(dissenting). Is there ground for reversal when developments at the time of sentencing follow exactly what is provided in a bargained plea agreement between defendants, their counsel and the prosecutor? Does a “conflict of interest” arise when the trial attorney for codefendants, recommending probation for both defendants, refers to their respective roles in the crime to which both entered pleas of guilty?
In the bargained plea agreement here, made part of the record, the district attorney suggested and the codefend-ants, Hall and Dixon, agreed that if the trial court was to consider incarceration appropriate that the court would be asked to “. . . consider less time for Mr. Dixon than Mr. Hall. . . .”
At the time of entry of plea, the trial court was informed that there had been negotiations and that: . An agreement has been reached by the defendants [Hall and Dixon] and our office [Milwaukee county district attorney’s office] . . .” As to codefendant Hall, the court was informed: “With regards to Mr. Hall . . . The defendant would plead guilty to strong-armed robbery, which is Count No. 1, and the second count, which is attempted strong-armed robbery, would be dismissed and read in for the purposes of sentencing. With regard to Mr. Hall, a presentence examination would be recommended; but at the conclusion of the presentence examination, we would again recommend incarceration for this defendant.”
As to the agreed plea bargain including a recommendation of a lesser or lighter prison sentence for defendant Dixon than for defendant Hall, if incarceration of both was deemed by the trial court appropriate, the record shows this colloquy between court and counsel:
“The Court: Mr. Reiher, you represent the defendants you stated; is that correct?
*317“Mr. Reiher [defendants’ trial counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
“The Court: Is that your understanding of the pretrial negotiations in their entirety?
“Mr. Reiher: Yes, with one exception, Your Honor. I think it should be clear that when I appeared at the District Attorney’s office, Mr. Klinkowitz indicated to me in the presence of the officer that if Your Honor were to consider incarceration eventually in this matter, that Your Honor consider less time for Mr. Dixon than Mr. Hall. That was the only exception to their recommendation.
“Mr. Jacobson [assistant district attorney] : Your Hon- or, I have spoken with the officer. He indicates that that is, in fact, correct.”
Completing the plea bargain agreement, the assistant district attorney stated: “. . . It is also my understanding that there is no objection on behalf of defendants, Mr. Dixon or the defendant Mr. Hall, for both of these cases, Case No. H-5991 and Case No. H-6781, for the purposes of this proceeding, to be considered at the same time.” The trial court added, “In other words, to be consolidated for the purposes of trial?” Defendants’ counsel and both defendants, Hall and Dixon, answered that that was their understanding.
Based on such bargained plea agreement, the defendants, Hall and Dixon, pleaded guilty to the first count of strong-armed robbery and the state moved to dismiss the second count, attempted strong-armed robbery. Asked whether he had heard the statements made by the district attorney and his attorney with regard to the pretrial negotiations had in the case, defendant Hall answered, “Yes, sir.” Asked whether they were correct according to his understanding, defendant Hall answered, “Yes, sir.”
At the time of sentencing, the district attorney did recommend that both defendants be incarcerated and that “Mr. Hall get a stronger sentence than Mr. Dixon.” The *318defendant Hall can hardly claim surprise or prejudice in the district attorney’s recommending exactly what the plea bargain provided that the state would recommend.
At the time of sentencing, the defendants’ attorney, James Reiher, recommended to the court that both defendants be placed on probation. As to defendant Dixon, he did identify Dixon as “. . . the man in tennis shoes, so-to-speak, who grabbed the purse and ran. . . .” The trial court interrupted to say, ‘‘You know, Mr. Reiher, the theory of parties to a crime, do you not?” Defense counsel answered that he did and had explained that entirely to Mr. Dixon. Conceding a pending charge for another strong-armed robbery, counsel argued that Dixon showed “. . . remorse and would, under proper supervision and given a proper job, contribute.”
In urging probation for defendant Hall, defense counsel Reiher stated that Hall had a very minimal prior criminal record, and had been gainfully employed until he was picked up on this particular charge, the only charge pending against him. He concluded: “. . . I would strongly urge the court to consider this disposition with regard to Mr. Hall.” We do not suggest that probation was appropriate for either of these two participants in a strong-armed robbery of two elderly ladies when we note that trial counsel did recommend probation for both.
What is claimed to be a “conflict of interest” derives from defendants’ attorney identifying Dixon as the purse snatcher who grabbed for a purse and ran, leaving Hall, the coparticipant who also grabbed for a purse but knocked an elderly lady down and kicked her when she was down. No claim or suggestion is made that this is not exactly what happened. What is apparently concluded is that the role of each defendant in the dual purse snatching should not have been mentioned or revealed to the court. On this record, with defendant Dixon facing and pleading *319guilty to another strong-armed robbery charge, the only reasonable basis for the state’s including in the bargained pleas a state recommendation of a lighter sentence for Dixon relates to his part in the double purse snatching here involved. If the recommendation of a lighter sentence for Hall’s codefendant was not indicated by their respective roles in the purse snatching, defendant Hall would and should not have agreed in the plea bargain to the recommendation as to sentencing being made, or to the consolidated plea entry that brought recommendation of a lesser sentence for Dixon to the court in both cases.
What here transpired at time of sentencing is exactly what the bargained plea agreement of the parties provided was to happen. A person ought not be permitted to complain later about something being added to a stew when he earlier agreed that the challenged ingredient be added. Nor would the writer fault the trial attorney for the two defendants who, in urging probation for both, mentioned the respective roles of each defendant in the purse snatchings involved. A criminal trial is a search for the truth, and the searching ought not cease when the sentencing process begins. The writer would affirm.