(dissenting).
It is my opinion that the ruling of the trial judge in this case is correct.
Try as I will, I cannot disassociate myself from my belief that defendants are attempting to do indirectly what they are prohibited by the Constitution from doing directly; that is, placing the full faith and credit of the State behind the bonds.
It is my view that my belief is sustained by a document entitled, “PRESENTATION to the LOUISIANA STADIUM and EXPOSITION DISTRICT,” by Kohlmeyer & Co./Blyth & Co., Inc./Financial Advisors, filed in this Court on June 13, 1969, which contains the following language on page 10 thereof:
“* * * In arriving at our recommended financial program we have studied virtually every major municipal stadium project which has been financed during the past fifteen years. In each other such major stadium financing, sources of income other than just stadium revenue have been pledged to secure the bonds issued, and generally the credit and taxing power of a state or large city or county has been directly or indirectly pledged.
“Based on such research and our knowledge of the existing municipal bond market we are of the opinion that an additional revenue source must be used to secure the District’s Bonds and accordingly it is our recommendation that the District enter into the described lease with the State.” (Emphasis mine.)
My belief is further sustained by the holding in the majority opinion that the right of the State to “appropriate funds” to discharge an obligation is the right to commit itself unconditionally from its entire resources.
It would be unwise to overlook the contingency that the revenues from the Hotel Occupancy Tax, and otherwise, may not be sufficient to meet the obligation of the bonds. Should such an event occur, the taxpayers of this State will be faced with the dreadful, frightening situation of additional taxation to pay the bonds.
I respectfully dissent.