On September 7, 1962, plaintiff-appellant, Edward J. Hakala, received an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Burroughs Corporation. As a result of this injury Mr. Hakala suffered the amputation of his right hand and portions of the first and second fingers of his left hand. The Burroughs Corporation paid workmen’s compensation benefits on a voluntary basis for these losses.
On June 17, 1968, appellant filed a petition for a hearing with the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation claiming eligibility for total and permanent disability benefits from defendant-appellee Second Injury Fund. Appellant offered uncontroverted evidence that prior to his injury at Burroughs Corpo*157ration, he was afflicted with a vision impairment in his left eye.1 After the matter was heard, the referee rendered a decision on June 13, 1969, stating in relevant part:
"It is further ordered that as a result of said injury employee’s right hand was amputated at the wrist and the first and second fingers of the left hand were amputated beyond the first joint and that compensation for such amputations was properly paid to 2/27/68 inclusive. It is further held that, prior to 9/7/62, for non-occupational reasons, said employee had lost the industrial vision in his left eye, his uncorrected vision being determined to be 20/300, being less than 20% vision in the eye [corrected — said vision is better than 20%, but we consider only uncorrected vision — see Lindsay v Glennie Industries, 379 Mich 573 [153 NW2d 642 (1967)]]:”
Plaintiff was accordingly awarded total and permanent disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund based on the prior loss of an eye and the loss *158of his right hand at Burroughs Corporation. MCLA 412.8a; MSA 17.158(1).2
The Second Injury Fund appealed the decision of the referee to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board. On February 24, 1972, the Appeal Board reversed the referee. It held that appellant’s claim was properly controlled by Hirschkorn v Fiege Desk Co, 184 Mich 239; 150 NW 851 (1915); Cline v Studebaker Corp, 189 Mich 514; 155 NW 519; 1916C LRA 1139 (1915), and must be judged with reference to a corrected vision standard. Since appellant retained more than 20% of normal vision in his left eye with the use of glasses, the Appeal Board concluded that there was no prior loss of the eye and denied appellant Second Injury Fund benefits.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the result of the Appeal Board but did so under a completely different legal theory. The Court of Appeals assumed that uncorrected vision was the proper standard, but then held that MCLA 412.8a; MSA 17.158(1) awards Second Injury Fund benefits only if the prior loss was the result of an injury. Since appellant’s loss of vision was due to nontraumatic causes, the Court of Appeals deemed him ineligible for benefits. Hakala v Burroughs Corp, 48 Mich App 639; 211 NW2d 60 (1973).
Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which we granted. 391 Mich 756 (1974).
The parties present two issues:
1. Must an injured worker’s prior loss be due to an injury in order to qualify for permanent and total disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund?
*1592. When a claim is made for Second Injury Fund benefits based on a prior loss of 80% vision in one eye, should the degree of vision loss be measured in terms of corrected or uncorrected vision?
I
This first issue represents a somewhat unique situation in that appellee specifically agrees with appellant’s position that the prior loss need not be due to an injury in order to qualify for Second Injury Fund benefits. In fact, after the opinion of the Court of Appeals was handed down, all three parties to that appeal joined in seeking a hearing in order to urge the Court of Appeals to reverse the position that it had adopted.
In our opinion, the position adopted by the Court of Appeals on this issue is in error. The legislative purpose behind the creation of the Second Injury Fund "was to enhance the prospects for employment of certain handicapped persons who had previously sustained specific losses, so that they and their families would have a means of livelihood. The statute made it certain, as an inducement to an employer to employ such persons, that in employing a handicapped person he would be required to pay no more if such handicapped person should suffer further injury than he would have been required to pay for such further injury had the person not been handicapped in the first place.” Verberg v Simplicity Pattern Co, 357 Mich 636, 643; 99 NW2d 508 (1959). It would make little sense, and it would be contrary to this Court’s prior interpretation of legislative intent, to distinguish between handicapped persons on the basis of the origin of their handicap. The Act’s purpose certainly would not be furthered by such a distinction, and we have not been able to hypoth*160esize any reasonable rationale on which this distinction could be founded. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals on this first issue.
II
The controversy between the parties in the present case is limited to the second stated issue. Under the provisions of MCLA 418.361(1) (1); MSA 17.237(361) (1) (1), the loss of an eye for the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is defined as an "[e]ighty percent loss of vision”. The question before us is whether a claimant’s vision should be assessed with or without the use of corrective lenses. In the present case it is agreed between the parties that if an uncorrected vision standard is proper, appellant has less than 80% vision and meets the statutory definition for the loss of an eye. Conversely, it is agreed that if a corrected vision test is adopted, appellant does not meet the definition for the loss of an eye and was correctly denied benefits from the Second Injury Fund.
In its opinion, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board held that the present issue was controlled by Hirschkorn v Fiege Desk Co, 184 Mich 239; 150 NW 851 (1915); Cline v Studebaker Corp, 189 Mich 514; 155 NW 519 (1915), and, accordingly, applied a corrected vision test. In ■arriving at this decision, the Appeal Board factually distinguished the more recent case of Lindsay v Glennie Industries, Inc, 379 Mich 573; 153 NW2d 642 (1967) from the Hakala claim. Its analysis of Lindsay concentrated on the fact that claimant Lindsay sustained the surgical removal of his natural lens necessitated by a cataract condition. The Appeal Board interpreted Lindsay to hold that the fact of the removal of a natural lens alone consti*161tuted the loss of the eye for statutory purposes. It then read any reference to an uncorrected vision standard contained in Lindsay as irrelevant to the decision.
In contrast to the analysis of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, we believe that appellant Hakala’s claim is factually and legally controlled by Lindsay and the subsequent case of Hilton v Oldsmobile Division of General Motors Corp, 390 Mich 43; 210 NW2d 316 (1973). Although both Lindsay and Hilton did concern the removal of a natural lens, this fact cannot be used to distinguish them from the present appeal. The Court in Lindsay did not base its decision on the loss of a lens per se. Rather, the Court founded its decision on the changes brought about by the 1943 amendment to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1943 PA 245. In 1943, the Legislature replaced the strict "loss of an eye” wording on which Cline and Hirschkorn were based with new language that defined the loss of an eye as an "80 per cent loss of vision”. Lindsay held that the plain meaning of this amended language required the eye to be tested without the benefit of any artificial device. We repeat below language from Lindsay that was quoted with approval in Hilton:
"We recognize that substituting an artificial lens has 'restored’ vision to the otherwise sightless eye. We point out that a specific loss award is not made as compensation for diminution of use of the involved organ or member. It is not awarded to compensate for loss of earnings or earning capacity. It is awarded irrespective of either fact or both. If ophthalmological advances and refinements in the use of contact lens has in fact rendered the amended statute inconsonant with its original legislative intent, it is the province of the legislature to say so. We construe the statute in the plain meaning of its wording.” 379 Mich 573, 578.
*162Appellee has cited several examples of employment requirements and cases from other jurisdictions which adopt the corrected vision standard. Such material would be more persuasive to us if we were addressing this problem for the first time. Lindsay and Hilton have interpreted the language of the act to require an uncorrected vision standard and the Legislature has not since modified the language of the controlling sections. We therefore continue to follow these cases.
We do note that the Lindsay-Hilton position is not without some contradiction even in the post-1943 case law. Appellee relies strongly on the case of Marrs v Ford Motor Co, 315 Mich 211; 23 NW2d 638 (1946). In Marrs, the claimant, due to a prior cataract removal, possessed only 20/200 uncorrected vision in his right eye and could not coordinate it with his good left eye. With the use of glasses, claimant’s vision was restored to 20/40 in the right eye. An industrial accident at Ford Motor Company resulted in the total loss of vision in claimant’s eye. The Department of Labor and Industry denied compensation. It ruled that since claimant’s pre-injury uncorrected vision was less than 20%, he had no eye to lose under the terms of the 1943 amendment. This Court reversed the Department and awarded benefits, apparently deciding the case on the basis of a corrected vision standard.
Marrs, while never overruled, was not extended beyond its unique facts. Three years later in the case of Edwards v United States Rubber Co, 325 Mich 203; 38 NW2d 319 (1949), the Court adopted the uncorrected vision standard subsequently employed in Lindsay and Hilton. Claimant Edwards was injured at work when a loose wire from a revolving wire brush struck his left eye and pene*163trated the cornea. As a result of this injury, a cataract developed which necessitated surgical removal. The vision loss in claimant’s left eye was 98% uncorrected, and 25% when corrected; although, even with the use of corrective lenses, the left eye could not be coordinated with the uninjured right eye.
Justice Boyles, writing for the Court in Edwards, initially assumed for the purposes of argument the continuing validity of Cline and the corrected vision standard. He then distinguished the Edwards case from Cline stating, "Cline had co-ordinated vision between the injured eye and his remaining good eye after the injury had been corrected by the use of glasses; which the plaintiff in the instant case would not have.” 325 Mich 203, 207. See, Lindhout v Brochu & Hass, 255 Mich 234; 238 NW 231 (1931). The actual decision in Edwards, however, was based on an uncorrected vision standard. The language of Justice Boyles’ opinion warrants no other conclusion. The Court, mindful that Edwards had an 80% loss of vision under only the uncorrected standard, awarded compensation stating in part:
"In the case at bar, the employee has not yet had compensation for the specific loss of his left eye. In the final analysis, an employee who has suffered 80 per cent, loss of vision of one eye, since the 1943 amendment, has suffered the total loss of that eye and is entitled to compensation. It is the injury to an eye, resulting in 80 per cent, loss of vision in the eye itself, for which the statute now allows compensation for the specific loss of an eye.” 325 Mich 203, 210.
Ill
To summarize, we believe that our case law, with minor exception, upholds the arguments ad*164vanced by appellant Hakala. Appellant’s prior loss of vision should have been determined under an uncorrected vision standard. Under this standard the vision in his left eye is less than 20% (or conversely, appellant has suffered more than an 80% loss of vision in that eye). Appellant thereby has statutorily lost his left eye and under the facts of this case is eligible for Second Injury Fund benefits. See Kunde v Teesdale Lumber Co, 52 Mich App 360, 365-367; 217 NW2d 429 (1974).
The Court of Appeals is reversed and this case remanded to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board for the entry of an order in conformity with today’s opinion.
Costs to appellant.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, J., concurred with Swainson, J.Appellant’s proof of the loss of vision in his left eye consisted of a letter from ophthalmologist, Sheldon D. Stern, M.D. The parties stipulated to allow the letter to be introduced into evidence. It read:
"Edward Hakala was examined by me on 6/29/68 with a history that his vision in the left eye has always been bad. He had received no treatment for it but he states, however, that his eyes were checked 35 years ago when he first started to work at Burroughs and he was told that his vision could not be brought up to normal, that it was out of focus. He states that he lost an arm in a punch-press in 1962. Vision in the right eye, without correction, was 20/100 plus or minus one. In the left eye it was 20/300. With correction, his vision in the right eye was 20/15 and in the left eye 20/50 minus one. He required a prescription of +200=.50x150 O.D. and a +4.50= — .50x15 with an add of +.200 in each eye. His extra ocular muscles were normal. External examination was normal. Pupils were equal and reacted to light. There was no evidence of any cataract formation. Intraocular pressures revealed no evidence of any glaucoma. Examination of the retina revealed no retinal abnormalities or abnormalities of his optic nerve. This diagnosis was a left amblyopia, secondary to anisometropia. In other words, he has a reduction of vision which will not respond to treatment in the left eye, secondary to a marked difference in his refractive error. The left eye is much more farsighted than the right eye and he has always preferred the right eye. There is no further treatment which will improve the vision in this eye.”
Now MCLA 418.521(1); MSA 17.237(521X1).