Plaintiff commenced the present paternity action over ten years after the birth of her child. Defendant moved for accelerated judgment based upon the six-year limitation period contained within the paternity statute. MCL 722.714(b); MSA 25.494(b). Plaintiff countered by arguing that the limitation period violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, US Const, Am XIV, and the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2. The trial court agreed that the statute precluded plaintiffs paternity claim but ruled nonetheless that a declaratory judgment action could be maintained on the child’s behalf. Defendant appeals by leave granted.
Initially, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the child could maintain a separate declaratory action to determine her paternity. In Michigan, paternity proceedings are of a purely statutory nature. Pangborn v Smith, 65 Mich 1, 4; 31 NW 599 (1887). The pertinent statute provides that paternity litigation may be commenced by a child’s mother, the putative father, or the Department of Social Services. In addition, a trial court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child’s interests. MCL 722.714; MSA 25.494. In any *531event, the action is governed by the statutory six-year limitation. Absent legislative action, a child may not maintain a paternity action separate from that allowed under the paternity statute and subject to the limitation period. Cf. JMS v Benson, 98 Wis 2d 406; 297 NW2d 18 (1980).
Secondly, although the dissenting opinion has put forth a well-reasoned analysis of this issue, we do not believe the limitation period of MCL 722.714(b); MSA 25.494(b) operates to violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, US Const, Am XIV, and the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2. To the extent the limitation period causes disparate treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children, it is substantially related to permissible governmental interests. Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259; 99 S Ct 518; 58 L Ed 2d 503 (1978), Daniel v Collier, 113 Mich App 74; 317 NW2d 293 (1982). The governmental interest in this case is in discouraging the litigation of stale or fraudulent paternity claims. The limitation period here, which is six years, does not produce an impenetrable barrier effectively shielding otherwise invidious discrimination. Because actions may be commenced by a child’s mother, father or the Department of Social Services, the fact that the provision requires initiation of suit during the child’s minority does not work an unfairness of constitutional magnitude. Daniel v Collier, supra.
Reversed and remanded for entry of accelerated judgment in favor of defendant.