stone was unavailable. Steve Stone was available prior to Chief Stone's testimony, and there is no indication in the record that Steve Stone became unavailable after Chief Stone's testimony or that Nelis attempted to procure Steve Stone for cross-examination. Thus, Nelis chose to rest on a record that is insufficiently developed to demonstrate any subsequent unavailability. I conclude that because Steve Stone testified at trial and that the record fails to demonstrate any subsequent unavailability, the statements are admissible under § 908.01(4) because they are not hearsay.
h — I HH HH
¶ 73. I would end the inquiry there. Since there is no showing of unavailability, Crawford is not impli*443cated. Crawford applies to the admission of statements from witnesses who are "absent from trial" and unavailable to testify. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. Even the majority acknowledges that the case is not really about Crawford. Majority op., ¶ 28.
¶ 74. Where a case is not really about a constitutional right, then we ought not make determinations about important aspects of that right. It is unwise for courts to unnecessarily address constitutional issues when the case can be disposed of on other grounds. ("Normally this court will not address a constitutional issue if the case can be disposed of on other grounds." State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶ 42, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637; see also State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶ 25 n.4, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811.)
¶ 75. The majority, though, does not end its inquiry. Instead, it engages in an analysis of Nelis' right to confrontation under Crawford. However, Crawford concerns very different circumstances. Moreover, the majority's discussion appears to needlessly narrow Crawford.
¶ 76. In Crawford, the state introduced a recorded statement made to police by the defendant's wife. 541 U.S. at 39-40. Because of the marital privilege, the defendant's wife was unavailable to testify at the trial. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court determined that the recorded statement was inadmissible. It held that in order for the state to introduce testimonial statements by persons who do not appear at trial, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation demands that the declarant he unavailable and that the defendant have had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 68. Thus, the issue in Crawford was whether the state could introduce a testimonial statement by a declarant who was unavailable and had not appeared at trial. In *444the present case, Steve Stone did appear at trial, and there is no indication in the record that he was unavailable after the court told him that he could "step down." This is therefore not a Crawford case.
¶ 77. Rather than simply noting that this is not a Crawford case, the majority concludes that for the purposes of Crawford, Nelis had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Steve Stone regarding his statements to Chief Stone. It cites to a footnote in Crawford stating that "when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his [or her] prior testimonial statements." Majority op., ¶ 43 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9). Although the majority recognizes that the meaning of "the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial," is unclear, it concludes that Steve Stone's appearance suffices. Id., ¶ 46.
¶ 78. This conclusion is unwarranted and unnecessary. As earlier noted, Nelis did not cross-examine Steve Stone regarding his statements to Chief Stone because Nelis had no notice that such oral statements would be introduced. More importantly, Crawford did not involve a witness who appeared at tried, and it did not contemplate a situation, such as the one here, in which a witness is cross-examined concerning some statements, and in which the State introduces other statements by the witness after the witness steps down. Crawford therefore leaves a gap with regard to cases like this one.1
*445¶ 79. Because the majority takes an expansive view of when a defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine a declarant under Crawford, it has the effect of answering questions that are not before us, thereby narrowing Crawford. Specifically, the majority's view would allow the State to introduce Steve Stone's statements to Chief Stone, even if Nelis could demonstrate that Steve Stone was subsequently unavailable,2 and even where Nelis had no indication that the State would seek to introduce Steve Stone's statements to Chief Stone. I am not certain that admitting the statements under such circumstances would be consistent with Nelis' right to confrontation under Crawford.3 Because that is not the case before us, I would not reach the question.
¶ 80. In sum, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that because Steve Stone was cross-examined, it follows that he was cross-examined concerning his statements to Chief Stone. Rather, I conclude that the statements are admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.04(1) because Steve Stone testified at trial and Nelis chose to rest on a record that is insufficiently developed to show any subsequent unavailability. Further, I determine that because Crawford is not implicated here, the *446majority undertakes an unwarranted constitutional analysis that has the effect of narrowing the constitutional right to confrontation afforded under Crawford. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
¶ 81. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.
The majority notes that "a witness is ordinarily regarded as subject to cross-examination when he [or she] is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions." Majority op., ¶ 43 (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)). It fails to acknowledge, however, that this case may not be "ordinary."
The majority indicates that whether "Steve Stove was unavailable for further cross-examination after his earlier testimony at trial" is "not necessary to our holding." Majority op., ¶ 47. As noted in the text, whether Steve Stone became unavailable after his initial testimony may well impact the proper outcome of the case.
At oral argument, the State conceded that the court of appeals' analysis — the very analysis now embraced by the majority — is inadequate for confrontation purposes. See State v. Nelis, No. 2005AP1920-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶ 27 (Wis. Ct. App. May 4, 2006).