¶ 35. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). The record discloses no attempt by the trial court to contact the State and defense counsel when faced with obviously significant requests from the jury during its deliberations. The trial court, without consulting counsel, twice decided not to grant the jury's request to have Anderson's testimony read to the jurors unless the jurors could specify which portions of his relatively short testimony they wanted to hear. They wanted to hear it all, so they heard nothing.
*105¶ 36. Earlier in the deliberations, the trial court consulted with counsel and over defense counsel objections allowed the jurors to view a videotaped statement of one of the victims. The net effect of the trial court's later unilateral decisions was to permit the jurors to hear again only testimony unfavorable to Anderson. I believe the supreme court's decision in Franklin v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 717, 724, 247 N.W.2d 721 (1976), which cautions against the dangers of overemphasizing the value of a recorded statement relative to the testimony from the witness stand, and the process required for fairness when the jury requests reading of testimony explained in Kohlhoff v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 159, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978), require reversal and remand for a new trial. Consequently, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the Majority opinion involving the jury's requests to review Anderson's testimony, and from the Majority's conclusion that the trial court's action resulted in no error for which Anderson can obtain relief.
¶ 37. The record discloses a written request by the jury for all exhibits. Counsel were present and consulted. Anderson's counsel objected to allowing the jury to view a videotape of one victim's testimony on grounds that it unduly emphasized the statement, which was unfavorable to Anderson. The trial court determined it would send the videotape to the jury, but instructed them to view it only once. The trial court also agreed to provide the jury with all of the other exhibits that had been admitted into evidence. These events occurred at some unknown time during the afternoon when the jury began its deliberations.
¶ 38’ There is no record of subsequent jury requests, nor are the notes the jury sent making those requests available. They were apparently inadvertently *106destroyed.1 However, when the jury returned its verdict on the second day of deliberations, the trial court for the first time advised counsel and Anderson that the jury had twice requested that Anderson's testimony be read. The first request the trial court described as a request that all of Anderson's testimony and one victim's testimony be read. The trial court indicated that it had responded by telling the jury that it had to specify the parts the jurors wished to hear, and that it urged the jurors to rely on their "collective memory."
¶ 39. The trial court also disclosed that the jury later made a second request to have Anderson's testimony read. The jury, as reported by the trial court, indicated this time that it "did not understand all of [defendant's] testimony." Without providing any opportunity for input from counsel, the trial court again refused to grant the request unless the jury specified what parts it did not understand. The jury was again unable to clarify its request, so it was not permitted to hear Anderson's testimony.
¶ 40. The trial court's decision to deny the jury's request to hear Anderson's testimony was especially damaging to Anderson's case because, as is apparent from the record, he had difficulty communicating. After careful review of the mere twenty-five pages of transcript, which compose Anderson's entire testimony, it is obvious why the jury had difficulty understanding portions of his testimony. Anderson, who testified he has a fourth grade education, was not an articulate witness. Several pages of the transcript involve obvious confusion between the questioner and Anderson as to dates when he became aware of certain material facts. *107Parts of Anderson's testimony are unclear and confusing. From its reading of his testimony the Majority concludes that Anderson was helped by not having the testimony repeated. I see that as a question the jury had a right to decide, but was erroneously not permitted to do so.
¶ 41. Not only was the decision to deny the jury's two requests to hear Anderson's testimony erroneously made without consulting counsel, it is particularly troubling because the trial court allowed the jury to hear a victim's testimony twice. In Franklin, the court explained that the risk of sending an audiotape and tape recorder to the jury room was that it would overemphasize the tape at the expense of testimony from the witness stand. 74 Wis. 2d at 724. Here, the jury was granted the opportunity to hear and view one victim's taped interview. After the jury viewed the videotape, it requested that Anderson's testimony be read to it. This request came after extensive deliberation. The second request attempted to explain why the jurors wanted Anderson's testimony read. However, the trial court still did not permit Anderson's testimony to be read to the jury, and it made this decision without any consultation with counsel.
¶ 42. Given the trial court's decision to allow the jury to hear one victim's testimony again, it faced an especially important decision when the jury then asked to hear Anderson's version of events again. "When, during its deliberations, a jury poses a question regarding testimony that has been presented, the jury has a right to have that testimony read to it, subject to the discretion of the trial judge to limit the reading." Kohlhoff, 85 Wis. 2d at 159. The trial court was faced with a matter of significance to the outcome of the deliberations, and was empowered to exercise its discretion. However, discretion in such a circumstance *108cannot fairly be exercised ex parte. Where the trial court's discretion to limit the reading of testimony to the jury, or even to summarize the requested testimony for the jury, has been upheld, it has always been after the trial court gave both counsel the opportunity to be heard. See id. at 159-61 (no erroneous exercise of discretion where both counsel and defendant participated in a conference in chambers prior to court reading back testimony); Jones v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 41, 57, 233 N.W.2d 430 (1975) (jury in criminal case has the right to have testimony read to it by the reporter, although extent of the reading is within discretion of trial court). This is not a ministerial matter, such as a request for lunch or coffee. The jury made a legitimate request to hear certain testimony again, and the trial court had an obligation to both attempt to give counsel and Anderson an opportunity to be heard, and to provide the jury with the testimony, "subject to the discretion of the trial judge to limit the reading." See Kohlhoff, 85 Wis. 2d at 159. The trial court did not, under the teachings of Kohlhoff, have the right to completely deny the request. However, that is the effect of the trial court's actions here.
¶ 43. In response to Anderson's postconviction motion, the trial court spoke of the need to conserve the reporter's time, and the length of Anderson's testimony as justification for refusing to permit the entire testimony to be read. However, Anderson's testimony was contained in a mere twenty-five double-spaced pages. Although it had not been transcribed at the time of the request, it was evident that Anderson was the last of six witnesses to testify during one morning of trial. While the challenges of calendar management, with which this court certainly sympathizes, are well known to both the court and the bar, this was not particularly *109lengthy testimony. The fact that the jury was unable to either identify specific parts of Anderson's testimony it wished to hear, or to explain more specifically to the trial court what subjects it found confusing, paints an eloquent picture of the jury's strongly felt need to simply hear the testimony again. The refusal to permit that reading in the circumstances where the jury was already allowed to view a videotape of testimony adverse to Anderson was, in my opinion, an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶ 44. The Majority concedes that the trial court's decision to communicate with the jury without consulting the parties was erroneous. The Majority does not discuss this in terms of the constitutional right of Anderson to be present during all court proceedings. As the supreme court instructed in State v. Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 570, 334 N.W.2d 263 (1983),
[C]ommunication between a judge and a jury, while the jury is deliberating, outside the courtroom and outside the presence of the defendant and defense counsel constitutes constitutional error, if the defendant has not waived the constitutional right to be present. The court must consider whether the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 45. Instead, the Majority implies that Anderson (not his counsel) knowingly waived a constitutionally protected right because his counsel failed to object to the trial court's actions when counsel learned of them long after the fact, and after the jury had reached its verdict. The "waiver" is then analyzed in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, as to which the Majority concludes that there was no showing that Anderson was prejudiced. I cannot agree.
¶ 46. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Anderson ever had an opportunity to discuss the trial *110court's action with his counsel before the verdict was read. There is no evidence that the constitutional right to be present at all stages of the trial was ever knowingly and voluntarily waived by Anderson. There was no court colloquy with Anderson on the subject of his right to be present, nor was there any affirmative representation by his counsel that the right had been discussed and was intentionally being waived. Because the right to be present is of a constitutional magnitude, I do not understand it to be a right that can be waived by an agent (counsel) without a showing by the State that the waiver, or the delegation of the right to make the waiver, was knowingly and voluntarily made by Anderson.
¶ 47. Finally, the Majority concludes that there was so much evidence against Anderson that he was not prejudiced by the trial court's actions. I disagree with that conclusion. As explained above, this jury twice indicated a strong desire to hear Anderson's testimony again — this request should have been carefully considered and, in my opinion, granted. It is not reasonable to conclude that "the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." See State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶ 60, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637 (citation omitted). Because we cannot know what brought about the jury's ultimate decision, but because we do know that it was twice denied testimony it considered important — testimony that was favorable to Anderson —Anderson is entitled to a new trial.
¶ 48. For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the parts of the Majority opinion involving the trial court's contact with the jury outside the presence of Anderson and counsel.