(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority makes two holdings in reaching its decision that branch out too far from the trunk of the legal principle from which they are derived. I would affirm the decisions of the court of appeals and the district court.
*572I. Role of the Court.
The majority correctly identifies that the standard of review for the admissibility of hearsay is for the correction of errors at law. State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 18 (Iowa 2006). Notwithstanding, it establishes a rule that gives the jury discretion to consider the admissibility of statements against interest made by a declarant with mixed motivations for making the statement. This approach is not only inconsistent with our reviewing standard, but it is also inconsistent with the important gatek-eeping function of courts.
In performing the legal task of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, a district court must decide certain preliminary questions by applying the law to existing evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 5.104(a). Once the courts decide the evidence is admissible, the jury determines its weight and credibility. Iowa R. Evid. 5.104(e).
Before a court can admit hearsay in the form of a statement against the interest of an unavailable declarant for the purposes of exculpating a defendant, several threshold requirements must be satisfied. One such threshold requirement is that the statement be sufficiently inculpatory to amount to a statement against penal interest. This important requirement is tied to the fundamental premise for admitting hearsay-cross-examination of the declarant is unnecessary to probe the truth of the statement because the statement itself is inherently trustworthy. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 312 (1973) (stating that whether the confession is “in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest” is a significant indicator of reliability).
In this case, the majority abandons trustworthiness as an essential predicate to the admissibility of hearsay. It holds that in cases, such as this case, in which the surrounding circumstances suggest mixed motives for a declarant to make a statement (which creates doubts about the trustworthiness of the statement), the jury, not the court, should decide if the statement is against the declarant’s interest. The Mississippi Supreme Court has eloquently described its reasons for disallowing exculpatory declarations against interest when mixed motives are apparent: “Many motives, apart from the love of truth and justice, induce men to assume the gravest risks.” Brown v. State, 55 So. 961, 962 (Miss.1911). The new rule declared by the majority today transfers a historical judicial function to the jury and essentially gives the jury the discretion to consider hearsay evidence.
The gatekeeping function of the court should be intensified, not eliminated, when the trustworthiness of the hearsay at issue is in doubt. The new rule created by the majority is detached from the purpose of creating exceptions to the rule against hearsay and conflicts with the time-honored role of the court in the trial of a case. It gives juries power well beyond their traditional role and undercuts the importance of cross-examination in our system of justice.
II. Preservation of Error.
The doctrine of preservation of error is built on the premise that trial courts must first decide legal questions, and appellate courts review the decisions made. The doctrine is also built on the principle of fairness, which has given rise to the principle that neither party to a case may normally assert a claim or defense on appeal they could have, but failed to, raise at trial. DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002).
In this case, there is nothing in the trial record to reveal Paredes raised the claim *573that the hearsay testimony of the social worker was admissible as a declaration against interest. If he had, he would have been required to establish the threshold requirements of the rule, including the unavailability of the declarant. Nevertheless, the preservation-of-error doctrine does not now preclude Paredes from claiming on appeal that the district court erred by failing to admit the evidence as a statement against interest because the district court used the statement-against-interest rule as a basis for ruling the evidence to be inadmissible. The district court made a preliminary finding that the declarant was unavailable, but found the other preliminary requirements were not satisfied.
On appeal, the State sought to uphold the ruling of the district court on the basis that the other predicate requirements of admissibility were not proven by Paredes. The State failed to argue on appeal that the evidence was inadmissible because the district court erred in finding that the declarant was unavailable. Nevertheless, the court of appeals upheld the decision of the district court, but on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to find that the declarant was unavailable.
As in district court, the court of appeals decided the contested issue on a ground not raised or contested by the parties. Yet, if this factor does not preclude Pa-redes from raising such a ground on appeal, it should not preclude the State from raising a ground relied on by the court of appeals on further review. In other words, just as the district court preserved error for Paredes, the court of appeals preserved error for the State. This approach is only a matter of fairness and does not undermine or disadvantage Pa-redes in any way. He was, under the law, required from the inception to establish all of the requirements for the admissibility of the evidence as a statement against interest. The trial record is now available to review to determine if the evidence supports this requirement.
There is, of course, no question Paredes failed to establish the requirement of unavailability. Therefore, Paredes should not receive the benefit of a new trial (with the right to have the disputed evidence admitted) without ever proving all the essential legal requirements for admission.
The majority has failed to apply the preservation-of-error rule in the same manner for both parties. This is unfair and contrary to the dictates of DeVoss. Id. Our law should not have rules that do not apply the same to both parties.
III. Conclusion.
I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals that Paredes failed to establish the declarant was unavailable.