(dissent). The decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board should be affirmed. The facts demonstrate that the employee’s injuries did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. The employee’s injuries were not actionable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, although he is not without remedy elsewhere.
The employee was injured when the truck he was driving struck the rear end of an automobile. *639The accident occurred at around 7 a.m. on the morning of May 1, 1968. The employee was going to his daughter’s residence three or so miles to the north of his home to give her a ride to school. He was to be at his place of employment at 8:00-8:30 a.m. It was located to the east of his residence.
The referee found, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board agreed and the record clearly proves
"that evidence submitted by or on behalf of Plaintiff fails to convince this Referee that at the time of said truck-auto accident that Plaintiff was carrying out any order or orders of his employer nor was he performing any duty or duties to further the business of his employer, but rather, that his mission was personal to the Plaintiff employee.”
The record also shows that the employer prohibited use of company trucks for the employees’ personal business.1 Although no employee was dis*640charged for such use, any vehicle or other damage occurring during personal business became the employee’s liability. 2 The employer did not even tacitly condone use of the company vehicle for personal purposes.
On the basis of the factual findings, the referee *641held "that the personal injury sustained by Plaintiff * * * did not arise out of and in the course pf his employment by said Defendant employer, and, accordingly, compensation is denied.” The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board affirmed saying "in this particular case plaintiff was not in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, because he had not even entered a business-connected path from which to deviate.” The board held that even if plaintiff had "entered a business-connected path” the claim would be barred by Conklin v Industrial Transport, Inc, 312 Mich 250; 20 NW2d 179 (1945).
The board’s reference to Conklin was made with regard to a posed hypothetical and was not required for its holding in this case. I reserve judgment on Conklin’s continuing validity until a case arises involving an employee’s deviation from the normal course of employment for the sole purpose of carrying out a personal mission. Conklin does not state a rule of law applicable to our facts.
In addition to unnecessarily overruling Conklin, the Court has remanded this case for investigation of whether the employee "acted under general acceptance by the employer that company vehicles would be used from time to time for personal purposes”. Such action is likewise unnecessary.
Article 6, §28 of our constitution says that "in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law” findings of fact "in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive.” Such language does not admit interpretation. Also see MCLA 413.12; MSA 17.186.
The referee found that "[prohibition by Defendant employer against the use of Company owned trucks by driver-employees for use on personal business has been established (D. ex. No. 1) with concurrence by Plaintiff.” The board agreed.
*642The Court has "recognized” this finding and said it "does not overlook that finding”. Not only must we "recognize” and "not overlook” such finding, but we are constitutionally compelled to accept such finding.
The employee’s accident occurred during a purely personal activity undertaken before he reported to work or began his assigned duties. The cases cited by the Court do not sustain an opinion indicating that injuries resulting from such an accident are compensable under the workmen’s compensation law.
The workman in Crilly v Ballou, 353 Mich 303; 91 NW2d 493 (1958), sustained an injury while throwing shingles. The employer claimed such conduct was not within the course of employment. The Court awarded compensation requiring "that there be a causal connection between the work, or the incidents thereof, the working conditions, and the injury”. Such requirement "serves to exclude the purely personal, nonwork connected disputes”. Also see Fidelity & Casualty Co of New York v DeShone, 384 Mich 686; 187 NW2d 215 (1971).
In Howard v Detroit, 377 Mich 102; 139 NW2d 677 (1966), plaintiff sought compensation for injuries received while returning to work for the second half of his split shift. The Court noted that "plaintiff had not finished his day’s work.” The following facts taken from Bisdom v Kerbrat, 251 Mich 316; 232 NW 408 (1930), were considered applicable:
"In the case cited, plaintiff was enroute to his dinner, rather than returning thereafter, but the special circumstance was created by a specific requirement of his employment on that day. It resulted from a direct order from his employer and had no application to any other day. The essential point abides. The circumstance was a *643deviation from his regular normal working schedule. It was for his employer’s benefit and was an incident of his contract of employment. Thus it was that a circumstance of his employment placed him where he was at the time of his accidental injury. So too, it was a circumstance of his employment that placed plaintiff in this case where he was when he was accidentally injured.”
The Court vacated an order denying benefits and remanded with instructions to award the employee benefits. Also see Beaudry v Watkins, 191 Mich 445; 158 NW 16 (1916).
In Burchett v Delton-Kellogg School, 378 Mich 231; 144 NW2d 337 (1966), the Court established the "dual-purpose rule”. The following passage from Clifton v Kroger Grocery & Baking Co, 217 Mich 462; 187 NW 380 (1922) was cited as support:
"This general rule has its full application to common laborers and other employees who work during stated hours at specific places, and when they are through for the day are free to go where they like and do as they please, with no further responsibility under their employment or duty to perform for their employers until working hours begin the next day or until they again resume their employment. If in the meantime they are accidentally injured while going somewhere or doing some act wholly for their own benefit they are not protected by the statute. But that rule does not necessarily apply where the injured employee is yet acting within the scope of his employment, carrying out the orders of his employer and performing some duty to further the latter’s business. Where he was going or what he was doing might also further his own interest but it would not in itself bar him from recovery.
* * *
"That plaintiff was performing a daily duty imposed by distinct orders of his employer at the time and as required by the terms of employmeiít is undisputed, and there is evidential support for the conclusion of the *644board that there were peculiar circumstances surrounding this case.”
While reserving my judgment on the "dual-purpose rule”, I do not believe the employee in this case may claim its protection. The employee was, in fact, acting contrary to the rules of his employer.
The findings of fact in the instant case were that the employee was not acting under orders of the employer nor were his actions furthering the business of the employer. The referee and the board agreed that the "mission was personal to the Plaintiff employee.”
I find no support for the employee’s claim in the cases cited above. They compel me to conclude that the claim must fail.
I believe the referee and the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board reached a proper legal conclusion based on the established facts. The employee did not suffer an injury that arose out of or in the course of his employment.
I would affirm.
J. W. Fitzgerald, J., did not sit in this case.The employee made the following remarks during the taking of his deposition:
"Q. Sir, are you aware of a company rule against using the trucks for personal business?
"A. Yes.
"Q. So that all you were suppose to do is drive the truck from your home to work and then directly home again, isn’t that true?
"A. That’s correct.
"Q. And you were not suppose to use it for your own personal affairs, isn’t that correct?
"A. Not for personal affairs.
"Q. It was suppose to be strictly company business whenever you used the truck?
"A. Yes.”
The president of defendant company testified in part:
"The Referee: Are you aware that in any of the trucks there’s posted any prohibition against using the trucks for personal use or for carrying passengers other than the driver?
"A. We have posted this on several different occasions over the last numerous years.
"The Referee: In the truck?
"A. Not in the truck, we, and the dispatcher hands them a memo.
"The Referee: Defendant’s Exhibit 1 has been admitted. Is this your signature?
"A. Yes, it is.
*640"The Referee: This is dated April 13,1966, is that correct?
"A. Yes.
"The Referee: Have there been prior notices?
"A. Prior, yes.
"The Referee: There have been?
"A. Yes.
"The Referee: You proceed to have them prepared, you said, then they are what?
"A. Handed to the man. Normally, the best way to get, to give it to them is with the pay check.”
The company president testified on cross-examination:
"Q. I see. Mr. Crawford, at any time has anyone ever been suspended or fired for using your trucks on personal business?
"A. Suspended or fired, they have paid for two trucks that they damaged on personal business, but they’ve never been suspended.
"Q. He was in a truck and had a wreck?
"A. That was what the police report was.
"Q. Was he suspended or fired?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. He just paid for the property damage to the truck?
"A. Yes, sir.”
On redirect examination he further explained the company policy:
"Q. There was more than one occasion or was that the only occasion?
"A. Just two of them.
"Q. That you recall?
"A. That I know of.
"Q. Let’s take another situation, let’s say the man is involved in a collision on Company business, do you charge him for it, then?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you have any insurance for collision?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. So, if it’s Company business, you pay for it; if he is on his own personal business and you catch him, then he has to pay for it, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.”
The company official who ran the personnel office and handled financial matters testified as to two instances where employees were required to pay for damages to company vehicles. He said that Mr. Thomas himself had been billed for damages to the company vehicle caused by the accident in the instant case.