Pro Tem., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein because I believe the findings of the referee *60are sustained by the record. Edmund Hollstein should be suspended from the practice of law as recommended by the referee.
I agree with the referee, respondent violated DR5105 (B) and DR7-101 (A) (1) in failing to take steps to protect the interests of Clifford’s incompetent brother Leonard. Respondent knew his client Clifford was the guardian for Leonard, since he was the attorney who conducted the guardianship proceedings in which Clifford was appointed the legal guardian for Leonard. He knew that Clifford’s interest in releasing the ranch from the lien of support for Leonard was in conflict with Leonard’s interest of having this lien as security for his continuing support. As attorney for the guardian, he essentially was the attorney for the incompetent, and owed a duty to the ward to protect his interest in the property.
Respondent argues it was the duty of the court to protect the rights of the incompetent. This to me demonstrates a woeful lack of appreciation for his responsibility. Respondent was an officer of the court, who had full knowledge of the situation and who actually was the attorney for the incompetent. It was his duty to fully apprise the court of what was happening and to show how it would affect the rights of the incompetent.
I also agree with the referee that the respondent violated all of the disciplinary rules and canons of ethics set forth in Count III of the formal charges. In addition to the evidence enumerated in Count I, disclosing there was an attorney-client relationship between respondent and Clifford Robins on several occasions prior to July 20, 1972, the record shows on that date Clifford again came to respondent’s office and asked him to get in touch with Don Forney about buying the ranch. Respondent called Forney on the telephone and Forney came to respondent’s office that same day and talked to Clifford Robins about *61the sale of the ranch. Respondent was the only attorney involved and helped the parties negotiate the terms. During the negotiations Don Forney asked respondent to become a partner with him in purchasing the ranch from Clifford. Respondent did so, and named his wife as a tenant-in-common with Forney in the contract and deed. At all times respondent knew the ranch was subject to a lien for the support of Leonard, as ordered by the court. He also knew that it was subject to liens for property settlement and child support in the District Court for Sheridan County in the divorce proceedings between Dorothy Robins Tinsley and Clifford Robins. In both of these cases the ranch was the subject matter of litigation in which respondent acquired a proprietary interest through his wife.
I also agree with the referee that respondent violated DR7-104 (A) (1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as alleged in Count IV. Respondent did not represent either Dorothy L. Robins or Clifford L. Robins in their divorce case. Sometime in June 1972, Clifford and his second wife, and Dorothy Robins Tinsley, formerly Dorothy L. Robins, came to respondent’s office in Rushville. At that time Dorothy told respondent that Michael Smith was her attorney. Dorothy Tinsley had gone to respondent’s office with Clifford Robins to discuss the subordination of her liens for property settlement and child support against the ranch so Clifford could get another loan from the bank. Respondent subsequently called Smith so he was well aware that Smith was her attorney.
The evidence is clear that on July 20, 1972, when respondent entered into the transaction with Donald Forney to purchase the ranch from Clifford Robins, he had personal knowledge of Michael Smith’s representation of Dorothy Robins Tinsley in reference to her property settlement and child support liens against the ranch. After he acquired a proprietary *62interest in the ranch, he talked to Dorothy Robins Tinsley in person, corresponded with her directly by letters, and talked to her on the telephone numerous times in reference to settlement of her property settlement lien against the ranch and in regard to child support payments due under the divorce decree. His conduct in talking directly to the client of another attorney cannot be excused on the ground they had been personal friends. If respondent did not understand that when a friend is represented by another attorney he could not deal with her personally about the subject matter of the other attorney’s employment, he is not qualified to practice law.
For all of these reasons, I believe the recommendation of the referee should have been adopted. I cannot go along with a slap on the wrist in this instance. The respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.