(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
An unfavorable fact scenario, that stumps the prosecution to explain, sometimes leads to bad law. That has now happened in this case. Our speedy indictment rule allows the prosecution forty-five days to indict an adult after the arrest is made. Iowa R.Crim.P. 27(2)(a). If that time limit is passed, the rule says that “the court must order the prosecution to be dismissed.” Id. The rule allows for a time extension if “good cause to the contrary is shown or the defendant waives his right thereto.” Id. But the prosecution’s problem here is that the defendant did not waive his right to a speedy indictment and there is no good cause shown for the State’s failure to indict.
Of course, the State only missed the deadline from one to three days, counting from when defendant Gathercole was arrested by Utah authorities or from when he was secured by Transcor, the Iowa agent. Since a good cause argument is not available, the majority contends this small delay would not amount to any constitutional prejudice. Thus occurs a misdirection of the legal question, the question of prejudice not being a part of the rule that frames the excuse in terms of “good cause.” See id.
The critical legal question in this case is “was Gathercole arrested” for purposes of rule 27(2)(a) when the agent of the State of Iowa, Transcor, took possession of him in Utah for delivery to the Polk County, Iowa sheriff? The issue is not, as the majority decides, “does Transcor have the power of arrest in Utah?” In its analysis and conclusion regarding the arresting authority under extradition law and the interstate extradition compact — that Transcor cannot arrest anybody — the majority ignores the Iowa statute that should decide this case. That statute defines what an “arrest” is and states as follows:
*576Arrest is the taking of a person into custody when and in the manner authorized by law, including restraint of the person or the person’s submission to custody.
Iowa Code § 804.5 (1993).
The majority speaks of arrest as though it is a concept so universally understood that further discussion is unnecessary. No dictionary definition is given. If it had been, we would have seen the same idea as expressed in section 804.5 of the Code.
Webster’s dictionary defines the term arrest:
1. an arresting or being arrested; esp., a taking or being taken into custody by authority of the law.
Webster’s New World Dictionary 77 (2d ed. 1986).
Transeor took Gathercole into custody by authority of the law. The interstate extradition compact, as adopted by Iowa, provides:
The local prosecuting authority of the demanding state shall cause a warrant to be issued to an agent, commanding the agent to receive the fugitive when delivered to the agent and convey the fugitive to the proper officer of the local jurisdiction in the demanding state.
Iowa Code § 818.9.
Gathercole was taken into custody by Transeor on February 17, 1994, and transported under the authority of an arrest warrant issued under the jurisdiction of Polk County, Iowa. That arrest warrant was filed in Polk County on February 7, 1994 and charged the defendant with the crime of robbery in the first degree. He was arrested on February 11,1994 by Utah officers on the Iowa warrant. Nobody suggests that Trans-cor was acting without authority. He was, by dictionary definition, “arrested” by Trans-cor officials.
Of even greater persuasion is the language used by the legislature in defining what constitutes an arrest. It defines an “arrest” as including “the restraint of a person” or the “person’s submission to custody.” Id. § 804.5. How has Gathercole not submitted to the custody of Iowa agents when he waives extradition? Waiver of extradition is not just a friendly gesture by a defendant who does not want to be a troublemaker. It is an act of lesser compulsion. How is Gath-ercole not restrained when he is delivered as a fugitive by Utah police to Iowa police agents for transport to Iowa for trial?
The entire conception of Transcor’s taking possession and delivering Gathercole is one of restraint and submission to custody. Thus, the Iowa statutory definition of arrest is met three ways under Iowa Code section 804.5.
The majority notes that our speedy indictment rules, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2) and Iowa Code section 804.14, which describe the manner of making arrests, were enacted together. In support of this assertion, State v. Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 1980), is cited. In Schmitt, we said that rule 27 and Iowa Code sections 804.5 and 804.14 concerning the arrest and the manner of making an arrest were enacted together and must be construed together. Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d at 26. We cited and approved this holding in State v. Davis, 525 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1994). Being enacted and construed together, section 804.5, which defines what constitutes an arrest, should control the interpretation of our speedy indictment rule 27(2)(a).
We have recently reviewed the purpose and application of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(a). In Davis, we affirmed the dismissal of the charge against a defendant because the state failed to indict him within forty-five days of his arrest. Davis, 525 N.W.2d at 841. The defendant had been arrested, jailed, and was in custody approximately two hours before being released. Later, when the results of a blood test were received, the state retrieved the citation previously issued to defendant and filed it with the clerk of court. The state argued the forty-five-day period started with the filing of the complaint and did not expire until after the trial information was filed. We held, however, the arrest triggered the commencement of the time period which therefore ran out before the indictment was filed. Id.
We noted in Davis that the officers of the state could have easily complied with the rule. This is also true in the case at bar. *577Defendant Gathereole’s presence in Polk County, Iowa was not required or even needed for the county attorney to file an information against him. Any time passed in transporting Gathercole from Utah to the Polk County sheriff could not have had any legal effect delaying the filing of a county attorney’s information.
After the forty-five days ran, in the absence of a showing of good cause for the state’s failure to comply, we held in Davis the state’s time was up. We said
An arrest of a citizen is a serious matter. It should not be done unless the peace officer or the state has probable cause to do so. Once an arrest is made, the state should be required to follow through on the time requirements for a speedy indictment and processing of the case pursuant to rule 27(1) and (2). To do otherwise generates disrespect for the law by the authorities.
It also threatens abuse of citizens’ rights....
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The forty-five day period under rule 27(2)(a) runs from the date defendant is arrested, unless the state shows good cause for the late filing of the trial information or defendant waives the right to have it timely filed. It would take legislative action to effect a different starting date.
Davis, 525 N.W.2d at 840-41.
In Davis the state did not contend that good cause had been shown for a late filing of the trial information or that defendant had waived his right to have it timely filed. In deciding Davis, we overruled State v. Van Beek, 443 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1989), and disavowed its analysis. We said
Van Beek seems to be bottomed on allowing “prosecutorial discretion” not to timely file a trial information within forty-five days after the defendant was arrested. There is no Iowa Code authority nor any provision in rule 27(2)(a) to allow such discretion.
Davis, 525 N.W.2d at 840 (citations omitted).
The statutory definition of arrest in section 804.5 and our eases embrace the concept of “in custody.” If a defendant is in custody, restrained, or submits to custody, the requirements of an arrest are satisfied. See State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Iowa 1996). A custodial arrest for purposes of speedy indictment was examined by our court of appeals in State v. Beeks, 428 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Iowa App.1988). The court noted that a person not in the custody of county authorities is not arrested by the mere bringing of a charge in that county. Beeks, 428 N.W.2d at 309. The court then stated
We agree with the trial court that defendant was not arrested on the Story County charges until he submitted to the custody of the Story County sheriff on March-4, 1987. Defendant was under arrest on the Hamilton County charges while he was detained at the Webster County jail.
Id. Defendant was arrested for purposes of the speedy indictment rule when he submitted to the custody of the Story County sheriff on March 4,1987.
In State v. Lyrek, 385 N.W.2d 248, 249 (Iowa 1986), the defendant was arrested in Minnesota by Minnesota officers after committing a robbery in Iowa and failing to appear for a DWI charge in Minnesota. Formal extradition proceedings were initiated by the State of Iowa, and the defendant then waived extradition. The following day an Iowa deputy sheriff picked up the defendant and transported him to Iowa. When the defendant moved to dismiss on the basis he was arrested in Minnesota more than forty-five days prior to the state’s filing of the trial information, the state argued the date of arrest was the date the defendant was taken into custody in Minnesota by the Iowa deputy. Lyrek, 385 N.W.2d at 250.
After explaining the principles underlying the limitations of power to arrest a person for crimes committed in another state, we held the defendant was not arrested for the purposes of rule 27(2)(a) until he was taken into custody in Minnesota by the Iowa deputy. Id. Therefore dismissal was inappropriate as the trial information was filed within the forty-five-day window.
Other cases have held that the rule is triggered by the taking into custody by Iowa *578officers on the crime charged even though the defendant is already in custody on another charge. See State v. Boelman, 330 N.W.2d 794, 795 (Iowa 1983) (defendant in jail on unrelated probation violation was arrested when deputies served her with arrest warrant on a new charge); State v. Eichorn, 325 N.W.2d 95, 96-97 (Iowa 1982) (when authorities bring an additional charge against a person already in custody, the time of arrest for purposes of rule 27(2)(a) only relates to the offense for which the defendant was charged).
This analysis is also appropriate in the present case. As an initial matter, an arrest warrant has no effect outside the boundaries of the state from which it issued. Drake v. Keeling, 230 Iowa 1038, 1044, 299 N.W. 919, 922 (1941). However, in Keeling we held Iowa deputy sheriffs taking custody of a defendant in Nebraska, pursuant to an Iowa arrest warrant, act by virtue of office and by color of office and are liable along with their sureties for false arrest. Id. Furthermore, the State of Utah was not without authority to arrest Gathercole. Rather, the State of Utah arrested Gathercole as a fugitive from justice, as is provided for in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act as adopted by both the Iowa and Utah legislatures. See Iowa Code ch. 820; Utah Code Tit. 77, ch. 30; U.S. Const, art. IV, § 2.
In the present case, Gathercole could not have been arrested for the Iowa robbery when he was arrested by Utah authorities, as they had no authority to do so. The question then becomes whether Gathercole was arrested when he was picked up by Transeor or whether he was not arrested until he reached Polk County. The defendant relies on Lyrek to argue he was arrested when he was first taken into custody by Transeor, an agent of Iowa. The State maintains he was not arrested until he reached Polk County.
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act provides
Any person arrested in this state charged with having committed any crime in another state ... may waive the issuance and service of the warrant ... by executing or subscribing ... a writing which states that the person consents to the return to the demanding state.
Iowa Code § 820.25 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code § 77-30-25 (1953).
Once this waiver is completed, the act provides it shall be forwarded to the office of the governor of the asylum state and the judge “shall direct the officer having such person in custody to deliver forthwith such person to the duly accredited agent or agents of the demanding state-” Iowa Code § 820.25; see also Utah Code § 77-30-25. Thus the waiver of extradition process itself contemplates delivery of the defendant to an agent of the demanding state. Several sections of the Iowa Code also contemplate arrests by persons other than police officers. See Iowa Code § 804.6 (providing an arrest by warrant may only be made by a peace officer; in other eases arrests may be made by private persons as provided in the chapter); § 804.9 (providing a private person may make an arrest for an offense committed in his presence or with a reasonable belief a felony has been committed); § 804.10 (providing the standard to determine the appropriate force a private person is entitled to use when making an arrest); § 804.24 (providing the private person must deliver the arrestee to a peace officer or a magistrate without delay).
The majority’s analysis of the wrong issue, i.e., whether Transeor has the power to make an arrest in Utah, leads it into an analytical inconsistency. It bases its entire analysis on Iowa’s agents having no power of arrest in Utah but then admits it must give Utah agents extraterritorial arresting power in Iowa. This is inconsistent with the general law of arrest, the majority concedes, but it is a practical necessity in order to get Gather-cole back to Iowa under some state’s authority-
The majority’s analysis is not needed when the focus is on the proper issue, i.e., whether an arrest, as defined by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 804.5, has been effected by Transeor’s authorized act, as an agent of the State of Iowa, for purposes of our speedy indictment rule.
Under the authority of our statutory language, the Lyrek analysis, and our cases interpreting arrest, therefore, Gathercole was arrested when Transeor first obtained custody of him to transport him to Iowa on February 17,1994. Because the State failed *579to file the trial information until April 5, 1994, forty-six days later 1 and one day beyond the allowable time for indictment of defendant under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(a), the defendant’s motion to dismiss should have been granted.
In State v. O’Bryan, 522 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa App.1994), our court of appeals held the charge against the defendant should have been dismissed because of a failure by the state to file a timely indictment. The state tried to justify a good cause excuse by charging time to the defendant because of his failure to appear after being given a citation. In finding this was not good cause, the court said, “The arbitrary forty-five-day limit cannot be violated, even ‘a little bit’ without a showing of good cause.” O’Bryan, 522 N.W.2d at 106 (cited with approval in Davis, 525 N.W.2d at 840).
Because the forty-five-day limit imposed under our speedy indictment rule, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(a), was violated by the State, I would reverse and remand for dismissal of the prosecution charges against defendant Gathercole.
. Forty-five days from February 17 is April 3, which in 1994 fell on a Sunday. By operation of Iowa Code § 4.1(34), the rule for computation of time, the prescribed time period is extended to the next non-holiday weekday. Thus, the final day for filing the trial information within the forty-five-day window was Monday, April 4, 1994. The State did not file it until Tuesday, April 5, 1994.