(dissenting).
¶ 114. The sum total of the majority opinion is to deliver the following bad news to the people of the State: all bets are off. Or at least, all new bets in the 2003 amendments are off.
¶ 115. A majority of the court devotes more than a third of its lengthy opinion to recounting the long history of gaming in the State of Wisconsin. Its factual diversions mask its inconsistent patchwork of legal analysis.
¶ 116. The practical consequences of the majority opinion are as breathtaking as its legal analysis.
I. Summation: All Bets Are Off
¶ 117. As a result of the majority opinion, the Tribe's payment to the State of $34,125 million due on June 30,2004, need not be paid.1 Almost $207 million of direct tribal payments to the State, upon which the legislature relied in adopting the budget, are in jeopardy, as is approximately $100 million annually thereafter.2 Employment in the State will also be dramatically affected by the majority opinion. The Tribe estimates that gaming compacts have created 35,000 *368jobs in the State to date and that the 2003 amendments will add 20,000 more jobs and a billion dollars in new investments.
¶ 118. The majority opinion's ruling against Indian gaming not only will have an enormous effect on the state and local economies but also will interfere with federal and state policies promoting the economic welfare of the Indian tribes and Indian education.3
¶ 119. In its desperation to save the 1992 compact and the 1998 amendments, and yet to invalidate the 2003 amendments, the majority has gone well beyond the issues originally presented in this case.
¶ 120. The majority has imported the Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle4 issue into the case at hand, namely whether Wisconsin Constitution Article iy §24 prohibits the 1998 amendments as well as any extension or renewal of the 1992 compact. The majority opinion swings from saying it does not decide this issue5 to nearly saying that the 1998 amendments negotiated by Governor Thompson are valid.6 The majority opinion states that no persuasive argument has been presented invalidating the 1992 compacts and the 1998 *369amendments,7 but also states that the durability of the 1992 compact is a separate unanswered question, turning in part on the impairment of contracts clauses and IGRA.8
¶ 121. It is difficult to reconcile the opinion of the justices in the majority in the present case with their position in Dairyland.9 Dairyland attacked the continued validity of the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments in light of the 1993 constitutional amendment.10 The circuit court in Dairyland concluded that the compacts and 1998 extensions were still valid despite the 1993 constitutional amendment.11 When the Dairyland case reached this court, three members of the majority voted *370to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and one member in the majority recused himself altogether. Those same justices now appear to be reversing their reversal and signaling that the compacts and the 1998 amendments are still permissible. Yet the reasoning of the majority opinion invalidating the 2003 amendments invalidates the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments. Where do these contradictory signals emitted by the majority leave the court of appeals when on remand it must decide Dairyland?
¶ 122. In sum, the majority's analysis cannot withstand scrutiny. Why is it unconstitutional for Governor Doyle to negotiate the 2003 amendments authorizing games outlawed by the 1993 Wisconsin constitutional amendment and yet it was constitutional for Governor Thompson to have negotiated the 1998 amendments authorizing games similarly outlawed? In light of the majority opinion, if any Indian gaming *371whatsoever is to be permitted in Wisconsin in the future, it may he only because of the intervention of the federal courts.
¶ 123. The majority opinion correctly concludes that Wis. Stat. § 14.035, which authorizes the Governor to compact with the tribes, is constitutional. Nevertheless, ignoring the fact that the Wisconsin Constitution charges the governor with the responsibility to expedite matters as may be resolved by the legislature and to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, the majority strikes down three provisions of the compact: the duration of the compact; the addition of new games; and the provision regarding sovereign immunity.
¶ 124. In contrast, we conclude that the Governor properly exercised his power pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 14.035. Likewise, the duration provision is valid, as similar provisions are commonplace and recognize the government's need to enter into long-term contracts. Furthermore, the majority's application of the 1993 Wisconsin constitutional amendment to outlaw certain gaming substantially impairs the contractual relationship between the State and the Tribe and violates the federal and state constitutional impairment of contracts clause. Finally, the issue of sovereign immunity is not ripe and fails on the merits. Thus we conclude that the 2003 amendments are valid and that the majority opinion raises substantial federal issues, rendering this court a stopping point on the parties' way to the federal courts.
¶ 125. To assist the reader we set forth a table of contents to this dissent:
II. Facts: ¶¶ 13-15
III. Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035; Delegation of Power: ¶¶ 16-57
*372IV Validity of Duration Provision: ¶¶ 58-80
V Validity of Adding Games: Wis. Const. Art. IN § 24 & the Impairment of Contracts: ¶¶ 81-122
VI. Federal Issues: ¶¶ 123-137
VII. Sovereign Immunity: ¶¶ 138-142
VIII. Conclusion: ¶ 143
Appendix:
IX. Severability: ¶¶ 141 — 156
X. Appropriations: ¶¶ 157-165
II. Facts
¶ 126. It is important first to state the significant relevant facts to understand the majority opinion's limited legal analysis. When the facts are clearly and concisely set forth, it is readily seen that the majority opinion has exaggerated and mischaracterized the differences among the 1992 compact, the 1998 amendments, and the 2003 amendments. Furthermore, it is evident that the 2003 amendments are valid.
¶ 127. Simply stated, the following are the facts relevant to the resolution of this case:
• 1987 Wisconsin Constitutional Amendment. In 1987, the Wisconsin Constitution was amended to authorize pari-mutuel betting and a state-operated lottery.12
*373• California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.13 The United States Supreme Court held that states lack authority over tribal gaming within Indian reservations if the state's policy was to regulate gaming rather than prohibit it outright.
• 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).14 Congress declared Class III gaming on Indian lands valid if such activities are located in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person.
• Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 (1989). The Wisconsin legislature authorized the governor to enter into compacts with tribes negotiated under IRGA as follows:
Wis. Stat. § 14.035. The governor may, on behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has been negotiated under 25 USC 2710(d).15
The legislature rejected proposed amendments to Wis. Stat. § 14.035 that would have required legislative ratification of compacts negotiated by the governor.16
*374• 1991 Lac du Flambeau case.17 In 1991, the federal district court for the Western District of Wisconsin concluded that by authorizing a lottery in the State, Wisconsin had adopted a regulatory, rather than prohibitive, approach to gambling and that the State was required to negotiate in good faith with the tribes over Class III gaming activities.
• Governor Thompson's 1992 compact. The 1992 compact with the Forest County Pota-watomi Tribe (hereinafter Tribe) included the following provisions relating to the duration of the compact, the games, and the effect of future changes of state or tribal law on the compact:
1. The Tribe may operate Class III gaming only while the compact or any extension is in effect.18
2. The compact continues for an indefinite term.19
3. The compact shall not be modified, amended or altered without the prior written agreement of both the State and the Tribe.20
*3754. The compact may cease if either party serves the other with written notice of nonrenewal at prescribed five-year intervals.21
5. In the event of nonrenewal, the Tribe may request the State to enter into negotiations, and the State shall negotiate with the Tribe in good faith under IGRA.22
6. If a successor compact is not concluded, the Tribe may sue the State in federal court,23 and the compact remains in effect until the procedures set forth in IGRA are exhausted.24
7. The Tribe may operate certain electronic games of chance with video facsimile or mechanical displays, blackjack, and pull-tabs or break-open tickets, each of which is a Class III game.25
8. The compact provides for change of state law: "To the extent that State law or Tribal ordinances, or any amendments thereto, are inconsistent with any provision of this Compact, this Compact shall control."26
• 1993 Wisconsin Constitutional Amendment: The Wisconsin Constitution was amended to prohibit the legislature's authoriza*376tion of gaming except in certain forms.27 The application of the constitutional amendment to existing Indian gaming compacts is not clear from either the text of the amendment or the debate on the amendment during its adoption.
• Governor Thompson's 1998 amendments to the compact. In 1998, pursuant to Section XXX, Governor Thompson and the Tribe amended the 1992 compact, principally adding games and increasing tribal payments to the State. Significant provisions include:
1. Blackjack tables were authorized on Meno-monee Valley Land where they had been explicitly prohibited by the 1992 compact.28
2. The number of electronic games of chance was increased from 200 to 1,000.29
• Governor Doyle's 2003 amendments to the compact. In 2003, pursuant to Section XXX, Governor Doyle and the Tribe further amended the 1992 compact as follows regarding the duration of the compact, the addition of games, and the State's sovereign immunity:
1. The compact continues for an indefinite term.30
*3772. Amendments to the compact may be proposed at each fifth annual anniversary "to enhance the regulation of gaming."31
3. Amendments to "any provision of the compact" may be proposed at each 25th annual anniversary by the Tribe or the governor as directed by a session law of the Wisconsin legislature.32
4. The compact may be terminated by mutual agreement of the parties.33
5. The Tribe and the State shall enter into good faith negotiations about any proposed amendment about which they do not reach agreement, and disputes over the obligation to negotiate in good faith may be resolved by binding arbitration under Section XXII.A. of the compact34
6. Several Class III games were added, including, for example, electronic keno, variations on the game of blackjack, pari-mutuel wagering on live simulcast racing events, roulette, and poker.35
7. The Tribe and State agreed to waive sovereign immunity with respect to any claim *378brought to enforce the compact to the extent that the Tribe and State could do so pursuant to law.36
• Legislative ratification of compacts. The legislature initially ratified the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments through its actions of establishing and continuing a director of Indian gaming. It then ratified the 2003 amendments by approving the biennium budget, which includes funds generated by the new provisions. The legislature did all of this without objection.37
• Legislative attempts to amend Wis. Stat. § 14.035. In 2003, the legislature twice attempted to amend Wis. Stat. § 14.035, but was unable to obtain the requisite votes to override the governor's veto.38
¶ 128. We examine each legal argument presented by the majority opinion in turn: the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035 as a violation of the delegation of power doctrine; the validity of the duration provision of the 2003 amendments to the compact; the validity of the games added by the 2003 amendments to the compact; and the validity of the provision concerning sovereign immunity. We conclude that the 2003 amend*379ments are valid and that the majority opinion raises substantial federal questions.
III. Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035: Delegation of Power
¶ 129. We turn first to the issue of whether Wis. Stat. § 14.035 violates the Wisconsin Constitution. We conclude, as does the majority opinion, that the statute is constitutional. We disagree with the majority's reading "implicit limits" into Wis. Stat. § 14.035, and are perplexed as the majority shifts between reading in these "implicit limits" as a matter of constitutional necessity39 and as a matter of statutory interpretation of legislative intent.40
¶ 130. The petitioners, Senator Panzer and Representative Gard, ask this court to declare Wis. Stat. § 14.035 an invalid delegation of legislative power to the Governor; to declare that the Governor "lacked authority to agree to the Compact with the Potawatomi Tribe;" and to declare the compact "invalid." In sum, they contest the Governor's authority to make binding compacts without a more substantial legislative analysis and blessing than contained in Wis. Stat. § 14.035.
¶ 131. The issues raised by the petitioners pose a basic dilemma for the majority, a dilemma the majority opinion fails to disclose: Senator Panzer and Representative Gard challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035, yet they have no authority to do so. The general rule is that Wisconsin public officers "cannot question the constitutionality of a statute unless it is their official duty to do so, or they will be personally affected if they fail to do so and the statute is held *380invalid."41 These petitioners have no official duty to question the constitutionality of the statute; their private rights are not involved.42 The petitioners' duty as legislators is to enact constitutional laws. Under our precedents, the petitioners do not now get a chance to challenge the constitutionality of a law enacted by the legislature or the Governor's exercise of power under that law.43
¶ 132. The majority opinion tries to mask this problem by presenting the issue in a narrower way than the one presented by the petitioners. According to the majority opinion, the petitioners' challenge is not to *381Wis. Stat. § 14.035 but to particular provisions of the 2003 amendments adopted by the Governor. Yet after apparently denying that the petitioners' challenge is to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035,. the majority unabashedly admits that "the validity of § 14.035 permeates this case."44
¶ 133. After meandering through the thickets of the doctrines of separation of power45 and delegation of power to determine the validity of Wis. Stat. § 14.035, the majority opinion begrudgingly concludes that "the statute is not unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."46 This conclusion is sound, and we agree with it.
¶ 134. Even though Wis. Stat. § 14.035 is constitutional, the majority opines that "the constitutionality of the statute does not automatically validate every *382compact term negotiated by the governor under the statute."47
¶ 135. Furthermore, the majority opinion asserts that if certain provisions of the compact are valid, then Wis. Stat. § 14.035 is unconstitutional. Thus, the majority reads "implicit limits" into Wis. Stat. § 14.035 to invalidate provisions of the 2003 amendments.48 The majority opinion muddles whether the "implicit limits" are required to render the statute constitutional or are required as a matter of statutory interpretation to comport with legislative intent49 So, even though it declares the statute constitutional, and even though the petitioners never mustered enough votes in the legislature to rewrite Wis. Stat. § 14.035, the majority opinion rewrites Wis. Stat. § 14.035 for the petitioners.
¶ 136. The majority opinion rewrites Wis. Stat. § 14.035 to read as follows: "The governor may, on behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has been negotiated under 25 USC 2710(d), and that complies with implicit limits."
¶ 137. The "implicit limits" that the majority reads into the statute are then used to invalidate certain provisions of the compact.
¶ 138. It is not clear from whence cometh these "implicit limits" in Wis. Stat. § 14.035. At times, the majority opinion seems to find them in the doctrine of delegation of powers, a doctrine "long moribund."50 The *383majority opinion revives the doctrine with great effort and transparent manipulation of authority. The majority seems to boil the delegation doctrine down to the theory that "in the absence of guidelines" the delegation must have "procedural safeguards."51
¶ 139. We are not persuaded by the analysis set forth in the majority opinion. We conclude that no delegation of power doctrine invalidates Wis. Stat. § 14.035 or requires that we read words into the statute. The governor's powers under Wis. Stat. § 14.035 are limited, of course, by the statute itself, the federal constitution, IGRA and other federal laws, and the state constitution and laws.
¶ 140. The majority opinion's analysis of the "absence of guidelines," and "procedural safeguards," is not persuasive to declare Wis. Stat. § 14.035 unconstitutional, to read "implicit limits" into it, or to declare certain provisions of the 2003 amendments invalid. Our reasoning is as follows:
*384¶ 141. First, there are guidelines for a governor's exercise of power. A governor does not have unfettered power to execute compacts. As the majority opinion recognizes, a governor's authority is limited by the existence of other statutes.52
¶ 142. Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 explicitly requires compacts "to be negotiated under 25 USC § 2710(d) [IGRA]." IGRA sets forth limitations, guidelines, and procedural safeguards.53
¶ 143. Second, there are safeguards, as the majority opinion concedes, to alter the policy choices made by a governor.54
¶ 144. Third, the majority opinion cites no case in which a tribal compact was struck down in any state when the legislature authorized the governor to enter into the compact.55 In contrast, compacts executed by a *385governor have been invalidated when the legislature has not authorized the governor to act.56
¶ 145. Fourth, the majority opinion fails to cite any authority in this State (or in any other jurisdiction) declaring that the "procedural safeguards" applicable to legislative delegation to administrative agencies apply here. Nevertheless, the majority opinion relies on the assumption that such concepts relate to a statute like Wis. Stat. § 14.035, which explicitly authorizes a governor to enter into a specific type of contract.57
¶ 146. Fifth, reversing course from relying on concepts in the delegation of power to administrative agencies, the majority opinion concludes that the rules governing the legislature's delegation of authority to administrative agencies do not apply to the delegation of legislative authority to a sister branch of government. Instead the majority opinion announces that "the court has adopted a stricter standard when the legisla*386ture delegates power directly to another branch of government."58 The majority does not explain what this stricter standard is.
¶ 147. Furthermore, the cases upon which the majority relies do not support a stricter standard for delegation from the legislature to the governor. These cases involve the legislature's uniting in the judiciary political, quasi-legislative power with the adjudicative function.59 The court held that such unification of functions expands the powers of the judiciary beyond its constitutional powers, which are limited to "judicial power."60 Political policymaking is not to be mixed with judicial power.
¶ 148. In contrast to these cases imposing nonjudicial functions on the judicial branch, we are asked in the case at hand whether the compact power set forth in Wis. Stat. § 14.035 extends beyond the "executive power" that the state constitution explicitly vests in *387the governor.61 The majority opinion never analyzes executive power. If it had, it would not reach the result it does.
¶ 149. The Wisconsin Constitution does not define the words "executive power" but does set forth the powers and duties of a governor.62 The constitutional powers and duties of a governor are exactly the same today as those enacted in 1848. The constitution provides that a governor "shall transact all necessary business with the officers of the government, civil and military."63 The constitution gives a governor powers relating to the legislature and lawmaking: a governor has the power to convene the legislature, communicate to the legislature in every session, recommend matters for the legislature's consideration, approve and sign bills, and approve appropriation bills in whole or in part.64 The constitution by vesting executive power in the governor and by its listing the powers and duties of a governor thus expressly blends both executive and legislative powers in a governor and grants a governor policymaking functions.
¶ 150. Finally, the constitution explicitly impresses on a governor the responsibility to expedite matters resolved by the legislature and to take care that laws be faithfully executed, declaring: a governor "shall expedite all such matters as may be resolved upon by the legislature, and shall take care that the laws he faithfully executed."65 This constitutional mandate *388vests broad powers in a governor and charges him with far-reaching responsibilities to effectuate the laws.
¶ 151. The exercise of judgment and discretion in the making of a compact is not, as the majority opinion acknowledges, exclusively a legislative duty.66 The governor's exercise of the power granted by the legislature to enter into a compact is a valid discharge of executive power and responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 14.035 and the constitution.67 The constitutional executive powers and duties vested in the governor, as we stated earlier, includes a policymaking component. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[executive action that has utterly no policymaking component is rare, particularly at an executive level as high as a jurisdiction's chief law enforcement officer."68
¶ 152. Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 and the compact fall within the range of authority and responsibility reserved to a governor as chief executive officer of the state with the constitutional responsibility to expedite matters as may be resolved by the legislature and to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Thus, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 does not provide an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the governor, nor does it unconstitutionally aggregate powers in the governor.
¶ 153. In summary, as long as a compact does not contravene a statute or constitutional provision, the governor may enter into it under Wis. Stat. § 14.035, embracing those conditions and provisions the gover*389nor deems will best promote the interests of the government. The majority opinion's conclusion that a stricter standard (whatever that means) exists for delegation from the legislature to the governor ignores the constitutionally granted executive power vested in a governor.
¶ 154. Sixth, the legislature has, early in the history of the State, enacted laws authorizing the governor to negotiate and execute contracts, although the state constitution does not assign the power to contract to either the executive or legislative branch. In 1887, the legislature simply provided that all contracts for labor and material in connection with the completion of Science Hall at the University of Wisconsin-Madison be subject to the control and approval of the governor.69 When the legislature wanted to limit the governor's contracting powers, it inserted restrictions in the enabling statute.70 Numerous laws presently authorize the governor to execute contracts, without limitations on the contracting power.71
*390¶ 155. These delegations of contractual authority-enable the governor to negotiate the best terms on behalf of the State for the benefit of the people of the State and allow flexibility in negotiations depending on the circumstances. Delegating power to negotiate and execute gaming contracts does not readily lend itself to limitations in the enabling legislation. "The delegation of some law-making responsibilities is an essential element of the efficient operation of government."72 A legislative body of 132 persons does not have the ability to negotiate a contract. Separation of powers and delegation of powers principles are "vindicated, not disser-ved, by measured cooperation between the two political branches of the Government, each contributing to a lawful objective through its own processes."73
¶ 156. Wisconsin Stat. § 14.035 thus comports with a long-standing legislative pattern of granting the governor broad authority to enter into agreements on behalf of the State.
¶ 157. Seventh, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 comes to us with a presumption of constitutionality. Obviously the legislature did not see any threat to its power or to aggregated executive power in enacting Wis. Stat. § 14.035. Furthermore, the legislature implemented and reinforced its recognition of the power of the governor by creating a director of Indian gaming to assist the "governor in determining the types of gaming *391that may be conducted on Indian lands and in entering into Indian gaming compacts"74 and by including moneys received under the compact in the most recent budget adopted by the legislature.75
¶ 158. The legislature has made policy choices in enacting Wis. Stat. § 14.035 and ratifying the 1992 compact and the 1998 and 2003 amendments. Our task, as the majority opinion concedes, is to accept those policy choices and not to second-guess the legislature.76 The legislature has considered the impact of Wis. Stat. § 14.035 on the State and on the tribes, and the legislature understands that the stated purpose of IGRA is to provide "for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."77
¶ 159. Eighth, the majority opinion confesses that" it is not considering the impact of its decision in the case at hand although it concedes that a court should consider the legal and practical consequences of its decisions.78 And therein lies a major defect of the majority's decision.
¶ 160. Laws, including Wis. Stat. § 14.035, must be interpreted considering the legal and practical consequences to avoid unreasonable and absurd results 79 So too the governor's powers and the 2003 amendments must be interpreted in light of our legislature's intent, *392the governing federal law, namely IGRA, and the practicalities of negotiating and reaching agreement on a compact relating to gaming to avoid unreasonable and absurd results.
¶ 161. Numerous amici argue that a decision in favor of the petitioners would undermine the purposes of IGRA and harm Wisconsin's economy. The Green Bay area Wisconsin Citizen Action and the Bay Area Workforce Development Board describe the significant impact of the gaming compacts on the economic development of the Tribe. They assert that by amending the compact the State has enabled the Tribe to have a long-term, stable investment horizon and to diversify economic investment in non-gaming enterprises for the benefit of the Tribe, Brown County, and the Fox Valley economy, and community services for members of the Tribe and for other families and individuals.80
¶ 162. The City and County of Milwaukee oppose the petitioners' challenge because of the "enormous and immediate negative impact on the economies of the City and County,"81 as well as the Indian community.
¶ 163. The Milwaukee Building & Construction Trades Council, Teamsters Local Union Nos. 200 and 344, Menomonee Valley Partners, Inc., Professional *393Firefighters of Wisconsin, Inc., and Indian Community School of Milwaukee, Inc. jointly filed a brief arguing that a ruling against Indian gaming would have an enormous effect on the State and local economies and would interfere with federal and state policies promoting Indian education.82
¶ 164. The parties stipulated that if the games authorized under the compacts were discontinued Milwaukee County would lose over 8,000 jobs, increasing countywide unemployment from 6.4% to 8.0%; Brown County would lose nearly 6,000 jobs, increasing countywide unemployment from 4.6% to 8.7%; Sauk County would lose nearly 6,000 jobs, increasing countywide unemployment from 4.0% to 19.5%; and unemployment in Forest County would rise from 6.9% to 28.3%.83
¶ 165. The Tribe estimates that gaming compacts have created 35,000 jobs in the State to date and that the new compacts will add 20,000 more jobs and a billion dollars in new investments.
¶ 166. Ignoring the consequences of its decision as well as sound legal principles imperils the soundness of the majority opinion and the welfare of the Tribe and the State.
¶ 167. In sum, this court should accept the legislature's decision about delegating compact power to the governor unless strong reasons point in another *394direction.84 As we have explained above and shall explain further below, no such reasons surface in the present case.
¶ 168. After analyzing the majority opinion and the doctrines of separation of powers and delegation of powers, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 14.035 constitutes a valid delegation of authority to the governor. No aspect of the delegation doctrine requires us to declare the statute unconstitutional, to read words like "implicit" into the statute to render it constitutional, or to declare any provisions of the compact invalid. If any provision is invalid, we must look beyond the delegation doctrine.
¶ 169. The petitioners apparently are unhappy with the compact. Their attempt to dress up their unhappiness in constitutional garb fails.
¶ 170. We turn to the majority opinion's conclusion that the compact's duration provision is invalid.
IV Validity of Duration Provision
¶ 171. The majority ultimately concludes that the Governor was without authority to agree to the duration provision in the 2003 amendments.85 It raises an ominous specter with the warning that such a provision "could terminate" the legislature's ability to make law.86 In suggesting such a foreboding result, the majority opinion exaggerates the consequences of the provision.
*395¶ 172. To further the exaggeration, the majority describes the duration provision as "perpetual."87 By employing such a term, it is apparent that the majority attempts to inflame a negative response.
¶ 173. The problems with the majority's analysis extend well beyond its exaggerated consequences. The majority mischaracterizes the differences between the 1992 compact together with the 1998 and 2003 amendments. What the majority fails to acknowledge is that not only is the 2003 duration provision substantively similar to those in the original 1992 compact and 1998 amendments, but it actually places the legislature in a better position to regulate gaming. Ultimately, the majority's analysis seems uncertain, raising more questions than it answers.
¶ 174. All of the duration provisions, whether in the 1992 compact or in the 1998 and 2003 amendments, were of a similar term. If the parties did nothing, the original compact and the amendments would continue in effect with no time limitation.
¶ 175. The 1992 compact provided that it would continue indefinitely, subject to the right of either party to issue a notice of non-renewal at specified intervals— initially after seven years, and then every five years thereafter.88 In the event of nonrenewal, the Tribe could request the State to enter into negotiations, and the State was required to negotiate with the Tribe in good faith under IGRA.89
¶ 176. The 1998 amendments had no effect on the indefinite nature of the compact. Although it was *396renewed for a five-year period, from June 3, 1999, to June 3, 2004, the compact was still subject to the automatic rollover provision.90
¶ 177. With the 2003 amendments, the duration provision in the compact was revised. The 2003 amendments deleted each party's unilateral right of nonre-newal, but the compact could still terminate on the occurrence of specified conditions. The 2003 changes provided for amendment of any provision of the compact every 25 years and of gaming regulation provisions every five years.91
¶ 178. The majority describes this change in part by noting the following language:
This Compact shall continue in effect until terminated by mutual agreement of the parties, or by a duly adopted ordinance or resolution of the Tribe ... ,92
¶ 179. Significantly, the majority omits the rest of the changes, which qualify this provision. These include revisions to Section XXX, Amendment and Periodic Enhancement of Compact Provisions. That section previously stated, "this compact shall not be modified, amended or otherwise altered without the prior written agreement of both the State and the Tribe."93 In 2003, *397the section was expanded to include a time frame (five and 25 years) to address the parties' desires to change the provisions along with a dispute resolution process (last best offer arbitration).94
¶ 180. Additionally, the parties maintained the requirement of good faith negotiations.95 The concept of good faith excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.96 This is not a meaningless provision; rather, it is a substantive limitation on the parties. A breach of contract may occur if a party violates an express or implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.97
¶ 181. Accordingly, the majority's characterization of the amended compact as "perpetual" is inaccurate. Under the 1992, 1998, and 2003 version, the compact could be amended every five years.98 Under all versions, the compact extended indefinitely absent an affirmative action by the Tribe, the State, or both.99 *398Finally, the new process maintains the requirement that the parties negotiate in good faith when discussing proposed amendments.100
¶ 182. The majority also fails to recognize that the 2003 amendments actually place the legislature in a better position to regulate gaming. Before, the legislature had delegated all of its power to the governor under Wis. Stat. § 14.035. To have any influence over the amendment process it needed to repeal that statute, which it twice failed to do. With the new provisions, however, the legislature is expressly granted an oversight role in the negotiation process. After 25 years, any provision of the compact may be amended. The Tribe or "the Governor as directed by an enactment of a session law by the Wisconsin legislature" may propose an amendment.101
¶ 183. After highlighting and bemoaning the duration of the 2003 amendments, the majority shifts course and contends that the legislature could not delegate to the Governor the power to enter into such a term because it binds future legislatures.102 Since the majority makes this determination without citing to authority, the legal underpinnings upon which its conclusions rest are uncertain.
¶ 184. By agreeing to the duration provision in the 2003 amendments, the Governor and the Tribe were hardly plowing new ground. Including Wisconsin, seven of the 24 states with Class III tribal gaming under IGRA have compacts of similar duration that cannot be *399unilaterally terminated by the State.103 Indeed, the parties have stipulated that Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, and Mississippi all have such provisions.104
¶ 185. The fact is that interstate compacts of indefinite or long-term duration are commonplace throughout the country.105 Wisconsin itself is a signatory to an interstate compact of indefinite duration, the Midwest Interstate Low-level Radioactive Waste Compact, codified at Wis. Stat. § 16.11. That compact remains in effect indefinitely, unless the signatory states unanimously agree to dissolve the compact or Congress withdraws its consent.106 A state cannot unilaterally withdraw from the compact.107
¶ 186. The majority attempts to distinguish the Midwest Interstate Low-level Radiation Waste Compact on grounds that the legislature ratified it.108 What the majority fails to mention, however, is that the legislature effectively ratified the 2003 amendments by in-*400eluding the revenue in the state budget, which expressly relies upon the receipt of nearly $207 million in compact payments by the tribes over the next biennium.109 We do not understand how the legislature can simultaneously ratify the terms of a compact with one hand and attack it with the other.
¶ 187. If the governor cannot make commitments, binding future legislatures, compacts like the ones just described are necessarily invalid. Such a sweeping rule would have profound consequence.
¶ 188. Long-term contracts or compacts of indefinite duration reflect the need for government to make agreements that extend well beyond the current legislative session. The operation of government would be handcuffed if a compact, or any other type of contract, could not extend more than two years.
¶ 189. Even the petitioners do not agree with the majority's extreme position. They have conceded that long-term compacts lasting many years are both constitutionally permissible and desirable as a matter of public policy. Just last year, both petitioners supported a bill that would have recognized a governor's authority to enter into gaming compacts lasting as long as 15 years without the need for any legislative oversight. Senator Panzer was a co-sponsor of that legislation.110 It passed both houses of the legislature but was subsequently vetoed by the Governor.
¶ 190. Ultimately, the majority's analysis regarding the duration provision raises more questions than it answers. It is unclear upon what legal basis the majority is declaring invalid the duration provision in the 2003 amendments to the compacts. Is it based on *401statutory interpretation discerning the intent of the legislature? Is the provision unconstitutional as applied? If it is the latter, one would expect such a profound conclusion to appear with supporting analysis and citation. Yet, the majority leaves the reader guessing.
¶ 191. Why would it be unconstitutional for Governor Doyle to bind future legislatures, but not unconstitutional for former Governor Thompson? Why would it be permissible to enact the legislation supported by the petitioners which allowed the governor to enter into compacts without legislative direction with 15 years duration but impermissible for the Governor to enter a compact without legislative direction with 25 years duration? Why would the difference of 10 years transform a valid compact into an invalid compact? Where is the legal authority or analysis to support such a transformation?
¶ 192. In the end, the majority attempts to accomplish by judicial override what the petitioners could not accomplish legislatively.111 The majority's analysis cannot withstand scrutiny. The exaggerated consequences *402combined with the lack of citation to authority and the uncertain legal underpinnings of its conclusion undermine the majority's result.
¶ 193. The majority fails to acknowledge that the 2003 duration provision is substantively similar to those in the original 1992 compact and 1998 amendments. It likewise fails to grasp that compacts of long-term or indefinite duration are commonplace throughout the country. Contrary to the majority's conclusion that the compacts are invalid because they bind future legislatures, such compacts reflect the government's need to enter agreements that extend well beyond a current legislative session.
V Validity of Adding Games: Wis. Const. Art. IV § 24 & the Impairment of Contracts
¶ 194. We turn next to the majority opinion's conclusion that the addition of new games renders the compact invalid. Section XXVI of the 1992 compact *403states the following: "To the extent that State law or Tribal ordinances, or any amendments thereto, are inconsistent with any provision of this Compact, this Compact shall control." In clear and simple language, the parties expressed their intent to be bound by the laws as they were in 1992. Regardless of future laws or amendments to preexisting laws, the parties agreed to let the terms of the compact control their relationship. In holding that the amendment to Article iy § 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution barred the Class III games that the parties agreed to in 2003, the majority opinion takes a position that clearly violates Section XXVI of the compact, and, therefore, runs afoul of the impairment of contract clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.
¶ 195. At the time the parties entered into the compact, all Class III games could be negotiated for and were permitted under the compact. The Lac du Flambeau112 decision controls the scope of gaming for purposes of this compact. In Lac du Flambeau, the district court concluded that the State was required to negotiate with the tribes regarding any activity that included an element of prize or chance, unless expressly prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution or state laws.113 The court stated that its initial inquiry involved a determination of whether Wisconsin permitted the types of games in question.114 "Permission," as noted by the court, was not whether the State had given its express approval of the playing of certain games.115 Rather, "permission" could be discerned . from examining *404Wisconsin's gaming policies in general and determining whether they were civil-regulatory or criminal-prohibitory in nature.116 For this question, the court relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon Band.117
¶ 196. In Cabazon Band, the United States Supreme Court concluded that, because California did not prohibit outright all forms of gaming, its laws with respect to gaming were regulatory in nature and could not be enforced on the reservations.118 The Supreme Court rejected California's contention that Congress expressly provided for the state laws to be applicable against the tribes by enacting Public Law 280,119 which gave the State broad criminal jurisdiction over Indians who committed offenses on reservations.120 In conducting its analysis, the Supreme Court stated that it must be determined whether the law the State sought to enforce was criminal, and therefore fully applicable to the tribes, or civil in nature. In Lac du Flambeau, the district court, in finding Wisconsin law to be civil-regulatory, explained this civil-regulatory and criminal-prohibitory distinction set forth in Cabazon Band as follows:
If the policy is to prohibit all forms of gambling by anyone, then the policy is characterized as criminal-prohibitory and the state's criminal laws apply to tribal gaming activity. On the other hand, if the state allows some forms of gambling, even subject to extensive *405regulation, its policy is deemed to be civil-regulatory and it is barred from enforcing its gambling laws on the reservation.121
¶ 197. The Supreme Court concluded that California permitted a substantial amount of gaming activity and actually promoted gaming by its operation of a state-run lottery.122 Given this conclusion, the Supreme Court held that California's laws regulated, rather than prohibited, gambling; thus, the tribes could continue operating bingo games on their reservations.123
¶ 198. In addition to noting the civil-regulatory and criminal-prohibitory distinction addressed in Caba-zon Band, the Lac du Flambeau court also commented that the congressional findings set forth in 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) supported the proposition that the term "permitted" was not intended to limit the scope of games to those already in operation.124 The congressional findings stated that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity."125
¶ 199. The Lac du Flambeau court noted that simply because Wisconsin prohibited certain types of games did not mean that its gaming policy was criminal-prohibitory in nature.126 Given Wisconsin's constitutional amendment in 1987 allowing the lottery *406and pari-mutuel betting, the court concluded that Wisconsin's policy was civil-regulatory in nature.127 The district court commented that the State's assertion that it was only required to negotiate for games already in operation misconstrued both IGRA and the Cabazon Band holding:
It was not Congress's intent that the states would be able to impose their gaming regulatory schemes on the tribes. The Act's drafters intended to leave it to the sovereign state and tribal governments to negotiate the specific gaming activities involving prize, chance and consideration that each tribe will offer under the terms of its tribal-state compact.128
¶ 200. The reasoning of Lac du Flambeau and Cabazon Band was reiterated and reaffirmed more recently in Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin u. United States,129 and Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Norquisf130
¶ 201. In Lac Courte Oreilles, the Seventh Circuit held that IGRA does not violate principles of federalism by interfering with the Wisconsin governor's powers.131 The Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized that the "Wisconsin Constitution and various statutes have implemented a fairly complex gaming policy."132 "The establishment of a state lottery signals Wisconsin's broader *407public policy of tolerating gaming on Indian lands."133 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon Band, the Seventh Circuit went on to state: "Further, because IGRA permits gaming on Indian lands only if they are 'located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity,' 25 U.S.C. § 2170(d)(1)(b), the lottery's continued existence demonstrates Wisconsin's amenability to Indian gaming."134
¶ 202. In Forest County, a jurisdiction agreement between the Tribe and the City of Milwaukee was at issue. While the original jurisdiction agreement excluded the Tribe's gaming activities from local regulation altogether, an amendment to the agreement provided that Class III gaming could be conducted if the following three conditions were met: "(1) that Wisconsin allow Class III gaming 'for any purpose by any person, organization or entity,' (2) that the Tribe comply with the IGRA, and (3) that the Tribe comply with all civil regulatory state and local regulations which authorize or regulate such gaming."135 The Seventh Circuit concluded that all of the factors were satisfied.136 With respect to the first factor, the court explicitly noted that, given the Lac du Flambeau holding, the issue of whether Class III gaming was permitted in Wisconsin was no longer in dispute.137
*408¶ 203. The Seventh Circuit rejected the City of Milwaukee's contention that Class III gaming should be allowed on the tribal lands only to the extent it was allowed elsewhere in Milwaukee.138 The amendment in question provided as follows:
Class III gaming, as defined in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, shall not be permitted on the Menom-onee Valley land unless Class III gaming is permitted in the State of Wisconsin for any purpose, by any person, organization or entity. If Class III gaming is so authorized in the state of Wisconsin, such gaming may be undertaken on the Menomonee Valley land only if done in compliance both with the requirements of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and with all civil regulatory state and local laws and regulations which authorize or regulate such gaming, including, but not limited to any requirements to obtain authorizations or licenses to undertake such gaming.139
¶ 204. The court reasoned that the purpose of the jurisdiction agreement was an attempt by the city to enforce regulatory ordinances on Indian land when they would not otherwise apply.140 Given the parties' use of the term "permitted" in the first sentence and their awareness of the civil-regulatory and criminal-prohibitory distinction following Cabazon Band, as well as the fact that the amendment limited compliance to those laws that "authorize or regulate" as opposed to "prohibit" such gaming, the court held that the jurisdiction agreement, both originally and as amended, did not *409prohibit the Tribe from conducting Class III gaming on its lands.141
¶ 205. As demonstrated by the case law discussed above, Wisconsin's laws with respect to Class III gaming, at the time the 1992 compact was entered into, were clear. The State was permitted to conduct negotiations regarding all Class III games. Simply because the majority asserts that Wisconsin has a "strong state policy against gambling" embodied in Article IY § 24 does not make it so.142 Clearly, Wisconsin has chosen to regulate gaming within the state, not prohibit it. In accordance with the holdings in Cabazon Band and Lac du Flambeau, the Tribe and the State were free to negotiate for any type of Class III game. Although the majority states that it doubts the "continued vitality of Lac du Flambeau's holding,"143 there is no reason to do so.
¶ 206. While the amendment to Article IY § 24 did change Wisconsin's law with respect to gaming, it did not affect the compact before us. The petitioners apparently agree. Their letter brief states that: "petitioners in this action, however, do not seek to apply any change in state law directly to the 2003 amendments. Instead, petitioners challenge the authority of the Governor to enter into the compacts and to agree to compact provisions without underlying authority."
¶ 207. Any Class III games that would be outlawed by Article IY § 24 could be negotiated for and permitted in an amended compact, given Section XXVI *410of the 1992 compact. This provision overrides any subsequent changes in state law, including those brought about by the amendment to Article IV, § 24. The changes to the compact made in the 1998 and 2003 amendments are permissible given the fact that they involve automatic extensions as well as amendments to the 1992 compact. That compact, in Section XXVI, clearly states that the provisions of the compact apply over any changes in state or tribal law. A conclusion to the contrary patently ignores the basic provisions contracted for by the parties involved.
¶ 208. We also recognize that federal preemption is involved in determining whether an impairment of contract would result by declaring the 2003 amendments unauthorized. Here, the compacts are between two sovereigns, the State and the Tribe, and are created under federal law with federal government approved. The compacts unquestionably have federal preemptive force. In American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, the district court noted that "IGRA preemption blocks the operation of state policy once a valid compact is executed, but it gives effect to state policy through the compact negotiation process."144 Because the State and Tribe entered into a valid compact in 1992, their agreement is insulated from further changes in Wisconsin's gaming laws. Section XXVI of the 1992 compact clearly reflects the intentions of the State and Tribe that changes in state law would not affect the compact's provisions.
¶ 209. The majority opinion concedes that the 1992 compact was valid when the parties agreed to it.
*411The majority correctly worries that questions regarding the validity of the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments, after the amendment to Article I\i § 24, might raise impairment of contract concerns.145 We conclude that any attempt to read Article IV, § 24 as altering the types of games that may be negotiated for under the compact would impair the compact to which the parties agreed, and would, therefore, run afoul of the United States and Wisconsin constitutional clauses against impairment of contract.
¶ 210. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution states: "No state shall enter into any. . . law impairing the obligation of contracts .. . ." Similarly, Article I, § 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides as follows: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate." We have interpreted the contract clauses in the Wisconsin Constitution and the United States Constitution coextensively.146
¶ 211. Although the language in the United States and Wisconsin contract clauses is absolute, it has not been interpreted so strictly. Instead, it has been interpreted to accommodate the State's inherent police power.147 It is very important to note that the federal *412contract clause applies to state constitutional amendments as well as legislative enactments.148
¶ 212. In order to determine whether a change in state law has impaired the parties' obligation of contract, three criteria must be analyzed and balanced.149 The first criterion is the severity of the impairment, that is, whether the change in the law substantially impaired the contractual relationship.150 The severity of the impairment should be viewed in light of the reasonableness of the parties' reliance on the contract and the foreseeability of the change in the law when the contract was entered into.151 If the State is a contracting party, the state law faces more stringent examination under the contract clause than laws regulating contracts between private parties.152
¶ 213. In this case, the parties relied on the state law as it was in 1992 in order to draft the terms of their compact. While it may have been foreseeable that state or tribal law could change, the parties planned for this by including Section XXVI in the compact. If the amendment to Article IV § 24 is held to affect the 2003 amendments to the compact, which merely continue the 1992 compact, as amended in 1998, the parties' contract will be substantially impaired. The types of *413Class III games that can be, and were, negotiated for as permitted games will be prohibited, and those which could have been allowed in 1992 will never be permitted. Because we conclude that such an interpretation works a substantial impairment on the contract and the contractual relationship, we proceed to the second factor.
¶ 214. The second criterion queries whether there is a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the constitutional amendment or legislation.153 Here, it cannot be persuasively asserted that the purpose of the constitutional amendment was to curtail Indian gaming. The legislative history simply does not support it. Indeed, it appears that the impetus behind the amendment was not to limit Indian gaming but rather to affect state gaming in riverboat casinos and video gambling machines.154
*414¶ 215. If a legitimate public purpose is found, £he final inquiry is whether the change in the law is " 'based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption.' "155 Since we conclude that curtailing Indian gaming was not the impetus behind the constitutional amendment, there is no need to discuss this factor. Having determined that the majority's application of the 1993 constitutional amendment substantially impairs the contractual relationship and that the impetus behind the constitutional amendment was not related to Indian gaming, we conclude that the majority's decision violates the impairment of contracts clause.
¶ 216. Generally, the law at the time the contract is entered into governs the enforcement of the contract.156 Subsequent changes in state law will not interfere with the parties’ agreement.157 Even though the 1992 compact was amended after the Article I\[ § 24 amendment, it does not follow that the amendment should abrogate the provisions of the compact. As the amendments to the 1992 compact merely continued the original compact, and did not create a new one, the law as it was in 1992 governs. The majority opinion certainly seems to concede that the 1998 amendments did *415not create a new compact.158 After making that statement, the majority opinion does not attack the validity of the 1998 compact amendments, but rather recognizes the significance of the impairment of contract clauses in the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions in relation to the 1998 and 2003 amendments to the 1992 compact.159
¶ 217. The decision in Rochester v. Royal Appliance Manufacturing Company160 contemplated this type of continuing agreement. In Rochester, the district court held that an oral franchise agreement entered into prior to the enactment of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (WDL), which was later modified to a guaranty agreement after the WDL's enactment, did not constitute a new contract.161 The Rochester court distinguished that amendment from the one present in Kealey Pharmacy v. Walgreen Company162 because the Kealey amendments involved a new decision in each instance.
*416¶ 218. The district court and the Wisconsin court of appeals have noted that the objective intentions of the parties, as manifested in the terms of the contract itself, serve as the best indicator of whether the parties intended an amendment to create a new contract or merely continue the previous one.163
¶ 219. Sections XXV and XXX of the compact clearly demonstrate the parties' intent that the original agreement would be extended and could be amended. Section XXV provides, in relevant part, the following:
This Compact shall be in effect for a term of seven years after it becomes binding on the parties.
The duration of this Compact shall thereafter be automatically extended for terms of five years, unless either party serves written notice of nonrenewal on the other party not less than one hundred eighty days prior to the expiration of the original term of this Compact or any extension thereof.164
¶ 220. Moreover, the parties clearly contemplated the compact could be amended, in regard to matters such as additional Class III gaming, as is evidenced by the language contained therein. The 1992 compact states in relevant part:
The Tribe may not operate any Class III gaming not expressly enumerated in this section of this Compact unless this Compact is amended pursuant to Section XXX.165
*417This Compact shall not be modified, amended or otherwise altered without the prior written agreement of both the State and the Tribe.166
¶ 221. Given the above-quoted language, it is evident that the parties intended to enter into a continuing agreement subject to automatic extensions and negotiated amendments.
¶ 222. We recognize that there may be concern as to whether Tribal-State compacts are more akin to contracts or interstate compacts. However, we note that even the majority concedes that the analysis would be the same regardless of the classification given such a compact.167 Whether the compact is referred to as a contract or compared to an interstate compact, the result is the same: retroactive application of Article IY § 24 to the compact violates the contract clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. We note that the petitioners acknowledge this fact.
¶ 223. In their brief, Senator Panzer and Representative Gard challenge the Governor's authority to "make public policy without adequate legislative authority." In fact, they have expressed this sentiment throughout this appeal. "Petitioners only contest the Governor's authority to make binding compacts without a more substantial legislative analysis and blessing." "Petitioners [] claim that Governor Doyle lacked authority." Even at oral arguments, counsel for the petitioners emphasized this point:
(W)e take no position on whether the legislature has that power.
*418We are definitely taking the position that the governor alone and unilaterally cannot expand the scope of gaming beyond that approved in the 1998 compacts, that to do so goes over what is otherwise a gray area between the legislative — or into the legislative prerogative and outside the executive prerogatives.
(W)e are simply arguing that the governor of Wisconsin lacks authority to make a compact of virtually indefinite perpetual duration which would expand the scope of gaming beyond any of the policies embraced by the 1998 compacts, which we do not contest.
¶ 224. Yet in their letter brief to this court, the petitioners abandoned that position and stated the following: "Petitioners Panzer and Gard do not believe the Governor and Legislature have either the authority or power to enter into a compact granting any tribe the right to offer games that were not a part of the 1992 Compact." This new position implies that absolutely no course of action could be taken that would result in a compact amendment which would authorize the games in dispute. The petitioners' brief offers no support or authority for this position.
¶ 225. In response, the Governor points out the complete change in argument and direction taken by petitioners:
Throughout the course of this litigation, petitioners have assiduously and explicitly avoided asserting the view that the new games were prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution, a fact acknowledged in petitioners' letter brief.
¶ 226. Although the petitioners seem to have changed their minds about the legislature's ability to add new games, the petitioners are anxious that the State be permitted to renew the 1992 compacts and *419allow continuation of the games specifically permitted in the 1992 compact but disallowed by the 1993 constitutional amendment.
Petitioners have taken the position in briefs and at the oral arguments that the Executive and Legislative branches have power to continue to approve games allowed in the 1992 Compact as amended in 1998 as a function of the Obligation of Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const. Article I, s. 10, clause 1). As a shorthand statement, these original games such as blackjack and slots have been grandfathered in through the subsequent amendments to the 1992 Compact.
¶ 227. On the one hand, the petitioners rely on the 1993 constitutional amendment to claim that the new games "are expressly prohibited by Article iy § 24 (6) (c) of the Wisconsin Constitution," and yet, on the other hand, consistent with Section XXVI of the 1992 compact, recognize that:
[A]n Indian tribe enjoys the prerogatives of other sovereigns. Hence, when it engages in a compact with another sovereign, such as a state, the obligations of both parties rest on the terms of the compact. A change in a state constitution does not eliminate the compact obligation, because the state cannot divest itself, unilaterally, of an obligation to another sovereign. In this context, an Indian Tribe enjoys the same sovereign status as a state.
¶ 228. We agree completely with petitioners in regard to the latter conclusion. The Cabazon Band and Lac du Flambeau decisions together with IGRA permitted the parties to negotiate for the inclusion of any Class III games in a compact between the Tribe and the State of Wisconsin, and a change in Wisconsin law *420cannot alter that fact.168 The claim that some Class III games are "grandfathered in," while others are not permitted because of the 1993 constitutional amendment, is not only illogical, it is nonsensical.
¶ 229. The majority, in a transparent attempt to save the 1992 compact and the 1998 amendments, but kill the 2003 amendments, states that the 1992 compact was valid when entered into, and notes that "any attempt at this point to impair these compacts would create serious constitutional questions."169 The continued vitality of the 1992 compacts is the very issue raised in Dairy land.170 As the petitioners explain in their letter brief, "the appellants in Dairyland address the broader question or issue that includes whether the initial games approved in the 1992 Compacts such as blackjack and slot machines must be prohibited due to the substantial policy changes that occurred with the 1993 constitutional amendment." Then, after raising this question and hinting at an answer, the majority opinion declines to address whether the compact, and the 1998 amendments, were "durable enough to withstand a change in state law."171
¶ 230. Given the majority's analysis, and petitioners' latest position, what reasons could the majority logically and legitimately use to retain the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments, yet discard the 2003 *421amendments? In its desperation to save the 1992 compacts and the 1998 amendments, and yet to invalidate the 2003 amendments, the majority has gone well beyond the issues originally presented in this case.
¶ 231. The majority, apparently taking its lead from petitioners' change of position, has taken it upon itself to import the issue from Dairyland into the case at hand. The issue in Dairyland, as we have explained, is whether Wisconsin Constitution Article iy § 24 prohibits any extension or renewal of the 1992 compacts. The petitioners acknowledge as much in their letter brief by stating:
It seems this Court is pressing the Petitioners for an answer to a question Petitioners sought to avoid. The issues of the scope of both the Executive and Legislative branches appears to be more directly discussed in Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. James E. Doyle et al. (Supreme Court Case No. 03-0421), a case presently under consideration by this Court. The appellants in Dairyland address the broader question or issue that includes whether the initial games approved in the 1992 Compacts such as blackjack and slot machines must be prohibited due to the substantial policy change that occurred with the 1993 constitutional amendment.
¶ 232. Given the 3-3 deadlock in our Dairyland decision, and the fact that the court of appeals is now faced with attempting to decide this issue, what, if anything, is left for the court of appeals to decide after the majority decision in the present case?
¶ 233. In Cook v. Cook,172 we enunciated several principles regarding precedent and the court of appeals: "The court of appeals is a unitary court; published opinions of the court of appeals are preceden-*422tial; litigants, lawyers and circuit courts should be able to rely on precedent; and law development and law defining rest primarily with the supreme court." However, we also noted that:
The supreme court is the only state court with power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a previous supreme court case.... [Ojnly the supreme court, the highest court in the state, has the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a published opinion of the court of appeals. In that way one court, not several, is the unifying law defining and law development court.173
¶ 234. Given the quoted language from Cook and the importation of the Dairyland issue in this case, the court of appeals may feel compelled to adopt the majority's reasoning to invalidate the 1998 amendments; that is why the majority opinion is so dangerous, and why it is so difficult to reconcile the opinion of the justices in the majority in the present case with their position in Dairyland.174 Dairyland attacked the continued validity of the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments in light of the 1993 constitutional amendment. The circuit court in Dairyland concluded that the compacts and 1998 extensions were still valid despite the 1993 constitutional amendment. When the Dairy-land case reached this court, three members of the majority voted to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and one member recused himself altogether. Those same justices now appear to be reversing their reversal and signaling that the compacts and the 1998 amendments are still permissible. Yet the reasoning of the majority opinion invalidating the 2003 amendments *423invalidates the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments. Where do these contradictory signals emitted by the majority leave the court of appeals when on remand it must decide Dairyland?
¶ 235. In light of the majority opinion, if any Indian gaming whatsoever is to be permitted in Wisconsin in the future, it may be only because of the intervention of the federal courts, and the proper application and interpretation of the Cabazon Band and Lac du Flambeau decisions, IGRA, Section XXVI and other provisions of the compact, and the impairment of contract clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.
VI. Federal Issues
¶ 236. As noted above, the issue of federal preemption is lurking in this case. Not surprisingly, the majority declines to address a number of matters on grounds that "they may turn in large measure on unresolved questions of federal law."175 Indeed, it attempts to frame the inquiry based only on state law.176
¶ 237. The conclusion of the majority is that the Governor violated state law by authorizing the disputed new games.177 That conclusion misses the mark because it rests on an erroneous assumption that states can directly regulate Indian gaming, independent of IGRA. They cannot. Under IGRA, state law can only *424indirectly affect Indian gaming, and only through compact negotiations. Outside of that process, state law does not apply to Indian gaming.
¶ 238. That state law may play a role in the legal analysis does not detract from the overriding federal nature of the claim. In Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly,178 the Tenth Circuit held that federal courts "indisputably have the power to determine whether a Tribal-State compact is valid," notwithstanding that "[s]tate law must determine whether a state has validly bound itself to a compact."
¶ 239. At its essence, the question in this case concerning the permissible scope of gaming is the same one as addressed in Lac du Flambeau,179 as well as numerous federal court cases.180 These cases were all federal court actions brought within the framework of the remedies expressly provided by IGRA.
¶ 240. Instead of recognizing this limitation to its jurisdiction, however, the majority proceeds to analyze IGRA, going so far as to call Lac du Flambeau's holding into doubt.181 By doing so, the majority flouts Congress' clear intent to preclude state courts from adjudicating the rights of Indian tribes to engage in on-reservation activities.
*425¶ 241. In the wake of Cabazon Band,182 states increasingly expressed their desires to be factored into Indian gaming regulation. Congress responded with the passage of IGRA in 1988. Through IGRA, Congress performed the necessary balancing of states' interest in regulating high stakes gambling within their borders and the Indians' resistance to state intrusions on their sovereignty.183 The essential feature of IGRA is the Tribal-State compact process.184
¶ 242. By enacting IGRA, Congress created a "carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme," which cannot be augmented by the courts.185 That scheme contemplates actions only in federal — not state— courts. As the Eighth Circuit noted in Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney,186 "[e]very reference to court action in IGRA specifies federal court jurisdiction .... State courts are never mentioned."187
¶ 243. The legislative history of IGRA supports the notion that Congress intended it to have extraordinary preemptive power. The Senate committee report *426explicitly states: "S. 555 is intended to expressly preempt the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands."188
¶ 244. Furthermore, the conclusion that IGRA preempts state law is reinforced when viewed within the larger jurisdictional framework of Indian law. The drafters of IGRA recognized this when they wrote:
It is a long- and well-established principle of Federal-Indian law as expressed in the United States Constitution, reflected in Federal statutes, and articulated in decisions of the Supreme Court, that unless authorized by Congress, the jurisdiction of State governments and the application of state laws do not extend to Indian lands.189
¶ 245. The preemptive force of compacts is essential to the effectiveness of the congressional plan set forth in IGRA, the fulfillment of IGRA's goal of promoting tribal economic development and self-sufficiency, and tribal interest in self-governance.190 The process allows states and tribes to decide what terms they will agree to and be bound by their own choices.
¶ 246. If the majority's approach was a sound one, Congress' strict limits on the means to enforce IGRA would be easily evaded by restyling collateral attacks on compacts as claims that the state is not bound by a particular compact because the state's agent exceeded his or her authority. The preemptive force of IGRA was designed to prevent such an evasion.
¶ 247. IGRA is not the only reason why this case belongs in federal court. Compacts entered into under *427IGRA are agreements between sovereigns, not private parties. Indeed, the governmental nature of compacts makes such agreements analogous to interstate compacts.191 The majority cites to a law review article advocating that Tribal-State compacts be examined under similar rationales as interstate compacts.192 However, it fails to appreciate the implications of such a position.
¶ 248. Questions regarding the meaning of an approved interstate compact or the parties' obligations under it present issues of federal law. As the Supreme Court recognized in Cuyler v. Adams,193 "an interstate compact approved by Congress ... is thus a federal law subject to federal rather than state construction."194 It further noted:
[W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the State's agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.195
*428¶ 249. Thus, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, questions regarding an approved compact's meaning of the parties' obligations under it present issues of federal law, which preempt application of inconsistent state law— whether such state law is set out in statutes, court decisions, or even state constitutional provisions.196
¶ 250. In the end, the majority's formulation of the scope-of-gaming issues as state law cannot mask the obvious federal nature of the case. Here, the petitioners have sought a declaratory judgment centered on the meaning and application of a federal statute and the validity of a federally approved compact. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.
VII. Sovereign Immunity
¶ 251. Our final consideration is the majority's conclusion that the Governor exceeded his authority by agreeing to waive the State's sovereign immunity. The sovereign immunity provision of the state constitution provides: "[t]he legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state."197
¶ 252. At the outset, we note that the challenge to the compact's sovereign immunity provision is not ripe for review by this court. Although a plaintiff need not suffer an actual injury before seeking declaratory relief, the facts must nevertheless "be sufficiently developed *429[both] to avoid courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreements,"198 and to ensure a conclusive adjudication.199
¶ 253. Here, the petitioners' sovereign immunity claim cannot ripen until: (1) the State breaches the compact and (2) the Tribe either obtains a favorable arbitration award against the State or sues to enforce the compact. Because neither has occurred, there simply is no controversy on which this court can rule. The fact that this case "represents only a layover on the journey to federal court," does not alter this conclusion.200
¶ 254. If this court did consider the petitioners' claim, however, it would fail on the merits. The provision in question is paragraph 6 of the technical amendments. The majority concludes that the Governor violated the state constitution by agreeing to it. The paragraph provides:
The Tribe and the State, to the extent the State or the Tribe may do so pursuant to law, expressly waive any and all sovereign immunity with respect to any claim brought by the State or the Tribe to enforce any provision of this Compact. This waiver includes suits to collect money due to the State pursuant to the terms of the Compact; to obtain an order to specifically enforce the terms of any provision of the Compact; or to obtain a declaratory judgment and/or enjoin any act or conduct in violation of the compact.201
*430¶ 255. After citing this passage, the majority spends several paragraphs reiterating the principle that no one but the legislature can waive sovereign immunity.202 Although we agree with this basic doctrine, we fail to see how paragraph 6 undermines it. Indeed, the provision specifically states that the compact waives sovereign immunity only "to the extent the State or Tribe may do so pursuant to law."203 Given this qualifying language, there cannot be an unlawful waiver. If the Governor were acting contrary to law, there is no waiver. As a result, we conclude that the Governor did not exceed his powers.
VIII. Conclusion
¶ 256. In sum, Wis. Stat. § 14.035 is a valid delegation of power to the Governor, which he properly exercised. Likewise, the duration provision is valid, as similar provisions are commonplace and recognize the government's need to enter into long-term contracts. Furthermore, the majority's application of the 1993 constitutional amendment would substantially impair the contractual relationship between the State and the Tribe and violate the impairment of contracts clause. Finally, the issue of sovereign immunity is not ripe and fails on the merits. Ultimately, we conclude that the 2003 amendments are valid and that the majority opinion raises substantial federal issues, which inevitably will be resolved in federal courts.
*431Appendix
EX. Severability
¶ 257. The majority concludes that the sections which added new games and revised the provisions relating to duration and sovereign immunity were unlawful.204 It does not address, however, the effect the compact's severability clause will have on its decision.
¶ 258. When a contract contains a severability clause, that clause, while not controlling, is entitled to great weight in determining whether valid portions can stand separate from any invalid portion.205 Whether a provision is severable from the remainder of the contract is largely a question of intent, with a presumption in favor of severability.206 If it is evident that the parties would have signed the contract without those provisions, the invalid part may be severed.207
¶ 259. Here, the compact contains such a provision. Section XXXV explicitly states:208
Each provision of this Compact shall stand separate and independent of every other provision. If a court of competent jurisdiction finds any provision of this Com*432pact to be invalid or unenforceable, it is the intent of the parties that the remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect.209
¶ 260. This provision illustrates that the parties intended for the disputed sections to be severable from the remaining provisions of the compact. Indeed, there is no indication that the compact would have been terminated without the addition of new games or the revisions relating to duration and sovereign immunity. Given the lucrative nature of the compact, it is evident that the parties would have signed the contract without those provisions. We therefore conclude that the valid portions of the compact can stand separate from the portions declared by the majority to be invalid.
A. Additional Games & Sovereign Immunity
¶ 261. We next address what happens when a section has been declared invalid. Section XXXIII.B. states in part:
In the event that any portion of the 2003 Amendments other than Section XXV [Effective Date and Duration] . .. are found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable or invalid, either party may serve on the other a demand for renegotiation of such portion of the amendments as are impacted ... 210
¶ 262. Under this provision, the Tribe could demand renegotiation of the affected sections. If the Tribe demanded renegotiation, the State would be required to *433negotiate in good faith. In the event that either party refused to negotiate in good faith, then the matter would be set for arbitration.211 The Tribe may wish to renegotiate other provisions, but the State is not required to renegotiate unaffected portions of the compact. If the Tribe does not demand renegotiation, the invalid sections would be permanently removed and the rest of the compact would remain.
B. Duration
¶ 263. The consequences of severing the provision relating to the duration of the compact, by comparison, have greater financial significance. In the 2003 amendments to the compact, the parties changed the wording of Section XXXIII.A. to specifically tie duration to payment. That section requires,
In the event that... a court of competent jurisdiction finds that the provision [Effective Date and Duration] is unenforceable or invalid, or that either party lacked the legal authority to agree to the provision, then (i) the Tribe shall be entitled to a refund of the amount paid to the State by the Tribe under Section XXXI.G.l.b.212 and the State shall be indebted to the Tribe in that *434amount, which sum may be recovered from the State by the Tribe under any procedures provided by the laws of Wisconsin for recovery of unpaid debts of the State, which includes Wis. Stat. §§ 16.007 & 775.01; (ii) the Tribe shall not be required to make any further payments under Section XXXI.G.2.,213 and (iii) the parties shall negotiate in good faith to reach agreement on substitute provisions for Sections XXV and XXXI.214
¶ 264. Therefore, in addition to the duration provision, Section XXXI, payments to the State, must be severed from the compact, and payments made must be returned. Again, the parties must renegotiate the sections on duration and payment in good faith.215
¶ 265. Section XXXIII.A. requires repayment of the amount paid under Section XXXI.G.l.b. The first payment under that section is not due until June 30, 2004.216 Thus, while the Tribe would not be reim*435bursed, it would not have to make that payment of $34,125 million on June 30, 2004, or the payment of $43,625 million on June 30, 2005.217 Furthermore, the Tribe would not make any further payments under Section XXXI.G.2. Those payments would start in 2005 at seven percent of the net win of the Tribe's Menom-onee Valley Class III games, and would fluctuate by up to one percent in the following years.
¶ 266. While the Tribe has not made the payment of $34,125 million required on June 30, 2004, that money has been allocated by the current Wisconsin biennium budget. Therefore, the State will be required to find other funds to fill the void left in the budget.
¶ 267. In light of these consequences, the majority describes the link between the duration and payment as a "poison pill."218 This mischaracterizes the situation. Before the 2003 amendments, the Tribe paid $6,375 million annually under Section XXXI.219 In the *4362003 amendments, the Tribe agreed to make that payment on June 30, 2004, and pay an additional $34,125 million on that date.
¶ 268. The connection between duration and payment cannot be construed as a punishment for the State to keep it from challenging the section. Rather, it is a protection for the Tribe in case the State does challenge the term since the Tribe agreed to make more than six times the previously agreed upon amount.
¶ 269. In sum, the addition of the severability clause in Section XXXV indicates that the parties intended for only the affected sections to be renegotiated if a court concludes they are invalid. Accordingly, the parties must go back to the table and renegotiate the duration provision, the payment section, and may renegotiate the sections regarding added games and sovereign immunity. Until the new terms are agreed upon, the 1998 amendments to those sections govern.220
X. Appropriations
¶ 270. The petitioners assert that certain terms of the 2003 amendments intrude into the domain of the legislature in that they appropriate state funds. The majority defers decision on that issue because it concludes that "it is likely that any subsequent amendments will have different terms."221 However, pursuant *437to the severability clause of the compact discussed above, that provision will not be renegotiated. Accordingly, we must consider the petitioners' claim.
¶ 271. At the outset, we again note that the petitioners' challenge is not ripe for review by this court. Three things must happen before the petitioners' appropriations claim can ripen: (1) the State must breach the compact; (2) an arbitrator must grant an award of monetary damages against the State; and (3) the legislature must disallow the claim. There is no evidence in the record that any of these three conditions has been met.
¶ 272. Neither party has asserted a breach or invoked the dispute resolution process in response to a breach. Even if that process had been invoked and an arbitrator had ruled that the State owed the Tribe money, such a debt would still have to go to the claims board or the legislature, either of which could approve it. Only if the legislature refuses to pay the debt will the claimant have a right "to maintain an action [in court] on his claim."222 Until that occurs, the petitioners' claim remains nothing more than an "abstract disagreement."
¶ 273. Thus, the petitioners' argument regarding appropriations cannot be maintained. If this court did consider the claim, however, it would fail on the merits.
¶ 274. The petitioners contend that the Governor unlawfully obliged the State to pay money to the Tribe in violation of Wisconsin Constitution Article VIII, § 2 *438("No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law."). They rely upon paragraph 2 of the technical amendments, which they maintain unconstitutionally creates a future appropriation without prior legislative approval. Paragraph 2 provides:
If the State fails to comply with an award of the tribunal, other than an award to pay money to the Tribe, and asserts the State's sovereign immunity, then the tribunal, upon the application of the Tribe, may issue an order requiring the State to pay the Tribe a sum of money as liquidated damages that the tribunal determines is commensurate with the value of the loss to the Tribe due to the inability of the Tribe to obtain judicial enforcement of the Compact provision which is the subject of the award and that is commensurate with the State's failure to comply with the order. The sum due to the Tribe under the order is a debt of the State, which may be recovered by the Tribe, unless the State complies with the award or a federal court sets aside the award on grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10.223
¶ 275. The problem with the petitioners' argument is that it confuses "debt" with "appropriation." Like many other state contracts, the compact at issue simply creates "a debt of the State." This, in turn, invokes a process by which the State agrees to become a "debtor" in its contractual relationships.224 Wisconsin *439Stat. §§ 16.007225 and 775.01226 together constitute legislative "consent" to suit in certain contract actions 227
¶ 276. The fact remains that the State regularly enters into contracts for goods and services that require a future payment.228 Each purchase contract makes the *440State a "debtor." If the State could not waive its sovereign immunity to allow payment of such debts, there would be no state contracts for future goods or services.
¶ 277. Moreover, as the Governor notes, the legislature has already created a standing, sum sufficient appropriation to pay for settlements and judgments on "debts." Wisconsin Stat. §§ 20.505(2)(a) and (k)229 together with 20.865(l)(fm)230 reference, inter alia, Wis. Stat. § 775.04, which provides that judgments against *441the State "shall be paid out of the state treasury." As a result, the terms of the compact do not create an appropriation any more than the numerous other state contracts that can give rise to debts recoverable in judgments.
¶ 278. Finally, it is important to remember that the 2003 amendments were anything but an appropriation. Indeed, the compact would have brought hundreds of millions of dollars into the state treasury. Such a revenue-generating agreement "and appropriations are more nearly antonyms than synonyms."231 Accordingly, the petitioners' argument fails on the merits and the provision in question need not be renegotiated.
See Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin & State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of1992 (hereinafter "Compact") Section XXXI.G.l.b. as amended by No. 8 (5/30/03).
Stipulation, ¶ 28.
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2702; Brief of the Green Bay area Wisconsin Citizen Action and Bay Area Workforce Development Board; Brief of City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County Opposing Amended Petition for Original Jurisdiction; Joint Brief of Milwaukee Building & Construction Trades Council, Teamsters Local Union Nos. 200 and 344, Menomonee Valley Partners, Inc., Professional Firefighters of Wisconsin, Inc., and Indian Community School of Milwaukee, Inc.
2004 WI 34, 270 Wis. 2d 267, 677 N.W.2d 275.
Majority op. ¶ 102.
Id., ¶ 93.
Id., ¶ 98, n. 37.
Id., ¶ 102.
See Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, 270 Wis. 2d 267.
The issue in the present case is different from that in Dairyland. The petitioners' brief clearly makes this point: "Gaming as permitted by the older compacts would not be eliminated by this lawsuit. This petition and challenge to the Governor's actions is unlike the remedy sought in the Dairy-land [case]. . . an action being considered alongside this petition."
The petitioners further wrote in supplemental briefing: "The appellants in Dairyland address the broader question or issue that includes whether the initial games approved in the 1992 Compacts such as blackjack and slot machines must be prohibited due to the substantial policy change that occurred with the 1993 constitutional amendment."
The order of the circuit court was entered on February 11, 2003, before the 2003 amendments were adopted. The circuit court denied Dairyland "injunctive relief preventing the Governor from extending or renewing the compacts presently in place." Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, No. 01-CV-2906, unpublished order (Dane Co. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2003) at 18.
In the certification to this court the court of appeals states:
*370In this lawsuit, Dairyland Greyhound Park seeks to enjoin Governor Doyle from renewing or extending any of the gaming compacts beyond their five-year terms. It contends that Wisconsin withdrew the necessary permission for Class III gaming activities by amending the constitution in 1993, such that the Lac du Flambeau decision no longer controls. The trial court disagreed and held that the amendments to article IV did not affect the gaming compacts or their extension. Applying Lac du Flambeau, the court ruled that permission for Class III gaming still flowed from the State's lottery and dog track betting. That holding is the subject of Dairyland's appeal.
Dairyland's brief before this court states the issue as follows: "whether the Governor has authority to amend or extend Indian gaming compacts which allow forms of gambling that are illegal under Wisconsin law." Dairyland concludes its brief that "the interests of all Wisconsin's citizens demand that the trial court's decision be reversed."
Wis. Const. Art. IV § 24(6)(a)&(b).
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
1989 Wis. Act 196. Both of the petitioners in this case voted in favor of enacting this statute.
See Proposed Assembly Amendment 1 to 1989 Assembly Bill 927; Proposed Senate Amendment 1 to 1989 Assembly Bill 927.
See Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
Prior to this decision, Governor Thompson refused to negotiate compacts with the Tribes.
Compact Section XXVD.
Compact Section XXWB.
Compact Section XXX.
Compact Section XXVB.
Compact Section XXVE.
Id.
Id.
Compact Section IV
Compact Section XXVI (emphasis added).
Wis. Const. Art. IV § 24.
See Compact Section XVI.B.l. (original) and as amended by No. 5 (1998). Thus, contrary to the majority op., ¶ 32, the 1998 amendments did grant the Tribe permission to operate an additional type of game at one of its sites.
See Compact Section XVH. (original) and as amended by No. 3 (1998).
Compact Section XXVA. as amended by No. 13 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXX.D.1. as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXX.D.2. as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXVB. as amended by No. 13 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXX.D. as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03).
Compact Section IVA. as amended by No. 2 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXIII.C. as amended by No. 6 (5/28/03).
2003 Senate Bill 41. Vetoed on February 28, 2003. Failed override vote on March 4, 2003.
2003 Assembly Bill 144. Vetoed on March 18, 2003. No legislative attempt to override the veto.
Majority op., ¶ 60, n. 22.
Id., ¶ 82.
State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 38, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 (citation omitted).
Id.
See Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1020 (Ariz. 1998) (rejecting argument that legislators had standing to attack compact when legislature expressly authorized the governor to enter into gaming contracts; under these circumstances this case no longer presented issues of constitutional moment requiring court to waive standing requirement); State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999) (same); Cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1998) (after legislative delegation to cities to participate in intergovernmental compacts, Illinois's attempt to litigate the validity of the statute and the compact executed thereunder was not justiciable).
This case differs from State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988), the governor's veto case cited by the majority. Majority op., ¶ 41. In the veto case, the legislator petitioners challenged Governor Thompson's acts as violating the powers granted the governor under the constitution relating to approval of laws and as impacting the legislature's constitutional powers to enact statutes. In this case, the challenge is to the Governor's actions under a legislatively granted power. The governor's role in compacting involves the governor's role in executing a statute.
Majority op., ¶ 60.
The majority opinion sets forth the following principles of separation of power that we do not debate for purposes of this action: There are three branches of government. Id., ¶ 48. The powers of each branch are not "neatly compartmentalized." Id., ¶ 49. Many powers lie in the vast borderlands that may be shared between and among the branches (except for core powers). Id., ¶ 51. Committing policy choices to be negotiated in gaming compacts constitutes a legislative function. Id., ¶ 64. The legislature has vested authority in the governor to contract with Tribes on behalf of the State. Id., ¶ 67. The legislature has affirmed the governor's role in compact negotiations by creating a director of Indian gaming in the Department of Administration to assist the governor into entering into Indian gaming compacts. Id., ¶ 69.
The majority opinion appears to turn on the delegation of powers issue.
Id., ¶ 72.
Id., ¶ 73.
Id., ¶ 60.
Id.
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).
*383The majority opinion restricts legislative power, forgetting that this court "has consistently held that the legislative power is not derived from either the state or federal constitution. The constitutional provisions are only limitations upon the legislative power." State ex rel. McCormack v. Foley, 18 Wis. 2d 274, 280, 118 N.W.2d 211 (1962). The court stated as early as 1860 that it is "a well settled political principle that the constitution of the state is to be regarded not as a grant of power, but rather as a limitation upon the powers of the legislature, and that it is competent for the legislature to exercise all legislative power not forbidden by the constitution or delegated to the general government, or prohibited by the constitution of the United States. The legislature, subject to a qualified veto of the executive, possesses all the legislative power of the state." Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 155, 168-69 (1860).
Majority op., ¶ 70.
Id., ¶ 70.
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (a state is required to negotiate a compact in good faith when a tribe requests a compact be negotiated); § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii) (listing subjects that may be included in the compacts including remedies for breach of contract; applicability of state laws at the casinos; standards for operation and maintenance of gaming facility); § 2710(d)(4) (prohibiting taxes or fees on tribes); § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (if a state refuses to enter into negotiations regarding Class III gaming, action may be initiated for mediation and ultimately decision-making by the Secretary of the Interior).
See majority op., ¶¶ 70-72.
Rather cases validate compacts entered into by a governor who has legislative authority to negotiate and execute contracts. See, e.g., Willis v. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. 523, 532-33 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd 55 F.3d 633 (1995). Cf. Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d at 1020 (no serious constitutional issues when legislature authorizes governor to enter into compacts).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1178-79 (Kan. 1992) (no statutory authority); State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 25 (N.M. 1995) (no statutory authority); Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1061 (N.Y. 2003) (not only was there no statutory authority for the governor to execute a compact but also the assembly adopted a resolution opposing unilateral gubernatorial action); Narrangansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280, 282 (R.I. 1995) (absent specific authorization from the general assembly, the governor had no express or implied constitutional right or statutory authority to execute a compact).
But see American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1066-67 (D. Ariz. 2001) (invalidating broad delegation of legislative authority to the governor to enter gaming compacts), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002).
Majority op., ¶¶ 53, 54 n. 21, 55.
Id., ¶ 57.
The majority opinion relies on Gilbert v. Medical Examining Board, 119 Wis. 2d 168, 349 N.W.2d 68 (1984), which in turn cites Schmidt v. Local Affairs & Development Dept., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968). Schmidt in turn relies on In re Incorporation of Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N.W. 1033 (1896), and In re City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d 637, 155 N.W. 633 (1968). North Milwaukee and Beloit invalidated legislative delegation of policymaking power to the judiciary. In Beloit that delegation to the judiciary was invalid even though, as the court recognized, the same delegation of policymaking power to an administrative agency would have passed muster as having sufficient standards.
See generally Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. at 624; and City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d at 637. See also Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 53 (explaining these two cases).
Wis. Const. Art. V, § 1.
Wis. Const. Art. V, § 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See majority op., ¶ 69.
The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that had a statute authorized the governor to enter into a compact, he could have done so. Clark, 904 P.2d at 25-26.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997).
See Ch. 500, Laws of 1887.
See Ch. 243, Laws of 1879.
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 14.11, authorizing governor to employ special counsel "if in the governor's opinion the public interest requires such action" without providing any review procedures; Wis. Stat. § 14.12, authorizing governor to execute releases and satisfactions; Wis. Stat. § 14.84(1), authorizing governor to commit state to participate in multi-state Great Lakes protection fund; Wis. Stat. § 196.494(5), authorizing governor to bind the state to interstate compact to facilitate siting of regional electric transmission facilities; Wis. Stat. § 254.335(1), authorizing governor to bind state to agreements with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding regulation of nuclear waste; Wis. Stat. § 285.15, authorizing governor to enter multi-state agreement to control air pollution; Wis. Stat. *390§ 16.54(1) authorizing the governor to accept federal funds for the state "for the education, the promotion of health, the relief of indigency, the promotion of agriculture," and to "impose such conditions as in the governor's discretion may be necessary to safeguard the interests of this state."
In re Klisurich, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 279-80, 296 N.W.2d 742 (1980).
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. at 773.
Wis. Stat. § 569.02(4). See also Wis. Stat. § 569.015(2).
2003 Senate Bill 44.
Majority op., ¶ 39.
25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
Majority op., ¶¶ 38-40.
State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶ 11, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 N.W.2d 393.
Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Citizen Action and Bay Area Workforce Development Board.
Brief of Amici Curiae City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County Opposing Amended Petition for Original Jurisdiction. According to the brief, the Tribe has paid the city and county $13.24 million since 2000; has contributed over $3 million per year to Milwaukee area charities; employs 1,500 people at the Milwaukee casino; and has already paid $108 million and will pay over $243 million in future years to support the operation of the Indian Community School of Milwaukee, an important economic resource to the city and county.
Brief of Amici Curiae Milwaukee Building & Construction Trades Council, Teamsters Local Union Nos. 200 and 344, Menomonee Valley Partners, Inc., Professional Firefighters of Wisconsin, Inc., and Indian Community School of Milwaukee, Inc.
Stipulation, ¶ 31.
Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1972) ("We must assume that the Legislature found there is no such threat [to aggregated executive power], and we must accept that evaluation unless it is plainly wrong.").
Majority op., ¶ 113.
Id., ¶ 82.
Id., ¶ 113.
Compact Section XXVB.
Compact Section XXVE. referring to 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(7), IGRA.
See Compact Section XXV as amended by No. 1 (12/3/98).
Amendments to the compacts may be proposed at each fifth annual anniversary "to enhance the regulation of gaming." Compact Section XXX.D.1-2 as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03). Furthermore, amendments to "any provision of the compact" may be proposed at each 25th annual anniversary by the Tribe or the Governor as directed by a session law of the Wisconsin Legislature. Id.
Compact Section XXV as amended by No. 13 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXX.
Compact Section XXX as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03).
See Compact Section XXII.A. 1. as amended by No. 3 (5/28/03).
State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 2002 WI App 207, 20, 257 Wis. 2d 421, 651 N.W.2d 345 (Restatement (Second) of Contracts 205 cmt. d (1981)).
See Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 442-43, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987).
See Compact Section XXV and Compact Section XXX as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03).
See id.
See Compact Section XXX.C. as created by No. 14 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXX as amended by No. 14 (2/19/03) (emphasis added).
Majority op., ¶ 80.
Stipulation, ¶ 37.
Stipulation, ¶ 41.
See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, art. I, § 1.6(a), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:llD-6 (duration of 100 years, with automatic renewals unless terminated); Susquehanna River Basin Compact, art. I, § 1.5(a), 32 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 820.1 (duration of 100 years, with automatic renewals unless terminated). Many others continue indefinitely, like the compact at issue, unless the signatories mutually agree to termination or Congress repeals it: Alabama-Coosa Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, art. VIII(a), Ga. Code Ann. § 12-10-110; Colorado River Compact, art. X, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-61-101; Snake River Compact, art. XII, Idaho Code § 42-3401.
Wis. Stat. § 16.11(8)(i).
See Wis. Stat. § 16.11(8)(c).
Majority op., ¶ 81.
2003 Senate Bill 44.
See 2003 Assembly Bill 144; Stipulation, ¶ 36.
When Wis. Stat. § 14.035 was enacted in 1989, the legislature assigned to the governor the responsibility of negotiating the compacts and specifically declined to retain any oversight role for the legislature. The petitioners Panzer and Gard voted for this legislation. Both houses of the legislature considered and rejected amendments that would have required the legislature to ratify any tribal gaming compact.
Now, after the election of a new governor from a different political party, the petitioners are trying to undo what they voted for 14 years earlier. Both petitioners voted in favor of legislation (2003 Senate Bill 41) which would have amended Wis. Stat. § 14.035 by requiring legislative approval of Tribal-State gaming compacts. Panzer was a co-sponsor of the bill. The *402Governor, however, vetoed the legislation. In response, on March 4, 2003, the Senate tried, but failed, to override the Governor's veto.
Undeterred, on March 14, 2003, the legislature gave final approval to another attempted amendment to Wis. Stat. § 14.035. Again, petitioner Panzer was a co-sponsor of the bill. This time, the legislature tried to insert a provision requiring legislative approval of Tribal-State gaming compacts that exceed 15 years in duration. Assembly Bill 144 would have allowed the Governor, without legislative approval, to enter into a compact amendment authorizing the new types of games included in the 2003 FCP compact amendments. The Governor vetoed 2003 Assembly Bill 144 on March 18, 2003, and there was no attempt to override the Governor's veto.
Instead, the petitioners turned to the court and commenced this original action.
770 F. Supp. at 480.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
480 U.S. 202.
Id. at 210.
Wisconsin is also a Public Law 280 state. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162.
Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 211.
Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485.
Cdbazon Band, 480 U.S. at 211.
Id. at 222.
Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 487.
2004 WL 909159, 367 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. April 29, 2004).
45 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 1995).
Lac Courte Oreilles, slip op. at 25.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23 (citing Cabazon Band 480 U.S. 202 and Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 487). The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed these decisions as recently as last month.
Id at 23.
Forest County, 45 F.3d at 1083.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1084.
See majority op., ¶ 94.
Id., ¶ 92.
American Greyhound, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Majority op., ¶¶ 98-102.
Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 186, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987).
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978). See also State ex rel. Cannon v. Moran, 111 Wis. 2d 544, 554, 331 N.W.2d 369 (1983) in regard to the interpretation of the clause in Wisconsin.
See Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195, 210 (1914) ("[T]he constitutional amendment of 1911, and the municipal ordinances adopted in pursuance thereof, were ineffectual to impair this [contractual] right, and that the company was entitled [to pursue its business]... as it stood before the amendment.").
Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244; Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187-88.
Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187.
Id. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Kolosso Auto Sales, Inc., 148 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 1998).
Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244.
Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 187. Although Chappy involved a statute, we note the holding in Russell, 233 U.S. at 209, which stated that the federal contract clause applies to state constitutional amendments as well as legislative enactments. *414ment to make that language permanent. The assembly did not hold a timely vote on that bill, so Governor Thompson called another special session. During that session, the legislature approved June 1992 Special Session Assembly Joint Resolution 1. This proposal was virtually similar to 1991 Wis. Act 321. Dan Ritsche, Legislative Reference Bureau, The Evolution of Legalized Gambling in Wisconsin at 34-38 (1993).
Between April 1989 and June 1991, seven bills were proposed in the legislature to legalize video gaming and riverboat casinos. In 1992, Governor Thompson established a blue ribbon task force on gambling that recommended the legalization of floating casinos and video gambling machines. Governor Thompson rejected the task force's floating casino recommendation, but included a proposal to allow video gaming machines in taverns. This proposal created considerable controversy, and in response Governor Thompson called a special legislative session to consider legislation to limit the scope of permissible state-operated gambling.
On June 11,1992, the legislature passed 1991 Wis. Act 321 creating Wis. Stat. § 565.01(6m), which defined "state lottery." Some proponents worried that the legislature could repeal 1991 Wis. Act 321 at any time and favored a constitutional amend-
Id. at 188 (citation omitted).
Cannon, 111 Wis. 2d at 554.
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, 108 Wis. 2d 637, 645-47, 323 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1982).
See majority op., ¶ 98 ("Our holding today raises inevitable questions about the validity of the original 1992 FCP Gaming Compact and the 1998 amendments thereto." (emphasis added)).
See id., ¶ 102. It is important to note that the 1998 amendments to the 1992 compact expanded the number of electronic games permitted from 200 to 1,000 and added previously prohibited blackjack tables as a permissible Class III game. Certainly, if Governor Doyle did not have authority to agree to the 2003 amendments, then, adopting the reasoning of the majority opinion, Governor Thompson did not have authority to agree to the 1998 amendments. We conclude, however, that both amendments were permissible.
569 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
Id. at 739-40.
539 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
See E.A. Dickinson v. Simpson Elec. Co., 509 F. Supp. 1241, 1243, 1247 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 16, 25-26, 374 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1985); La Follette, 108 Wis. 2d at 645-46.
Compact, Section XXV
Compact, Section IVB.
Compact, Section XXX.
See majority op., ¶ 100 ("[W]e think it axiomatic that a compact is a form of contract.").
See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951).
Majority op., ¶ 99.
270 Wis. 2d 267.
Majority op., ¶ 102. Although declining to address the issue, the majority opinion doubles back and states that it has "not yet been presented with a persuasive case" to conclude that the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments were invalid. Id., ¶ 98, n. 37.
208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).
Id. at 189-90.
See Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle, 270 Wis. 2d 267.
These issues include the application of the impairment of contracts clause in the United States Constitution as well as IGRA. Majority op., ¶ 102.
Curiously, for a question of state law, all but two of the cases the majority cites in its discussion of "Expansion of Permissible Class III Gaming" are federal. See id., ¶¶ 83-102.
Id., 1 113.
104 F.3d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir. 1997).
770 F. Supp. at 480.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 135 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998); Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. State, 842 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Idaho 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1995); Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1993); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State of Conn., 913 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1990).
Majority op., ¶¶ 88-92.
480 U.S. at 222.
Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 480-81.
Id.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-74 (1996).
88 F.3d 536, 545 (8th Cir. 1996). In Gaming Corp., the Eighth Circuit also held that "[e]xamination of the text and structure of IGRA, its legislative history, and its jurisdictional framework likewise indicates that Congress intended it completely preempt state law." Id. at 544.
See also Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1557 ("IGRA is a federal statute, the interpretation of which presents a federal question suitable for determination by a federal court.").
S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3076.
Id. at 3075.
See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
In Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1557, the court analogized Tribal-State gaming compacts to interstate compacts and cited Dyer, 341 U.S. at 22 for the proposition that challenges to the validity of such compacts present issues of federal law.
Majority op., ¶ 81, n. 31 (citing Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 Ariz. St. L. J. 25 (1997)).
449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981).
See also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959); Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. at 28-29.
Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440.
Dyer, 341 U.S. at 28; Petty, 359 U.S. at 278-79.
Wis. Const. Art. IV § 27.
Miller Brands-Milwaukee v. Case, 162 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 470 N.W.2d 290 (1991).
Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, ¶ 41, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866.
Majority op., ¶ 103, n. 42.
See Compact Section XXII.C. as amended by No. 6 (5/28/03) (emphasis added).
Majority op., ¶ 110.
See Compact Section XXII.C. as amended by No. 6 (5/28/03) (emphasis added).
Majority op., ¶ 113.
Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 Wis. 2d 10, 24, 440 N.W.2d 777 (1989).
State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 379, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).
Id.
This clause was added in its entirety in the 2003 amendment. Previously the compact contained no severability clause.
Compact Section XXXV as amended by No. 18 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXXIII.B. as amended by No. 17 (2/19/03). This clause was new in the 2003 amendments. The previous Section XXXIII treated all compact terms the same. If one term were found invalid or unenforceable, the parties would meet and renegotiate that term.
See generally Compact Section XXII as amended by No. 11 (2/19/03).
XXXI Payment to the State.
G. In consideration for the agreement in Section XXXI.B. of the Compact, which affords the Tribe substantial exclusivity, the Tribe shall:
1. Pay one-time payments, on or before the due date, by electronic transfer as follows:
a. $6,375 million on June 30, 2003 and $6,375 million on June 30, 2004 to the State of Wisconsin as provided in Amendments #1; and
*434b. $34,125 million on June 30, 2004 and $43,625 million on June 30, 2005 to State of Wisconsin ....
Compact Section XXXI as amended by No. 16 (2/19/03).
XXXI.G.2. Commencing July 1, 2005, the Tribe shall pay to the State of Wisconsin an amount equal to a percentage of the Tribe's Menomonee Valley Class III net win as follows: 7% per annum for the period July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006; 8% per annum for- the period July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2008; 7% per annum for the period July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009; 6% per annum for the period July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2011; and 6.5% per annum thereafter. Compact Section XXXI.G.2. as amended by No. 16 (2/19/03).
Compact Section XXXIII.A. as amended by No. 17 (2/19/03).
See Compact Section XXXIII.A.(iii) as amended by No. 9 (5/30/03).
Under Section XXXI.G.l.a. the tribe was required to pay $6,375 million on June 30, 2003 and $6,375 million on June 30, *4352004. However, the 1998 amendment already required those payments to be made so they need not be refunded. See Compact Section XXXI as amended by No. 1 (1998). Section XXXI.G.l.b. requires payments in addition to the payments previously required and reflects the changes made by the 2003 amendments.
See Compact Section XXXI.G.l.b. as amended by No. 8 (5/30/03). As previously noted, payments from all Wisconsin Tribes would have totaled nearly $207 million over the biennium.
Majority op., ¶ 75.
The Tribe shall make an annual payment to the State for each one (1) year period beginning June 3, 1999 through June 3, 2004 in the amount of $6,375,000. Compact Section XXXI.A. as created by No. 6 (1998).
See Compact Section XXXIII.C. as amended by No. 17 (2/19/03).
Majority op., ¶ 112.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. State, 53 Wis. 509, 512, 10 N.W. 560 (1881).
See Compact Section XXII.A.9.C. as amended by No. 2 (5/28/03).
See CleanSoils Wisconsin, Inc. v. DOT, 229 Wis. 2d 600, 610-11, 599 N.W.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1999).
Wisconsin Stat. § 16.007 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Purpose. The claims board shall receive, investigate and make recommendations on all claims of $10 or more presented against the state which are referred to the board by the department. No claim or bill relating to such a claim shall he considered by the legislature until a recommendation thereon has been made by the claims board....
(3) Procedure. When a claim has been referred to the claims board, the board may upon its own motion and shall upon request of the claimant, schedule such claim for hearing.
(5) Findings. The board shall report its findings and recommendations, on all claims referred to it, to the legislature.
Wisconsin Stat. § 775.01 provides:
Actions against state; bond. Upon the refusal of the legislature to allow a claim against the state the claimant may commence an action against the state by service as provided in s. 801.11(3) and by filing with the clerk of court a bond, not exceeding $1,000, with 2 or more sureties, to be approved by the attorney general, to the effect that the claimant will indemnify the state against all costs that may accrue in such action and pay to the clerk of court all costs, in case the claimant fails to obtain judgment against the state.
See State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 1053, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994).
Wisconsin Stat. § 16.75 provides in part:
(l)(a) 1. All orders awarded or contracts made by the department for all materials, supplies, equipment, and contractual services to be provided to any agency, except as otherwise provided ... shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, taking into consideration life cycle cost estimates under sub. (lm), when appropriate, the location of the agency, the quantities of the articles to be *440supplied, their conformity with the specifications, and the purposes for which they are required and the date of delivery....
(lm) The department shall award each order or contract for materials, supplies or equipment on the basis of life cycle cost estimates, whenever such action is appropriate. Each authority other than the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority shall award each order or contract for materials, supplies or equipment on the basis of life cycle contract for materials, supplies or equipment on the basis of life cycle cost estimates, whenever such action is appropriate....
Wisconsin Stat. § 20.505(2)(a) and (k) provide:
(a) General fund supplement — risk management claims. A sum sufficient to supplement the appropriation under par. (k) whenever the amounts collected under par. (k) are insufficient to pay all claims under that paragraph and all administrative costs under par. (ki) in any fiscal year.
(k) Risk management costs. All moneys received from agencies under s. 16.865(8) and all moneys transferred from the appropriation under par. (ki) for the costs of paying claims for losses of and damage to state property, settlements of state liability under ss. 165.25(6), 775.04, 895.46(1) and 895.47, and state employer costs for worker's compensation claims of state employees under ch. 102, and for related administrative costs under par. (ki).
Wisconsin Stat. § 20.865(l)(fm) provides:
The amounts in the schedule to supplement the appropriations of state agencies for costs assessed under s. 16.865(8) to pay for state liability arising from judgments and settlements under ss. 165.25(6), 775.04, 895.46 (1) and 895.47, for state employer costs for worker's compensation claims of state employees under ch. 102 *441and for losses of and damage to state property incurred in programs financed with general purpose revenue.
State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 148, 264 N.W.2d 622 (1936) (internal quotation marks omitted).