(dissenting). I don’t think we should sweep away the solid underpinnings and blur the bright line ruling in Walker v Walker, 155 Mich App 405; 399 NW2d 541 (1986). I resolutely reaffirm the Walker holding and wholeheartedly agree with the ruling that a spouse who is awarded pension benefits "free and clear from any and all claims” of the opposite party cannot have that benefit recategorized as income upon retire*660ment for purposes of determining ability to pay alimony.
Is this such a case?
These parties were married June 16, 1950. At the time of the divorce the husband was fifty and the wife forty-nine. The property settlement provisions of the divorce are as sparse as I have ever seen and cover only a page and a quarter of a four-page judgment. The judgment itself offers no clue as to the relative value of the proportions of property awarded to the parties. Trial was conducted before the Honorable Arthur E. Moore, a visiting circuit judge sitting in Macomb County on July, 26, 1979. The court made findings of fact in which it stated:
The Judgment of Divorce will recognize the settlement which you have made of property and assets previously. They were made voluntarily, and there is no reason why they should be interferred [sic] with. They give both parties home [sic, some?] rights.
In the division of assets the wife got $36,500 from the sale of the home, the husband got his pension valued at $26,500 and $6,500 from the sale of the home for a total of $33,000. As to the retirement benefit the trial judge stated as follows:
I also find and determine that an asset involved in this litigation, or at least discussed in it, is Mr. Stoltman’s right to retirement benefits, and here the only testimony which is available, and which I accept, is that as of the present time that retirement benefits [sic] has a cash value, alternatively, of twenty-six thousand five hundred dollars, or thereabouts. The terms of that retirement are that he may designate himself, or a future wife, or other beneficiary as he chooses.
Now, under the law, and he has the right, as it *661is presently provided, to take his own retirement if and when he retires, and that he is not under any requirement of early retirement, or specified retirement, and that it is uncertain at this time when he will retire and become entitled to his retirement. For this reason, I think it is particularly important to note the following findings: There is nothing to indicate that Mr. Stoltman isn’t reasonably well. On the other hand, it is notable from both the testimony and appearance of Mrs. Stoltman, that she has been, and is ill to a considerable extent, and that she is emotionally excitable, and somewhat, I would think, resultant combustibly, emotionally unstable, and is unemployed for that reason, and will not be employed unless much change for the good, [sic] Since she is not employed now, and he is employed, and may be employed for a considerable time, the alimony allowance should be quite liberal.
The court continued on with regard to the award of alimony:
I find and determine he is presently supporting and living with another woman as a family entity, which is in violation of his obligation as a married person. I find, and determine, that it is fair for the Court to demand and require payment of alimony for a continuing period of time; namely for an indefinite time unless and until a change of circumstances show [sic] that it should be modified. That is the reason why the law provides for modification in alimony situations. Since the parties have been unable to agree upon the amount of alimony, or upon the limitation, any limitation on alimony, it will be an order that it is continuing until further order of the Court.
Turning to the amount of alimony, since the alimony may continue for some considerable time, I think it’s only fair and reasonable that the retirement benefits which he may have, be decreed to be his own and separate property, and because *662of that being one of the reasons, because of that, it is a good reason for some liberality in alimony.
In setting the alimony the trial judge completely garbled the amounts and came out with a figure of $200 per week alimony. For some reason a judgment was not entered thereafter until November 13, 1979, by a different judge, Judge James C. Daner, incorporating the $200 figure. On April 3, 1980, the husband convinced Judge Daner, and presumably the Friend of the Court, that Judge Moore had garbled the figures and the alimony award was reduced to $130 per week retroactive to the date of the judgment, November 13, 1979.
In the Walker case there are very few facts presented. They may of course be irrelevant but we do not know the length of the marriage, the amount of the alimony, the amount of the property settlement, or the amount of the pension benefits. In the case at bar we know the ages of the parties, the very modest amount of the property settlement, and the cash evaluation of the plaintiff’s retirement benefits as of July 26, 1979: $26,500.
However, immediately prior to plaintiff’s retirement on April 3, 1986, his weekly gross salary was $577.62. We don’t know his net pay. His subsequent net retirement income was estimated at $430.21 per week. This retirement income evidences almost no diminution in income from plaintiff’s 1979 salary of $474.20 net per week. Therefore, the evaluation of plaintiff’s pension made in July, 1979, was either grossly understated because of a tiered or platform evaluation or was an inaccurate valuation.
I think what the last successor judge (Judge Bruff) did in his order of May 9, 1986, was eminently correct when he remanded to the Friend of *663the Court to investigate plaintiffs income and make a recommendation. However, he should have permitted evaluation only of that amount of plaintiffs pension which constituted an increase from July, 1979, to his retirement, April 3, 1986. In other words, plaintiff husband should not have to pay alimony out of the amount of the pension he was awarded in November of 1979. That should be excluded from the trial court’s assessment of his ability to pay when considering the reduction of alimony because of his retirement. I do not suggest how this should be accomplished. Certainly at a minimum plaintiff husband should not have to pay alimony out of his pension until he himself has received $26,500 from it.1 There might be consideration of how much the pension was enhanced after the date of the termination of the marriage so that the portion of the pension attributable to the valuation of the pension through 1979 would be excluded from the amount available for consideration as income. There must be other possibilities to be considered and presumably these would be presented to the trial court on remand.2 As observed in D’Oro v D’Oro, 193 NJ Super 385, 388; 474 A2d 1070, 1071 (1984), "a substantial argument may be made that no matter how much is paid to the pensioner, the payments should not be *664regarded as income for alimony purposes.” The competing considerations must be threshed out below. I do not suggest how they be resolved. I do not agree with the implication that since "there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant was expected to provide for her own support ...” the plaintiff ought to support her.
I would remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of plaintiff husband’s income that is available for award of alimony, the jurisdiction to modify same having been specifically retained in the trial court’s judgment of divorce.3 The trial court should then exercise its discretion and decide the motion to modify based upon its fact-finding. This panel should retain jurisdiction to review by means of an appropriate motion if either party is aggrieved by that decision.
If the trial court considers that the husband would not have to pay alimony out of his pension until he had himself received the amount awarded to him for that pension, namely, $26,500, it would appear appropriate that expert comparison be made between the valuation in July of 1979 and the valuation commencing April of 1986, when the actual cash payment of benefits was begun. It is incontrovertible that the 1979 dollars had more purchasing power than the 1986 dollars, but the experts may not agree on how much.
The parties should look to other jurisdictions for clues as to the possible alternatives. See, for example, Pelot v Pelot, 116 Wis 2d 339; 342 NW2d 64 (1983), and New Jersey has treated some of the questions in at least four cases. See D’Oro v D’Oro, 193 NJ Super 385; 474 A2d 1070 (1984), Johns v Johns, 208 NJ Super 733; 506 A2d 854 (1985), Staver v Staver, 217 NJ Super 541; 526 A2d 290 (1987), and Horton v Horton, 219 NJ Super 76; 529 A2d 1034 (1987).
The trial court stated:
I find, and determine, that it is fair for the court to demand and require payment of alimony for a Continuing period of time; namely for an indefinite time unless and until a change of circumstances show [sic] that it should be modified. That is the reason why the law provides for modification in alimony situations.