(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The majority hold that the trial judge was in error in declining to interview a 7-year-old child to ascertain whether he had a custodial preference between his maternal grandmother and his stepfather.
In custody matters, by statute, case law and common sense, the paramount overriding consideration is the best interest of the child. In many cases, the best interest of the child is served by declining to force the child to express a preference.
The complex inter-racial factors present suggest that the trial judge was wise and correct in declining to expose the child to the inevitable pressures involved in extracting an expression of preference for appellate review.
I do not believe that the Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq., requires that in every case the trial judge conduct some kind of on-the-record hearing or interview with the child to determine whether the child should be required to express a preference. Contrary to In re Custody of James B,1 I doubt that the Supreme Court will find that a 4-year-old is of *567sufficient age to express a preference, or that it is error for a trial judge to decline to force a 4-year-old child to testify so that an appellate court will have a record to review.
In the within case, the trial judge has made his position clear. He did not believe the 7-year-old was of sufficient age to express a preference. Obviously, the trial judge assumed that if asked, the 7-year-old would express a preference to stay with the Stepfather. Apparently, the trial judge also believes it will not serve the child’s best interest to probe for the reason for his preference.
Last, I find nothing in this record to suggest a basis for taking this case from the trial judge who heard and decided it and to assign it to another judge on remand.
I would vote to affirm.
66 Mich App 133; 238 NW2d 550 (1975).