¶ 22. (dissenting). Wisconsin Stat.
§ 800.14(4) states:
Upon the request of either party within 20 days after notice of appeal under sub. (1), or on its own motion, the circuit court shall order that a new trial be held in circuit court. The new trial shall be conducted by the court without a jury unless the appellant re*517quests a jury trial in the notice of appeal under sub. (1). The required fee for a jury is prescribed in s. 814.61(4). (Emphasis added.)
¶ 23. It is clear that a "new" trial presupposes that there was a prior trial in the municipal court. Had I been on the panel in Village of Menomonee Falls v. Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d 811, 601 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999), I would have agreed with the result, therefore, because there was never a prior trial in that case. The case was dismissed before a trial ever took place.
¶ 24. I submit that there was a prior trial in this case, unlike the circumstance in Meyer, and that the City of Pewaukee is therefore entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit court. I would reverse the instant case and remand for a new trial.
¶ 25. Here, witnesses were sworn under oath and testimony was taken. The trial thus not only began, it was in progress. At the end of the City's case, the municipal court granted a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiffs evidence. While I realize that this case was therefore "judicially resolved," that does not mean there was no trial. I would bet that there is not a litigator in this state who, following a directed verdict after evidence was taken and one party rested, would walk out of the courtroom believing that he or she was not in a trial.
¶ 26. I profess not to understand the majority's insistence on a "full trial." That is certainly not found in the statute. The majority seems to hang its hat on not the statute, but on Meyer. In that case, the court wrote that Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) "does not permit a new trial before the circuit court when the case was judicially resolved, but not fully litigated on the merits, before the municipal court." Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d at 818. If the *518Meyer panel was saying that the statute requires a complete trial in the municipal court before a party may avail itself of a trial de novo in the circuit court, as the majority seems to assert, I think the statement was wrong. The statute says no such thing and the court was putting a spin on the statute that does not exist on the face of the statute and cannot be found in the legislative history. Moreover, the statement is dicta since, in Meyer, there was no trial — so discussion on the need for the prior trial to be "fully litigated" went beyond what was necessary to decide. I would not follow Meyer in this case. I would hold that once witnesses have been sworn and testimony is being taken, a trial is in progress. That trial has full force and effect for collateral estoppel and res judicata purposes in civil cases and is "on the books" as a trial unless there is a voluntary nonsuit.
¶ 27. I have another problem with the majority's logic. If there is no trial until the case is fully litigated, this means that a motion made at the close of the plaintiffs case does not allow for a trial de novo in the circuit court but a motion made at the close of all evidence, based on the same legal grounds and thus decided as a matter of law rather than fact, does allow for a trial de novo. I do not think the legislature intended to grant access to the circuit court for new trial purposes depending on when the motion was made.
¶ 28. As I said, I would reverse and remand with directions for a trial de novo.