(dissenting).
I dissent.
The majority have established a rule in this case that the Supreme Court on an appeal from the district court in a Workmen’s Compensation case, as it relates to a determination of the facts, is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Bureau’s findings of fact. I agree with this principle of law as to the scope of our review. However, this rule precludes a review in this case because the Bureau made no findings of fact when it made its permanent disability award. Bernardy v. Beals, 75 N.D. 377, 28 N.W.2d 374 (1947), cited by the majority, does not constitute precedent for ignoring procedural defects of this grave nature. In Bernardy the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau did make brief findings of ultimate facts essential to its decision. These findings are set forth in the opinion and were found sufficient to show the basic facts upon which the Bureau based its decision. In this case we have no findings whatsoever in regard to the facts upon which the permanent award is based. Nowhere in the entire record submitted by the Bureau is there a finding by the Bureau that Ziegler’s thrombophlebitis was causally connected to the pneumonia or to his work, or that they have permanently and totally disabled him.
Section 28-32-13, N.D.C.C., provides in part:
“ * * * in a proceeding before an administrative agency, * * * the agency shall make and state concisely and explicitly its findings of fact and its separate conclusions of law, and the decision of the agency based upon such findings and conclusions. * * * ”
In Hvidsten v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 76 N.D. 111, 33 N.W.2d 615 (1948), in construing this statute, this court said:
“This statute requires explicit findings. Explicit is defined by Webster’s International Dictionary 2nd ed., as ‘Not implied *118merely, or conveyed by implication; distinctly stated; plain in language; clear; not ambiguous; express; unequivocal.’ The language of the statute is precise. It does not allow a construction which would permit an inference or a presumption of favorable findings upon matters not mentioned by the Commission.”
The court then found that certain designated findings of fact were not findings of fact at all but merely references to the evidence and do not, under the statute, constitute a basis for the agency’s order. It held “under the express language of the appeal statute, Section 28-3219, supra [the same statute is now in effect as Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C.], the order of the Commission in this case must be reversed.” The court adopted the following syllabus in that case:
“4. Where the statute requires ‘explicit’ findings of fact, the granting of an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission does not give rise to an inference or a presumption that the Commission considered and made favorable findings upon matters, essential to the granting of the application but which are not mentioned in the Commission’s findings of fact.
“5. Where the findings of fact of the Public Service Commission omit findings upon matters essential to the granting of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, a decision of the Commission, granting such certificate, is not supported by the findings of fact and under the provisions of Section 28-3219 NDRC 1943 must be reversed.”
In another case, Kuhn v. North Dakota Public Service Commission (N.D.), 76 N.W.2d 171 (1956), this court reaffirmed its position when it held:
“5. If it appears upon an appeal from a determination of the Public Service Commission that any provisions of Chapter 28-32, NDRC 1943 providing for the scope and procedure of the trial have not been complied with and the decision of the Commission is not supported by findings of fact, the case shall be remanded to the agency for such action as the court determines.”
In the text of its opinion the court stated that:
“There are no findings as to what territory respondent had served up to the time of the hearing nor any finding upon the matter of convenience and necessity for limiting his zone to the extent the Commission ordered. Both the district court and this court were deprived of ‘the value which attaches to the acumen and aptitude of skilled men whose business is to hear and determine such questions as the one involved — the value which attaches to their training and experience.’ In re Theel Bros. Rapid Transit Co., 72 N.D. 280, 287, 6 N.W.2d 560, 564. Without the benefit of the conclusion of the Commission on the facts we are not justified in attempting to review the evidence to determine whether the court erred in not sustaining the order of the Public Service Commission as alleged in specification No. 6.”
The above-cited cases involve appeals from the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission and the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau are both administrative agencies of the State. Section 28-32-01, N.D.C.C.; Petition of Village Board of Wheatland, 77 N.D. 194, 42 N.W.2d 321; Schnoor v. Meinecke, 77 N.D. 96, 40 N.W.2d 803; Knutson v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau (N.D.), 120 N.W.2d 880. Therefore, both are governed by the provisions of Section 28-32-13, N.D.C.C., requiring that they make findings of fact and the courts are governed as to the scope of review on appeal as to both by Sections 28-32-15 through 28-32-21, N.D.C.C.
The majority do not reject the interpretation of these statutes in the two cases I have cited nor do they distinguish them. Bernardy is not the precedent for a sitúa*119tion where no findings of fact whatever are made by the administrative agency. It is my opinion that the district court- and, on appeal from its judgment, this court cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decision of the Bureau on an appeal from such decision where the Bureau has made no findings of fact or conclusions of law upon which it based its decision. I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the district court with directions that the district court return the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau for further proceedings conformable to law.