(concurring in part, dissenting in part). That part of the majority’s opinion resolving the first issue is strengthened by the decision in Michigan Civil Rights Commission v Clark, 390 Mich 717, 727; 212 NW2d 912, 916 (1973). I am in agreement with that part of the opinion.
However, I must dissent from the manner in which the majority has resolved the second issue because it is inappropriate at this stage of this case. The majority’s opinion may well encourage other respondents to attempt to similarly circumvent the Civil Rights Commission.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff city has the right to establish bona fide occupational qualifications for various job classifications. There is considerable doubt, however, as to the advisability of making the initial determination in the circuit court or this Court as to what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification before the Civil Rights Commission has had an opportunity to pass upon the question. The plaintiff city chose to respond to the complaint by starting suit in circuit court rather than by answering and defending on the merits before the commission. Recourse to the court at that point was premature.
*111The constitutional stature of the Civil Rights Commission has been reaffirmed in Michigan Civil Rights Commission v Clark, supra, 390 Mich 726; 212 NW2d 915, 916 (1973), which held that the provisions of MCLA 564.401a; MSA 26.1300(401a) authorizing the removal of a proceeding before the commission to the circuit court was unconstitutional. Justice Levin, writing for the majority, reasoned that just as the Legislature may not prevent the executive or judicial branches of government from exercising their powers, similarly the Legislature could not prevent the Civil Rights Commission from functioning effectively.
The majority has recognized the significance of the spirit as well as the letter of the holdings of the Supreme Court. This recognition prevents me from joining in the decision to reverse. The courts no less than the Legislature should not act in a matter which prevents the Civil Rights Commission from functioning effectively. The decision of the majority ordering the issuance of the order of superintending control will interfere with the orderly functioning of the commission.
Another reason for not issuing the order of superintending control under circumstances such as these was referred to in Clark:
" 'An individual against whom the Commission has proceeded may seek injunctive relief from threatened harm under the same principles applicable to threatened illegal action by other administrative agencies’, including further developments (after the adoption of the 1963 Constitution) of general application of such principles.” Michigan Civil Rights Commission v Clark, supra, 390 Mich 725; 212 NW2d 915.
In the present case, equitable relief is not warranted because the city has not made a sufficient showing that it will suffer harm if required to *112proceed initially before the Civil Rights Commission.
One of the fundamental principles of administrative law requires that all administrative remedies be exhausted before judicial relief is sought. Holman v Industrial Stamping & Manufacturing Co, 344 Mich 235; 74 NW2d 322 (1955); Craig v Detroit Police Department, 49 Mich App 599; 212 NW2d 235 (1973). This rule was based upon the presumption that the administrative agency will decide the issue correctly if it is given an opportunity to do so. The rule is not suspended merely by the fact that the administrative alction may be erroneous. Bennett v Royal Oak School District, 10 Mich App 265, 159 NW2d 245 (1968), leave to appeal denied, 381 Mich 755 (1968).
In addition, the policy considerations governing the issuance of an order of superintending control, expressed in GCR 1963, 711.2, are further indication of the unsuitability of that relief in this case:
"The order of superintending control should not be issued if another plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to the party seeking the order.”
The city has another adequate remedy; it can participate in the proceedings before the commission, reserving resort to the courts until the commission’s ruling is known. Where an alternative remedy is available, the order of superintending control will not issue. Bennett v Royal Oak School District, supra.
There is a strong possibility that, following a hearing, the Civil Rights Commission would have determined that the age restriction was a "bona fide occupational qualification” and, therefore, that it did not constitute an unfair employment practice under MCLA 423.303a(a); MSA 17.458(3a)(a). *113After such a determination had been made, the city, if still dissatisfied, could have taken an appeal to the circuit court on the record developed before the commission. Lesniak v Fair Employment Practices Commission, 364 Mich 495, 506; 111 NW2d 790, 796 (1961). Had the city allowed the administrative process to continue to completion, it is conceivable that no court action would have been required. Burton v Velosky, 22 Mich App 646, 649-650; 177 NW2d 679, 681 (1970).
Finally, the grant or denial of an order of superintending control is within the sound discretion of the trial court. A denial of the order should be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion. People v East Lansing Judge, 42 Mich App 32, 36; 201 NW2d 318, 321 (1972); LaPratt v Keego Harbor Justice of the Peace, 1 Mich App 657, 660; 137 NW2d 769, 770-771 (1965). There has been no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in the present case. I would affirm.