(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The basis for the imposition of the tax on Border States arises by virtue of SDCL 10-48-2.1, which provides:
The tax as provided by § 10-48-2 shall be paid by any person, firm, or public or private corporation on any fuel used in any highway construction work performed under a contract which is paid for all or in part from public funds, regardless of whether such fuel is consumed on the public highways or not. (Emphasis supplied).
This court previously upheld the imposition of a use tax on diesel fuel used in the construction of highways on the Rosebud Sioux and Pine Ridge Reservations in In re State Motor Fuel Tax Liability of A.G.E. Corp., 273 N.W.2d 737 (S.D.1978). We stated that SDCL 10-48-2.1 is “clear and *877unambiguous on its face” and that there is “no reason for attempting a strained or forced construction of the words therein.” Id. at 742, 743. When we are presented with such clear, certain, and unambiguous language, our only function is to declare “the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed in the statute.” Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D.1984) citing Matter of Aiken, 296 N.W.2d 538, 540 (S.D.1980); State Highway Comm’n v. Wieczorek, 248 N.W.2d 369, 372 (S.D.1976); Kalmbach v. City of Mobridge, 81 S.D. 158, 162, 132 N.W.2d 293, 295 (1964); State ex rel. Widdoss v. Esmay, 72 S.D. 270, 273, 33 N.W.2d 280, 282 (1948).
The majority relies upon an examination of the legislative history of SDCL 10-48-2.-1. Resorting to legislative history, however, is justified “only when legislation is ambiguous, or its literal meaning is absurd or unreasonable.” Petition of Famous Brands, 347 N.W.2d at 885. In the absence of these circumstances, we must give legislation its plain meaning. Id.
Applying the foregoing principles, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation as to the application of the statutes in question to Border States’ circumstances. I find no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of SDCL 10-48-2.1. The statute clearly imposes a separate tax on any fuel used in highway construction projects paid for wholly or partially from the public coffers. It matters little, if at all, that such fuel is not consumed on the public highways. The facts of the present case clearly satisfy the criteria necessary for the imposition of the special fuel tax under SDCL 10-48-2.1. I would reverse.