(dissenting). The majority opinion declares constitutional the "experimental" Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, which involves less than one percent of the city's school popu*556lation and, according to the majority, an "inconsequential" amount of funding. Majority op. at 513, 527 n.11, 530, 539. I dissent even though I have concluded that the majority opinion has very limited application. Any increased coverage of the program or continuation of the program beyond a reasonable time for experimentation could still fall victim to a successful constitutional attack.
Despite the majority opinion's limited application, I dissent because I believe that the existing Parental Choice Program violates art. X, the Education Article, of the Wisconsin Constitution. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
H-i
First, I conclude that the Parental Choice Program violates the mandate of art. X that the legislature provide a system of free public education for children of a certain age.1 To determine the constitutionality of the Parental Choice Program the court must look to the words of art. X, the constitutional debates and educational practices in existence in 1848, and the earliest interpretations by the legislature. State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). If these sources do not provide an answer, the court will look to "the objectives of the framers in adopting the provision." Beno, 116 Wis. 2d at 138.
*557The language of art. X does not grant the legislature authority to create district schools. The legislature has that authority without art. X.2 Article X compels the legislature to exercise its authority to create district schools; it commands the legislature to establish a specific educational system — district schools, statewide uniformity, and free tuition for children of certain ages. Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 98, 285 N.W. 403 (1939). In other words, art. X prohibits the legislature from refusing to establish district schools. Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1 Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 657, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977); 64 O.A.G. 24, 25-26 (1975). The legislature could not disband the public school system and pay every student in the state or every private school a sum for education. The state constitution through art. X, unlike the federal Constitution, makes an equal opportunity for government-supported education a fundamental right of the student and a fundamental responsibility of state and local government. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 488, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989); Base v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 569, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
In 1846 when Wisconsin's first constitution was drafted, substantially all schooling was private. 37 O.A.G. 347, 349 (1948). Although art. X was debated at the convention, support for wholly publicly funded district schools was virtually unanimous. The constitutional plan was an express rejection of and remedy for the patchwork system of diverse schools with mixed public and private funding that existed during the territorial period. Article X mandates a state system of free *558public education.3
From art. X's command to the legislature to establish publicly funded education and its extensive provisions for a general system of free public schools, I conclude that the constitution prohibits the legislature from diverting state support for the district schools to a duplicate, competitive private system of schools.4 It seems clear that the constitutional system of public education was intended to be the only general school instruction to be supported by taxation. No Wisconsin case has interpreted the constitution as permitting the legislature to create a system of publicly financed private schools that operates in competition with the district schools in delivering basic education.5
*559Under the Parental Choice Program, tax money earmarked for the public schools is transferred to private schools, enabling them to compete directly with public schools in supplying basic primary education. The majority opinion correctly concludes, majority op. at 538, that the legislature is free to establish free public educational programs beyond those that are constitutionally mandated. See, e.g., Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 97-98, 285 N.W. 403 (1939). In this case, however, the Parental Choice Program does not augment but instead supplants the educational programs the constitution requires the legislature to provide in public schools. I therefore conclude that the Program violates art. X.
My second reason for concluding that the Parental Choice Program is unconstitutional is that the Program does not ensure that the students who receive basic education through public funding in participating private *560schools receive an education as nearly uniform as practicable to that received by other students who receive basic education through public funds. Article X, sec. 3, requires the legislature to "provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable . . .."6
Interpretation of the uniformity provision is difficult because the language is ambiguous and the framers of the constitution did not discuss this particular clause. Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 519 (Heffernan, C.J., Abrahamson, J. & Bablitch, J., dissenting); Erik LeRoy, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1325, 1350. Nevertheless, the court has derived at least two principles from art. X and from the educational practices in Wisconsin at the time of the adoption of the constitution to govern the interpretation of art. X, sec. 3.
This court has repeatedly asserted the principle that art. X, sec. 3 "applies to the districts after they are formed, —to the character of the instruction given, —rather than to the means by which they are established and their boundaries fixed." Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 486 (quoting State ex rel Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 290, 223 N.W. 123 (1928)). Therefore we know that the framers were not concerned in art. X, sec. 3, with the structure of the school system established7 but with the *561character of instruction or "the training that these schools should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin." Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 486 (quoting Zilisch, 197 Wis. at 290).
The majority opinion, however, focuses on the organization of the schools providing the education and not on the character of the education provided in interpreting the term "district schools."
The second principle is that the framers of the 1848 constitution viewed uniform public education as the means to strengthen democracy by allowing knowledgeable participation in all public affairs. LeRoy, supra, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. at 1325-26, 1345-46. "A general system of education was the only system on which we could depend for the preservation of our liberties." Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 488 (quoting Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 238 (1847-48)). Uniform public education provided a unifying force for the citizens of diverse heritages who settled in the new state of Wisconsin. "Universal Education," Milwaukee Sentinel & Gazette (August 22, 1846), reproduced in Milo M. Quaife, The Movement for Statehood 188 (1918); LeRoy, supra, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. at 1347.8 The majority opinion, *562however, permits the legislature to subvert the unifying, democratizing purpose of public education by using public funds to substitute private education for public education without the concomitant controls exerted over public education. -
Article X, sec. 3 requires the legislature to ensure that all Wisconsin children who receive basic education through public funding receive a uniform education reflecting the shared values of our state. By failing to guide adequately the education of students who participate in the Parental Choice Program, the legislature has failed to obey its constitutional mandate.
II.
The majority opinion devotes nearly three quarters of its lengthy opinion to the issue whether this experimental program is a private or local bill passed contrary to the procedural requirements set forth in art. IV, sec. 18, Wis. Const.9 This case once again proves that "the constitutional language embodied in sec. 18, art. IV, is easily understood but not easily applied.. . . The task of deciding what constitutes a local or private law as opposed to a general law has been the source of difficulty in this state . . Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Department of Transp., 101 Wis. 2d 64, 73, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981), *563quoted with approval in Milwaukee Brewers v. DH&SS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 107, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986). Other states have had the same difficulty with similar provisions in their constitutions.
Unfortunately this court's prior opinions, and the majority and two dissenting opinions in this case, have not set forth analyses and tests that the legislature, the public, lawyers, circuit courts or the court of appeals can apply with any certainty or confidence. No one can be sure, until this court decides, probably by a closely divided vote, whether a law sets forth a classification making the Brookfield test applicable, Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988), or is specific to a person or place requiring the application of the Milwaukee Brewers test, and whether the law passes constitutional muster under either test.10 Chief Justice Heffernan's and Justice Bab-litch's dissents add the possibility of the court's not accepting the legislature's classification, recharacterizing the legislation, and testing the court-imposed classification for constitutionality.
The majority opinion, like the court's prior opinions, again fails to explain the overlap between the classification test under art. IV, sec. 18, and the test under the state constitutional equal protection guarantee.11
More significantly, while upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the majority opinion has mandated an analysis that seriously infringes on the legislature's autonomy. The majority opinion applies a *564presumption of constitutionality only when the legislature has "adequately considered or discussed" or "intelligently participated in considering" the bill at issue. Majority op. at 522, 523.12 Nothing in the constitution directly or indirectly empowers this court to measure the legislative consideration of a bill for adequacy or intelligence. This court's grading the deliberations of the legislative branch inappropriately invades the functions of the legislative branch and misconstrues art. IV, sec. 18.
If the majority believes a law tested under art. IV, sec. 18, a procedural provision, requires a different presumption than the presumption of constitutionality generally accorded a law tested under a substantive constitutional provision, and I do not think it does, I suggest that the court accord the law challenged under art. IV., sec. 18, a presumption of regularity.13
*565The constitution speaks of private or local bills; the constitution does not talk about smuggling or degrees of the legislature's awareness of the subject matter of bills. Our opinions interpreting art. IV, sec. 18, should formulate as simple a test as possible for determining whether a law is private or local, the issue addressed by the state constitution, without.considering "smuggling."
Because the legislature has the power to enact private and local laws as separate laws and because the statutes are replete with laws affecting only first class cities or specific people or places in the state, I believe the court should, in deference to the separation of powers doctrine, exercise restraint in declaring laws unconstitutional under art. IV, sec. 18. The court should invalidate a statute on the basis of the form of the statute only in exceptional cases where the private and local aspects are pervasive and only a general statewide interest appears.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
The majority devotes a mere three and a half pages, less than ten percent of its opinion, to the question whether the legislation satisfies the constitutional requirement of the educational uniformity clause, art. X, sec. 3, an issue of first impression. It devotes seven pages (about 19 percent) to the issue of public purpose.
The state constitution is not a grant of power to the legislature but a restriction on legislative authority. Outagamie County v. Zuehlke, 165 Wis. 32, 35, 161 N.W. 6 (1917).
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 518, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989); Alice Smith, The History of Wisconsin 576 (1973); Erik LeRoy, Comment, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1325, 1344-50.
Wisconsin educators have always been aware of the potential detrimental effect of competing private schools on public schools. Responding to charges of "immorality" in the public schools, one early state superintendent asked: "But. . . was not this the fault of the private schools? Was not the removal of the best scholars the most severe blow that could be dealt the public schools? Did it not produce the very inferiority that was condemned?” Lloyd P. Jorgenson, The Founding of Public Education in Wisconsin 188 (1956) (citing Wisconsin Journal of Education 2:23-25 (July 1857)).
In 1869, about twenty years after the adoption of the constitution, Justice Paine advanced a similar interpretation of art. X. In a case where a private law authorized the town of Jefferson to levy a tax to aid in the construction of buildings for a private educational institution, Justice Paine reasoned that granting public funding for the private school was invalid under art. X because art. X implied that the public system was designed to be the only *559instruction to be supported by taxation. "Our constitution provides for a general system of public free schools. . . . And from the general and extensive character of the provisions upon this subject, I think there is some implication that this system was designed to be exclusive, and to furnish the only public instruction which was to be supported by taxation." Curtis's Administrator v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, 360 (1869) (Paine, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Hallows, writing for the court in State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d 210, 170 N.W.2d 790 (1969), concluded that Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 98, 285 N.W. 403 (1939), rejected Justices Paine's view. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 221. Manitowoc does not support Justice Hallows' conclusion. The Manitowoc court held that art. X, sec. 3 does not prohibit the legislature from providing free education to people beyond the ages of four through twenty. Manitowoc therefore stands only for the proposition that the legislature may augment the free public education system the constitution mandates in art. X.
Article X, sec. 3 provides in full:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein; but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction outside the district schools, authorize the release of students during regular school hours.
See also Larson v. State Appeal Board, 56 Wis. 2d 823, *561827-28, 202 N.W.2d 916 (1973); Joint School District v. Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d 410, 420, 88 N.W.2d 357 (1958).
The framers reinforced this concern for the content of education when they required local financial support for the schools in art. X, sec. 4. The framers believed that local financial contributions would focus local attention on the operation of the schools and the education of their children. "No adequate interest was felt by the people, in common schools, unless they contributed to their support." Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 335 (1847-48).
Article X, sec. 4 states:
Each town and city shall be required to raise by tax, annually, for the *562support of common schools therein, a sum not less than one-half the amount received by such town or city respectively for school purposes from the income of the school fund.
Article X, sec. 2 established the school fund from the proceeds of the sale of lands that the United States granted to Wisconsin upon its attaining statehood.
Article IV, sec. 18 states:
No private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title.
Why should this court apply a different test to a statute referring to Milwaukee than it would to a statute referring to first class cities?
See Keith Levy, Constitutional Limitations on Appropriations, 11 UCLA-Alaska L. Rev. 189, 200-02 (1982); State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 642-43 (Alaska 1977).
All decisions prior to Brookfield evaluating a challenge under art. IV, sec. 18 or the similar provisions of art. IV, secs. 31 and 32 applied a presumption of constitutionality. See, e.g., Soo Line, 101 Wis. 2d at 76; Madison Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 356-57, 359 (1970); Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 24 (1901); Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 391 (1894). See also 2 C. Dallas Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction sec. 40.06, at 215 (1986 Rev. ed.); 1 C. Dallas Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction sec. 2.04, at 29 (1986 Rev. ed.).
I continue to wonder why courts and litigants rely on the concepts of presumption of constitutionality and proof of unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt without discussing what these concepts mean in the particular case. What does the presumption mean in terms of what evidence is needed? Does the presumption affect how the evidence is to be presented? What is the significance of who bears the burden of proof? What is the application of the presumption when the facts are undisputed and only the question of constitutionality, that is a question of law, is presented? See, e.g., Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 125-31 *565(Abrahamson, J., dissenting); State ex rel. Briggs & Stratton v. Noll, 100 Wis. 2d 650, 663-64 (1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). See generally Williard Hurst, Dealing With Statutes, 87-99 (1982).