(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Although an order of forfeiture will not be reversed unless the evidence is utterly wanting to support the conclusion of the trial court, the evidence must be substantial. In re Property of Rush, 448 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Iowa 1989); In re Property of H.E.W., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa App.1995).
“A finding is supported by substantial evidence if it may be reasonably inferred from the evidence.” Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to reach a conclusion. A finding may be supported by substantial evidence although two inconsistent conclusions might be inferred from the same evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence, but it need not be a preponderance of the evidence.
In re Property of McIntyre, 550 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted).
“Forfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when within both the letter and spirit of the law.” United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226, 59 S.Ct. 861, 864, 83 L.Ed. 1249, 1254 (1939); H.E.W., 530 N.W.2d at 464.
Former Iowa Code section 809.1(2) stated “forfeitable property” includes:
b. Property which has been used or is intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense or to avoid detection or apprehension of a person committing a criminal offense.
e. Property which is acquired as or from the proceeds of a criminal offense.
“Facilitate” in this section requires “a substantial connection between the property and the crime.” In re Property Seized from Chiodo, 555 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 1996) (citing In re Property Seized from Kaster, 454 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Iowa 1990)). Whether there is such nexus between the seized property and the criminal offense is a question of fact. Id.
The evidence connecting Patrick’s $10,000 to drug dealing was circumstantial.
While circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in proving a matter in issue, circumstances must have sufficient probative force to constitute a basis for a legal inference. Circumstantial evidence does not have such probative force when the inference drawn from it is “based on surmise, speculation, or conjecture.”
H.E.W., 530 N.W.2d at 463-64 (citing Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 1984)). The State offered “expert” testimony from Officer DeJoode who opined the couriers buy one-way airline tickets in California and return promptly by bus after they make their buy. The drug deals are usually made with $20 bills. The couriers use Tupperware containers to carry the drugs either on their person or inside their luggage. The couriers use duct tape to secure the drugs to their body or package the individual sandwich bags used to put the drugs in. The officer stated drug dealers have the mistaken belief drug-sniffing dogs cannot smell the drugs if wrapped in duct tape.
The record reveals that Patrick has no criminal record whatsoever. There were no drugs in the suitcase belonging to Patrick except for traces of “invisible” methamphetamine of which there was such a minute amount an independent test could not be made. No drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in her home in rural Eddyville when peace officers executed a search warrant. While there was a role of duct tape in Patrick’s suitcase, evidence failed to establish it was used to wrap drugs or money. Likewise, the plastic sandwich bags were empty and no evidence was submitted to show they had been used to hold drugs.
Patrick testified the Tupperware was used to transport her shampoo to prevent it from spilling. She explained the sandwich bags were to be used to hold wet soap and toiletries. She also testified she had brought the *197roll of duct tape to tape various toiletries shut. Patrick added she brought the $10,000 in ease she found a business opportunity to invest in while in California. Patrick produced legitimate receipts for the money, which showed that $2000 were winnings from Mesquaki Bingo and Casino; $3000 came from cash advances from two of Patrick’s VISA cards; $2500 was a loan from Mr. Reed, Patrick’s boyfriend; and $2500 was her own money. No evidence was submitted linking the $10,000 seized to proceeds from illegal drug transactions.
While I am not convinced Patrick’s testimony was credible, the district court’s findings rested on the weak evidence connecting the $10,000 to drug dealing and Patrick’s lack of credibility. The district court’s determination that the claimant’s testimony was not credible does not render the evidence on the drug connection substantial. See In re Property of Daniels, 478 N.W.2d 622, 623 (Iowa 1991).
The trial court makes much of the fact that Patrick only packed one change of underwear for a two-week vacation and that her shampoo had to be forced into the Tupperware container to make it fit. The trial court noted the presence of the empty sandwich bags, the roll of duct tape, and the small amount of methamphetamine vacuumed from Patrick’s suitcase. The court also observed that Patrick and the friends she was going to visit were the subject of a drug investigation and the home she was staying in was that of persons incarcerated for selling drugs.
I am well aware that the possibility of drawing inconsistent conclusions from the same body of evidence does not prevent a finding from being unsupported by substantial evidence. Rush, 448 N.W.2d at 477. While I would not find that Patrick’s testimony was credible, I would find the State’s evidence linking the $10,000 to drug dealing was insubstantial despite the credibility determinations made by the trial court. See Chiodo, 555 N.W.2d at 415 n. 3. The minute amount of methamphetamine vacuumed from the suitcase, the Tupperware container, duct tape, sandwich bags, and Officer DeJoode’s speculative testimony does not provide substantial evidence connecting the money with drug dealing, thereby allowing forfeiture of the money. The evidence presented by the State was weak and required impermissible conjecture or speculation to tie the cash seized with illegal drug transactions. See Daniels, 478 N.W.2d at 623.
Consequently, I believe there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that the money seized was forfeitable. I would reverse the district court’s forfeiture and remand the case.