(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I recognize that statutes of limitation promote an important policy of bringing closure to disputes and protecting people from stale claims. Wschola v. Snyder, 478 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn.App.1991), review denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1992). But because these statutes, especially those providing for short periods, can lead to harsh results, they have been narrowly construed. See Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assoc., 308 Minn. 237, 241, 241 N.W.2d 799, 801 (1976) (construing statute of limitations narrowly, in part, because failing to do so could have a harsh result); Rademacher v. Tountas, 474 N.W.2d 446, 449 n. 2 (Minn.App.1991) (citing Kittson for the proposition that ambiguous statutes of limitations are strictly construed against those invoking their protection). Cf. Kaiser v. Mem’l Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 762 (Minn.1992) (narrowing the reach of a short medical limitation statute and applying the general six-year statute).
We face an awkward choice in this case. In part, it arises under the Public Employee Labor Relations Act (PELRA), which is structured to promote prompt resolution of disputes. See Minn.Stat. .§§ 179A.01-.30 (2002 & Supp.2003). However, PELRA does not include any provision limiting the time for bringing claims of the type in this proceeding. The general statute of limitation provides a six-year period for actions upon express or implied contracts or other obligations. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2002). It should apply to the case before us absent a shorter, specific statute. This six-year period is long, but the 90-day statute of limitation for appealing arbitration awards under the Uniform Arbitration Act that has been applied by the majority is very short.
Perhaps more important is the fact that the 90-day arbitration appeal- limitation on *568actions only applies to this case by analogy. See Minn.Stat. § 572.19, subd. 2 (2002). Appellant’s claim has not been the subject of any arbitration; only a refusal to arbitrate and an alleged breach of the duty of fair representation (DFR). There was no arbitration from which the appellant could appeal.
Equally important since the arbitration statute does not clearly apply, appellant Willie Allen and his attorney could not reasonably be expected to know that he would be subject to its terms. It is doubly harsh to unexpectedly face a short limitation of action statute.
Further, applying the 90-day limitation period in the arbitration law is not related to the PELRA’s public policy of “pro-vid[ing] for the protection of the rights of the public employee.” Minn.Stat. § 179A.01(3) (2002). Too tight a time-frame may deny an employee the opportunity to vindicate his or her rights. In DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, the Supreme Court discussed the unfairness of a tight timeframe in this setting as follows:
In the labor setting .... the employee will often be unsophisticated in collective-bargaining matters, and he will almost always be represented solely by the union. He is called upon, within the limitations period, to evaluate the adequacy of the union’s representation, to retain counsel, to investigate substantial matters that were not at issue in the arbitration proceeding, and to frame his suit. Yet state arbitration statutes typically provide very short times in which to sue for vacation of arbitration awards.
462 U.S. 151, 165-66, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2291, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983).
When faced with this issue, courts in other jurisdictions have declined to apply the short arbitration statutes of limitation. In DelCostello, the Supreme Court criticized the analogy to and the short limit period of arbitration statutes because they “fail to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights....” 462 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. Two states have applied the longer federal labor limitations period of six months. See Ray v. Org. of Sch. Admin. & Supervisors, Local 28, 141 Mich.App. 708, 367 N.W.2d 438, 439-40 (Mich.Ct.App.1985); Hrabinski v. Exxon Chemical Co. 258 N.J.Super. 143, 609 A.2d 120, 122-24 (Ct.Law Div.1992).
Other state courts have applied their general, multi-year limitation period for tort claims and attorney-malpractice claims rather than the short arbitration statutes of limitation. See Casner v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 658 A.2d 865, 870-71 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1995); Norton v. Adair County, 441 N.W.2d 347, 355 (Iowa 1989); Graham v. Quincy Food Serv. Employees Ass’n, 407 Mass. 601, 612-14, 555 N.E.2d 543, 549-50 (1990); Baker v. Bd. of Educ. 70 N.Y.2d 314, 520 N.Y.S.2d 538, 514 N.E.2d 1109, 1111-1113 (1987). In applying the longer limitation period, some courts invited the legislature to determine whether a shorter period should be enacted. See Baker, 520 N.Y.S.2d 538, 514 N.E.2d at 1113. In some cases, the legislature has responded. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 217(2)(a) (McKinney 2003) (shortening New York’s limitations period for breach of DFR claims to four months).
When presented with the limited options available to us, we should apply the six-year period found in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) and call the legislature’s attention to the absence of a limitation period in the PELRA.