(dissenting).
I concur with the dissent that the trial court’s award of summary judgment should be affirmed and that the facts here support a summary judgment for respondents even more strongly than the facts presented in McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471 (Minn.Ct.App.), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. Dec. 30, 1985). However, I would analyze the nonapplicability of Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing, Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn.1982), and Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976), differently.
In order to recover under a theory of strict liability arising from a defective product, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) that the defendant’s product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, (2) that the defect existed when the product left the defendant’s control, and (3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury sustained.
Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 623 n. 3 (Minn.1984) (citing Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. *268321, 329, 188 N.W.2d 426, 432 (1971)). For the purposes of the summary judgment motion at issue here, respondents admit the existence of design defects and insufficient warnings. Therefore, the only issue before the trial court was the issue of proximate cause.
Proximate cause is a separate factor in assigning tort liability. Thorn v. The Glass Depot, 373 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn.Ct.App.), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. Nov. 1, 1985). The trial court recognized the separate proximate cause requirement and found as a matter of law that appellant’s injuries were “caused exclusively by his own negligence” and not by negligence or breach of duty by respondents.
In contrast to this case, the issue raised in Holm did not involve causation, but was
whether the manufacturer of an aerial ladder in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user is liable to the user if that defective condition is obvious.
324 N.W.2d at 209. See also Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 621. In Holm, the court held that a manufacturer was not relieved of its duty to consumers because a product’s defect was obvious, reversing prior case law that barred recovery when the defect was either obvious or known to the consumer. 324 N.W.2d at 213. In Ferguson, the issue raised involved the comparative negligence of the parties, not causation. 307 Minn. at 33, 239 N.W.2d at 194.
Respondents here do not contend that they should be relieved of any duty that may arise because of appellant’s knowledge of the alleged defect in the swimming pool. They concede the duty, the defect and the negligence. I conclude that inasmuch as in the instant case all negligence and defect issues are resolved against respondents and the only issue is that of causation, neither Holm nor Ferguson are on point.
The trial court here found that regardless of a breach of duty by respondents, as a matter of law the injury was caused by appellant’s negligence in diving into the pool and not by any act or omission of respondents. As in McCormick, the sole question presented to the trial court and to this court was one of causation. The appellant’s injuries are devastating, but I must conclude that the trial court was correct in its determination that appellant’s injuries were “caused exclusively by his own negligence.”