(dissenting).
Even if the majority is correct in their position that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the transcripts of the prior judgments,* the admission of the *494transcripts should not result in a directed verdict on liability.
Even if the prior decisions were admitted into evidence, they are only an additional fact for the jury to consider and should not form the basis for a directed verdict by this court. Whether damages, if any, were caused by Attorney Tobin’s actions, if any, or by the conduct of plaintiff Weiszhaar himself are proper questions for the jury. It is clearly error on the part of this court to direct a verdict for plaintiff Weiszhaar and I dissent.
“[W]hen faced with a motion for directed verdict, we must accept as true the evidence presented by the nonmoving party and indulge all legitimate inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is brought.” Savold v. Johnson, 443 N.W.2d 656, 658-59 (S.D.1989); Kreager v. Blomstrom Oil Company, 379 N.W.2d 307 (S.D.1985); Budahl v. Gordon & David Associates, 323 N.W.2d 853 (S.D.1982); Myers v. Quenzer, 79 S.D. 248, 110 N.W.2d 840 (1961). “We must determine if there is any substantial evidence to sustain the cause of action. If such evidence exists as would allow reasonable minds to differ, the case must go to the jury.” Haggar v. Olfert, 387 N.W.2d 45, 49 (S.D.1986); Sabag v. Continental South Dakota, 374 N.W.2d 349, 354-55 (S.D.1985); Lytle v. Morgan, 270 N.W.2d 359, 361 (S.D.1978). Tobin presented evidence that the sanctions award of $50,-777.59 was compensatory and not punitive. He presented evidence that the award was to cover the expenses of the foreclosure sale of the cattle, except for $2,600 in legal fees for the improper filing of the Chapter 12 petition. This should also prevent a directed verdict.
The verdict shows that the jury believed Weiszhaar was responsible for the costs. Weiszhaar requested that the Bank wait to sell the livestock for his own income tax purposes. The Bank did wait to sell most of the cattle until the beginning of the next year, to Weiszhaar’s benefit. Tobin presented evidence that most of the costs were for the care of the cattle during this waiting period. Therefore, Tobin presented sufficient evidence which clearly precludes this court from directing a verdict in favor of Weiszhaar on the issue of indemnity on the sanctions award.
The jury’s verdict should be affirmed or the case should be remanded for retrial, but this Court should not direet the verdict.
AMUNDSON, J., joins this dissent.
The admissibility of prior civil judgments in subsequent civil cases is questionable. Although "there are numerous situations in which it seems unreasonable and impractical to ignore the evidential use of a judgment in another proceeding involving the same fact as in the present case,” 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1671a (Chadboum rev. 1974) other authorities state that a jury would be unduly prejudiced by admitting into evidence prior civil judgments when res judicata or collateral estoppel do not apply. 2.C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, § 298 (John W. Strong ed.) (4th ed. 1992); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Medical Inc., 382 N.W.2d 201, 208-09 (Minn.App.1986) (holding that prior civil judgments are inadmissible because the jury would give undue weight to findings issued by a judge).
Here, the trial court ruled that the bankruptcy decisions would be allowed only on the issue of damages. Otherwise, the transcripts of the decisions were not admitted. We should not disturb the trial court's evidentiary ruling, absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Grooms, 399 N.W.2d 358 (S.D.1987). An abuse of discretion was not shown.
*494Additionally, the majority would seem to be arguing that some form of res judicata or collateral estoppel controls this case. The majority opinion states in part:
A jury has no jurisdiction to overrule a binding Federal Court judgment against Tobin, and paid by Weiszhaar.
The majority misses the point. First, it is not a matter of jurisdiction. Secondly, the jury’s task is clearly to determine the meaning or significance of the prior civil judgments if in fact they are admissible in the first place.