(dissenting).
We respectfully dissent. This court in Dunker v. Brown County Board of Education (1963), 80 S.D. 193, 121 N.W.2d 10, recognized the creation, enlargement, consolidation or dissolution of school districts was a legislative function. Nevertheless, it is our opinion this court did not intend to abdicate virtually all judicial responsibility and give carte blanche approval to any and all actions of an administrative agency *170in the reorganization of school districts including boundary changes.
This court said in Sunny wood Common School District v. County Board of Education of Minnehaha County (1964), 81 S.D. 111, 131 N.W.2d 105, that the “electorate’s opportunity to petition for a change of boundaries should be confined to relatively unimportant or insignificant changes. It may be granted when in the conduct of established schools it is necessary in order to promote the convenience of patrons of the district, or to alleviate situations of hardship, or for other compelling reasons. The statute was not intended to provide a method whereby certain electors of an established operating district could accomplish their absorption into an adjoining district by petitioning the county board for a boundary change, when the result would be a substantial detriment, although not necessarily a catastrophic' blow, to the district from which territory was being severed. The statute was not designed to authorize major surgery on school districts by detaching substantial portions of land area, school population, or assessed valuation from one established school district and adding it to another. If this is sought it should be accomplished by the elective process provided by statute * * *. In reviewing the history of this much amended statute at no time did the legislature see fit to require the approval or disapproval of the district to which territory was attached as a factor to be considered before making a boundary change. We can envision cases where the addition of an area with a substantial school population and a small tax base might seriously impede the successful operation of the larger school district, but such situations would be rare, and in most instances the larger district can absorb additional pupils and area without appreciable detriment or benefit. This is not true of the small district which is struggling to survive and we give primary importance to the injury sustained by such district in determining legislative intent as to what was meant by a minor boundary change.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Using Dunker as precedent in conjunction with our pronouncements in Sunnywood, it is our opinion the Brown County Board of Education acted unreasonably, arbitrarily *171and manifestly abused its discretion in granting the petition for a boundary change. It transferred 2,.000 acres of land with an assessed valuation of $82,505.00 from the struggling Warner district to the large Aberdeen district for no reason other than the desire of the Ryman family to have their children educated in the Aberdeen school rather than in the Warner school.
The Warner district is situated along an irregular boundary south of the Aberdeen district. The map of the two districts reveals a crazy-quilt pattern with isolated areas situated within the boundaries of one district but attached to the other. The property sought to be transferred is located in the approximate center of the Warner district. It does, however, adjoin an isolated area attached to the Aberdeen district. This isolated area is entirely surrounded by the Warner district on the north, east, and west. A Spink County district bounds it on the south. To serve this isolated area the Aberdeen school bus must drive past the town of Warner and cross over the north half of the Warner district. The land sought to be transferred comes within three miles of Warner and the Ryman residence is about 16 miles from the Aberdeen school. In attending the Aberdeen school the Ryman children will necessarily have to travel considerably farther and longer than if they attended the Warner school.
This is not a temporary pupil assignment case where the wish of the parents is a controlling consideration. Instead, this involves the permanent transfer of taxable property from one district to another. In our opinion it is neither reasonable nor right to transfer property from the center of the small Warner district to the large Aberdeen district to satisfy the desire of one family to attend a larger school. By enlarging the isolated Aberdeen island in the heart of the Warner district a pre-existing mistake is aggravated. The confusion, duplication, and cost will increase. In its struggle to provide equal educational opportunities for its school children, the Warner district needs a larger tax base and not a smaller one. This is an obvious and inescapable conclusion.
In our opinion the trial court erroneously affirmed the action of the county board on the theory that any boundary *172change so long as it involved less than five percent of the assessed valuation was not subject to judicial review.
We would reverse.