concurring specially.
Lest the members of the House of Representatives be caused to believe that we may have somewhat cavalierly or indifferently declined to exercise original jurisdiction in this case to resolve the dispute between the House and Senate, and think that we have ignored precedent in doing so, *395I feel compelled to speak briefly on this subject.
Another reason for further explanation is that I am the only Justice remaining on the Court who participated on the side of the majority of this Court in State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898 (N.D.1977), wherein we accepted original jurisdiction and acted to resolve a dispute between the Lieutenant Governor in his capacity as presiding officer of the Senate, and a majority of the membership of the Senate over the Lieutenant Governor’s authority to break a tie vote on second reading and final passage of a bill.
I do this fully realizing that precedent is recognized as a stabilizing element in our system of jurisprudence and that, as it contributes to predictability, it should not be abandoned without careful study nor should its meaning be curtailed by finding distinguishing features which have little real meaning. This does not mean, however, that once a decision has been made upon an issue of law that it should never be reconsidered. As we said in Lembke v. Unke, 171 N.W.2d 837 at 841 (N.D.1969), “we do not see our function as limited to deciding today’s controversies in light only of yesterday’s opinions.” If such were the case then all we would need is a good computer and a competent operator once the computer was properly programmed and the data supplied.
In her inimitable way, Justice Levine, speaking for this Court, has explained why it was appropriate for this Court to assume jurisdiction in Sanstead and not in this case. I shall attempt to complement her efforts in a small way.
In Sanstead, Justice Paulson, speaking for the majority of this Court, in finding it appropriate to assume jurisdiction to decide the dispute between Lieutenant Governor Sanstead and the majority of the membership of the Senate, said:
“We make such finding based on the following factors: (1) the Lieutenant Governor openly declared his intent to cast a tie-breaking vote if the members of the State Senate are equally divided on the final consideration on a bill; (2) members of the State Senate have openly declared an intent to challenge any attempt by the Lieutenant Governor to vote on the final consideration on a bill; (3) the 45th Legislative Assembly is currently in session; (4) the legal status of any bill passed by the State Senate with a tie-breaking vote cast by the Lieutenant Governor would be in doubt; and (5) it is in the best interests of the State of North Dakota that a direct confrontation between the Lieutenant Governor and the State Senate be avoided, so as to assure an orderly law-making process during the term of the 45th Legislative Assembly.” 251 N.W.2d at 903. [Emphasis added.]
Factor number four, which impressed me the most in Sanstead, is non-existent in this case. House Bill 1346 passed the House with a majority vote, but it was rejected by the presiding officer of the Senate, Senator Redlin, acting as President Pro Tempore, and his action has now been sustained by a majority vote of the Senate. It was rejected for the reasons set forth in Justice Levine’s opinion because the bill did not pass the House of Representatives by a two-thirds vote. As a result, there will be no law in existence arising from the rejection of House Bill 1346 over which there could be any doubt or which could produce any problems. The Senate has, in effect, killed the bill by this procedure, and it is as dead as though it had been considered on its merits after normal first reading, referral to committee, report to the Senate, and vote for indefinite postponement on the report to the Senate. Some people, including the House members, may have preferred that the Senate would have considered the merits of the bill and discussed it openly in committee and on the floor of the Senate, and some people may attempt to hold the Senate accountable for not having done so, but such is the legislative process and the nature of our political system.
Accordingly, I see no crisis which would justify our intervention in this case, but I *396say this reserving the right to decide in another case, under different circumstances, that it may be imperative, as we found it to be in Sanstead, to accept jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that we might have resolved the problem between the House and Senate in this case had we intervened, I think that the precedent would be such that henceforth we would be expected to act as an arbiter in the settlement of disputes as they arise between the House and Senate which would leave us little time to perform the constitutional duties which constantly press heavily upon us. This is more appropriately the function of the Attorney General in his opinion-rendering capacity. What I advocate here is a common sense basis for declining to accept jurisdiction which is in addition to the reason Justice Levine so succinctly yet graphically articulates in her opinion which relates to the restraint the judiciary must exercise when requested to intervene in matters entrusted to another of the three co-equal branches of government. With this additional practical reason, I join Justice Levine and my colleagues in her conclusion that this is not an appropriate case for us to exercise our original jurisdiction.