(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.1994), we held that “all custodial interrogation ... shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention.” We further held, under our “supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice,” that courts must suppress any statement “obtained in violation of the recording requirement if the violation is deemed ‘substantial.’ ” Id. Our purpose in so holding “was to prevent factual disputes about the existence and context of Miranda warnings and any ensuing waiver of rights” by providing courts with an objective record of custodial interrogations. See State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 674 (Minn.1998). We were concerned that courts tended to credit statements by law enforcement and, without more, conclude that the defendant waived his or her rights. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591 (“trial and appellant courts consistently credit the recollections of police officers regarding the events that take place in an unrecorded interview”). Even though law enforcement officers testified that the defendant in Scales waived his rights, we were persuaded that recording custodial interrogations was “a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the adequate protection of the accused’s right to counsel, his right against self incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial.” Id. at 592 (quoting Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Alaska 1985)). Thus, the recording requirement is intended to provide an objective record of what takes place during custodial interviews and to eliminate the need for courts to decide factual disputes about a defendant’s waiver of rights. See State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224 n. 5 (Minn.1988).
When addressing alleged violations of the Scales recording requirement, we follow a two-step procedure. State v. Inman, 692 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn.2005). The first step is to determine whether Scales applies to the facts of the case. Id. If we *891conclude that Scales is applicable, the second step requires us to determine whether the violation of the Scales recording requirement is substantial. Id. In this case, the court ignores both steps and, without determining whether there was a violation or whether, if there was a Scales violation, that violation was substantial, concludes that any violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I.
Sanders filed a pretrial motion to suppress, claiming that his statement to the FBI agents was unrecorded and that he “did not make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right against self incrimination,” citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). At a pretrial hearing, Sanders’ attorney highlighted the motion, arguing that, “[b]ecause it was not recorded, there is no way for me to independently determine whether or not it’s correct as alleged that Mr. Sanders was advised of his Miranda Warnings and that the statement given was a knowing and voluntary statement.” (Emphasis added.)
The district court ruled that there was no Scales violation because the Scales rule “applies specifically to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s authority to exercise its supervisory power ... [that] does not extend, and would be unfair to be extended, to FBI agents or other law enforcement officials who are not aware of its terms.” The district court did not analyze whether the FBI’s failure to record was a substantial violation of the Scales recording requirement. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Scales was intended to govern conduct occurring within Minnesota. State v. Sanders, 743 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn.App.2008). Like the district court, the court of appeals did not reach the question of whether the failure to record Sanders’ statement was a substantial violation of Scales. In this appeal, the court declines to address the applicability of Scales, holding that the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the admission of the FBI agent’s testimony. My reading of Scales and its progeny leads me to conclude that the district court and the court of appeals’ holdings are wrong and that we should squarely address the issue.1 My reading of the record before us leads me to conclude that it cannot be said with any certainty that the verdict was surely unattributable to the error in admitting the unrecorded testimony of the FBI agent.
The Scales recording requirement is a necessary safeguard, essential to the protection of a defendant’s right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and right to a fair trial. Scales, 618 N.W.2d at 592. Because we have never limited our concern for a defendant’s rights solely to cases involving Minnesota law enforcement or events occurring solely within Minnesota’s geographical borders,2 I conclude that the rationale underlying the Scales decision applies with equal force to interrogations *892conducted both within and outside of Minnesota. On that basis, I conclude that Scales applies to Sanders’ interrogation. Having concluded that the Scales requirement applies, I would go on to determine whether that requirement was violated in this case and, if so, whether the violation was substantial.
In Inman, we indicated that “[t]he Scales requirement mandates that all custodial interviews at a place of detention be recorded” and that, “[i]f such an interview is not recorded, by definition it violates the Scales requirement.” 692 N.W.2d at 80. Sanders was arrested by FBI agents and was taken to a place of detention and interrogated. The interview was not recorded. By definition, therefore, the Scales requirement was violated. See Inman, 692 N.W.2d at 80. Whether that violation requires suppression of Sanders’ FBI interrogation turns on whether the failure to record the interrogation was a substantial violation of the Scales rule.
II.
When determining whether a Scales violation is substantial and whether the unrecorded statement must be suppressed, we follow “the approach recommended by the drafters of the Model Code of Pre-Ar-raignment Procedure.” Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. In particular, we are to consider “all relevant circumstances bearing on substantiality, including those set forth in section 150.3(2) and (3) of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.” Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. Under section 150.3(5) of the Model Code, “the prosecution shall have the burden of showing by the preponderance of the evidence that such statement ... should not be excluded” because the violation was not substantial. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 150.3(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
Under section 150.3(2)(a) of the Model Code, a violation is substantial if “[t]he violation was gross, wilful and prejudicial to the accused. A violation shall be deemed wilful regardless of the good faith of the individual officer if it appears to be part of the practice of the law enforcement agency or was authorized by a high authority within it.” Section 150.3(3)(g) requires consideration of “the extent to which the violation prejudiced the defendant’s ability to ... defend himself in the proceeding in which the statement is sought to be offered in evidence against him.” Model Code, § 150.3(3)(g).
The question, then, is whether the State met its burden in this case of showing that there was no substantial violation of the Scales requirement. It did not. It is a practice of the FBI not to record custodial interrogations and, in accordance with that practice, the FBI agent here did not record Sanders’ statement. This failure to record Sanders’ custodial interrogation is therefore “deemed wilful regardless of the good faith of the individual officer.” See Model Code, § 150.3(2)(a).
The admission of the agent’s statement was also prejudicial. In this case, Sanders was not able to defend against the challenge to his credibility resulting from the State’s use of his alleged statements made during the unrecorded interrogation. This credibility battle between an officer and a defendant is precisely the situation we sought to avoid in Scales.
Here, the State, in its effort to show that the violation was neither substantial nor prejudicial, offered testimony from the FBI agent that Sanders was advised of his rights against self-incrimination, waived those rights, and agreed to be interviewed. This testimony does not address, much less meet, the State’s burden. It, instead, *893attempts to show that a Miranda warning was given and that Sanders waived his right to remain silent. If a law enforcement officer’s testimony about a defendant’s waiver is enough to meet the State’s burden of showing that a Scales violation is not substantial, then the Scales requirement is meaningless. The note to Model Code § 150.3 explains that placing upon the State the burden of showing a violation is not substantial “alleviate[s] the dilemma of a court which is confronted with conflicting versions of what took place during the custody of an arrested person.” The note further states that if a court finds an “agency has not taken reasonably adequate steps in good faith to assure compliance ..., it should give special credence to the account of the defendant.” Model Code, § 150.3 note. In this case, the Scales requirement was violated because there was no recording. Nothing in this record suggests that the State took any steps, much less reasonably adequate steps, in good faith to assure compliance with the Scales recording requirement. Indeed, the record is silent on the actions taken by the State. On that basis, I can only conclude that the unrecorded interrogation constituted a substantial Scales violation warranting suppression of any statements from that interrogation. Therefore, I would end the analysis here, concluding that the district court erred in admitting the FBI agent’s testimony, and grant Sanders a new trial. However, because the court applies a harmless-error analysis and concludes that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I will address that issue as well.
III.
We generally review evidentiary errors applying a harmless error impact analysis to determine if the error was sufficiently harmful to warrant a new trial. In Scales, we upheld Scales’ conviction despite the admission of the unrecorded interrogation because “the result would have been the same.” 518 N.W.2d at 593. That is to say, “any error in admitting the unrecorded statements was harmless.” Id. Notwithstanding the fact that we appeared to apply a harmless-error analysis in Scales, it is unclear which harmless-error analysis should be applied to a Scales violation, if one should be applied at all. Because we have yet to determine whether a Scales violation implicates a constitutional right, we have not decided whether to apply the constitutional standard for reviewing harmless error, i.e., whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997), or the standard we apply to non-constitutional error, i.e., whether the error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict, State v. Anderson, 763 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn.2009). The court notes that it need not decide which standard applies “because even under the more favorable constitutional harmless-error standard, Sanders was not prejudiced by the district court’s admission of [the FBI agent’s] testimony.” I disagree.
Under the constitutional harmless-error standard, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To show an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the State must prove that the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d at 292. We do not determine “whether a jury would have convicted the defendant without the error, rather we look[] to whether the error reasonably could have impacted upon the jury’s decision.” Id. When determining whether the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to an error, we consider the manner in which the evidence was presented, the persuasiveness of the evidence, the use of the evidence in closing, whether the evidence was effectively countered by the defense, and the strength of the evidence of guilt. State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn.2005).
*894The manner in which the evidence was presented is significant when it gives the evidence special weight, such that it is perceived to be more persuasive. See State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 883 (Minn.1998) (reviewing an erroneously admitted dying declaration for persuasiveness by analyzing the manner in which it was presented). That is what occurred here. Generally, in cases involving competing recollections of the same event, the jury must determine the credibility of each witness. As noted above, when a law enforcement officer testifies to certain events, such as an unrecorded interrogation, the tendency is to credit the officer’s testimony to the detriment of the defendant. See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591. Here, the FBI agent testified to Sanders’ statements made during the unrecorded interrogation. Because this evidence was admitted through the FBI agent’s testimony, the jury likely gave it special weight, thereby increasing the persuasiveness and finding it more credible than Sanders’ testimony. Further, if the jury found Sanders to be less credible due to the special weight afforded to the FBI agent’s testimony, that conclusion would influence the jury’s credibility determinations with respect to other witnesses. Although the agent’s testimony did not suggest that Sanders made any inculpatory statements, the State used the agent’s testimony to effectively attack Sanders’ credibility. Specifically, the State used that testimony to impeach Sanders during cross-examination and closing. Sanders had testified that the allegations by B.J. were untrue. He detailed his actions on the day in question, explaining that he did not have any contact with B.J., and further denied any of the other sexual conduct alleged by B.J. and her sister, N.J. On cross-examination, the State questioned Sanders extensively about statements he made during the unrecorded interrogation. In doing so, the State repeatedly confronted Sanders with the agent’s testimony that Sanders gave him a false birth date and admitted that he had lied to them about his birth date. The State also confronted Sanders with the agent’s allegations that Sanders made several other statements, including saying “I did not f — her,” that B.J. had a venereal disease, and that Sanders had slept with an upstairs neighbor who also had a venereal disease. When Sanders denied making these statements, the State impeached him by referencing the agent’s testimony. In total, eight pages of the State’s 19-page cross-examination of Sanders focused on the contradictions between Sanders’ testimony and that of the FBI agent.
The State further exploited the inconsistencies between the FBI agent and Sanders during closing. Although the court notes that “fewer than four pages of the state’s closing argument were spent discussing Sanders’s denial of the statements attributed to him by [the agent],” it does not necessarily follow that the admission of that testimony was therefore harmless. Four pages focusing heavily on the contradictions between the agent’s and Sanders’ testimony out of a 25-page closing argument is significant. Further, in the remaining pages of the closing, the State concentrated on credibility. Because B.J.’s testimony provided the most inculpa-tory evidence, the State first focused on bolstering her credibility. The State then focused on Sanders’ lack of credibility by aggressively comparing his testimony to that given by each of the other witnesses. In order to remove any doubt that B.J. would have been lying, the State referenced the FBI agent’s testimony, arguing that it would not have made sense for B.J. to be lying as part of a conspiracy to convict Sanders unless the FBI agent was in on the conspiracy and was also lying. The State also attacked Sanders’ credibility in other ways — such as by pointing out the lack of detail in Sanders’ recollection of *895the events on the day of the alleged incident.
According to the court, Sanders was able to counter the testimony of the FBI agent by arguing in his closing that he “consistently said in Chicago, when he was interviewed by the FBI and on this witness stand, [the alleged contact] didn’t happen.” This statement from Sanders’ closing argument did not effectively counter the harm the agent’s testimony did to Sanders’ credibility for at least two reasons. First, a closing is not testimony. Because the interrogation was unrecorded, there was no effective way for Sanders to offer evidence to counter the erroneously admitted testimony. Second, it is likely that, if the jury believed that Sanders lacked credibility, it also believed that Sanders’ denial at trial and defense counsel’s statement during closing was also not credible.
In the end, the jury’s verdict in this case turned on whether the jury credited B.J.’s testimony or Sanders’ testimony. Because the State was able to use the FBI agent’s testimony regarding Sanders’ unrecorded interrogation to aggressively undermine Sanders’ credibility, it cannot be said that the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error in admitting that testimony.
Because this is a close case that turned on Sanders’ credibility, I also conclude that under the less stringent non-constitutional harmless-error standard, it cannot be said that the error did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. Therefore, I would reverse Sanders’ conviction and remand for a new trial.
. With respect to the district court’s ruling, I would note that this court has no supervisory power over law enforcement officials in the executive branch of Minnesota state government. As for the court of appeals’ determination, I would note that the concerns that prompted our Scales decision are not mitigated by the fact that an interrogation takes place outside of Minnesota’s borders. If anything, that fact aggravates those concerns.
. We often consider events that occur outside of Minnesota and analyze those events under Minnesota law to see if they comport with our own standards. See, e.g., State v. Reece, 625 N.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Minn.2001) (specifying that the criminal history score of out-of-state offenses must be analyzed under Minnesota sentencing guidelines); State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 736-37 (Minn.1985) (applying Minnesota evidentiary rules to admit evidence *892obtained in Wisconsin that would have been inadmissible in Wisconsin).