(concurring specially):
I concur with the Per Curiam decision to quash the writ as having been improvidently granted.
The question of the custody of these two minor children has been before four (4) different trial judges. Undoubtedly, each had as his guiding principle the best interests and welfare of these children. Each of these four judges decided that custody should be in the grandparents. Three appellate judges have agreed with this result, seven judges in all.
Not having the opportunity as the four trial judges have had, of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify, and judging their testimony by those objective and subjective standards which trial judges follow, I am unwilling to substitute my judgment for theirs on this critical issue as to whom the custody of these children ought to be given.
To adopt such a rigid mechanistic standard, as has been suggested, to award children always to their natural parents if fit, would, in my judgment, obfuscate the rule which has been followed, without deviation, in this jurisdiction for nearly a hundred years — that the best interest and welfare of the children is the polestar for the guidance of all courts in awarding custody of minor children. The rule has been thus expressed:
“Where a court is confronted with the conflicting claims of parents or others for custody of infants, the fundamental controlling inquiry is the best interest of the child.” Carter v. Harbin, 279 Ala. 237, 184 So.2d 145 (1966) (Per Lawson, J.) [Emphasis supplied.]
The paternal grandparents were adjudged to be fit and suitable, church-going, hard-working and loving grandparents. Great store was placed upon the children’s having been in their home for six years. It is clear from the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion, authored by Judge Holmes, that all the facts upon which that court based its decision are not set out in its opinion. It concluded that, in view of the presumptions favoring the trial court’s findings and the primary consideration being the welfare of the children, it could not find the trial judge erred to a reversal. To thus review, and reverse, its decision would not comport with our rules of review on certiorari.
The case of Chandler v. Whatley, 238 Ala. 206, 189 So. 751 (1939), simply stands for the proposition that in a contest between a natural father and stepfather, equally fit, the natural father prevails. Such is not the issue in the case at bar which is a contest between paternal grandparents and the natural mother, with an express finding by the trial court that the best interest of the children would be served by allowing the custody to remain in the grandparents.
Of course, we have holdings to effect that a parent has a right to the custody of his child unless there is a strong showing that it would be against the best interests of the child. Smith v. Jones, 275 Ala. 148, 153 So.2d 226 (1963).
Any indication or suggestion said to be gleaned from Chandler v. Whatley, supra, or from any other of our cases, which is *437contrary to, or not in accordance with, the guiding principle in awarding custody of minor children — the best interests and welfare of the children- — is simply not our rule and should not be followed.
As it was so well expressed by Judge Wright, for the Court of Civil Appeals in Borsdorf v. Mills, 49 Ala.App. 658, 275 So.2d 338 (1973), viz.:
“ * * * The principle of priority of right of a parent to custody is founded upon the premise that because of a blood relation and instinct, such parent will better love and care for a child than one not so related. Such premise may be theoretically correct but practical experience has often proved it incorrect. The bonds of love between parent and child are not dependent upon blood relation and instinct, but may be forged as strongly in the crucible of day to day living. Out of the actual relationship of parent and child love grows. It is not merely a product of the biological function of conception and giving birth. To give paramount consideration to the principle of parental priority or ownership in custody decisions would often be an anathema to the best interest of the child.”
This writer is keenly aware of the heavy burden and lonely responsibility which rests upon the trial judge, who undertakes to make awards of custody in these cases. It is an awesome task. Nevertheless, it is the trial judge’s burden to bear, and the wonder of it all is that judges bear it so well.
I cannot say that the award of custody by the trial judge here was plainly and palpably erroneous.
I applaud the efforts of the mother to rehabilitate herself and simply note, in passing, that the question of custody is always subject to change upon a showing of changed circumstances.
Therefore, I concur in quashing the writ as being improvidently granted.
MERRILL, HARWOOD, MADDOX, McCALL and FAULKNER, JJ., concur.