(dissenting). I agree with the majority that public policy, as recognized by Watts v. Watts, 137 *698Wis. 2d 506, 529, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (1987) (contract claim by one cohabitant against the other must rest on consideration independent of the sexual relationship), precludes an action for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift when the expectancy rests solely on a meretricious relationship. Nevertheless, I conclude that dismissal of the complaint was error.
As the majority notes, our analysis on this appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Lynette Harris' complaint is not only limited by the allegations in that complaint, but those allegations must also be viewed in a light most favorable to the assertion of a lawful claim. See Morgan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1979) (A claim may be dismissed only if " 'it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover.' ") (citation omitted). I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the allegation that Harris provided to David Kritzik "all of the services and companionship of a wife" (emphasis added) requires the majority's conclusion that "Harris' services or consideration for [David Kritzik's] promise [of a legacy] were merely meretricious." Majority op. at 697 (emphasis added). While the majority's conclusion may be true, it is not the only supportable inference that can be drawn from the complaint. Since "a bargain between two people is not illegal merely because there is an illicit relationship between the two so long as the bargain is independent of the illicit relationship and the illicit relationship does not constitute any part of the consideration bargained for and is not a condition of the bargain," In re Estate of Steffes, 95 Wis. 2d 490, 514, 290 N.W.2d 697, 709 (1980), and since the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to Harris, can be read as alleging a *699promise "independent" of an "illicit relationship," I respectfully dissent.