(concurring). I concur with the majority opinion's conclusion that the terms of Dinges's employment contract did not encompass either the safety rules and curriculum developed by the shop instructor under the supervision of the principal, or any of the provisions of the faculty handbook. Because the safety rules were not part of Dinges's employment contract, the failure to implement them could not constitute a breach of that contract, as a matter of law. Therefore, I also concur in the result reached by the majority, that Schilling's contract claim must be dismissed.
However, the conclusion that Dinges's contract did not include the safety provisions upon which the plaintiffs rely is dispositive of the appeal. Therefore, I do not join that part of the majority's opinion which concludes that Schilling was not a third party beneficiary to a provision which we have already determined was not in the contract. See State ex rel. Schultz v. Bruendl, 168 Wis. 2d 101, 112, 483 N.W.2d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 1992) (statements which extend beyond the facts of the case or which are broader than necessary to determine the issue before the court are dicta) and Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 *897N.W.2d 559, 562 (Ct. App. 1983) (appellate court need only address dispositive issues).
Furthermore, even if the safety provisions had been included in Dinges's employment contract, I am not fully persuaded that the cpnclusion that they would act to limit the exposure of the school district precludes the conclusion that they might also have been primarily intended to insure the safety of students. I do not address this issue further today because this is not the case in which to decide such a broad question of public importance.