¶ 31. (dissenting). While I join the majority opinion in almost all respects, because I have concluded that suppression1 of Noble's John Doe *557testimony, exacted by the majority for what it concludes is the unauthorized practice of law, is improper, unnecessary and contrary to binding precedent, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 32. To reach the sanction the majority applies, it first determines, without the benefit of a trial, that Matthews engaged in the unauthorized practice of law contrary to WlS. Stat. § 757.30(1); then it assumes that Matthews probably will not be prosecuted for this crime:
We are reluctant to conclude that there is no sanction for the unauthorized practice of law at a John Doe investigation other than the remote possibility of criminal prosecution. District attorneys have great discretion in deciding whom to prosecute. . . . [I]t is unlikely that after asking an unlicensed person to examine witnesses at a John Doe investigation, a district attorney would then prosecute the person who had just done so.
Majority at ¶ 24. The majority then reasons, "[W]e conclude that if the choice is between sanction and no sanction, the better conclusion is that there should be a sanction when the State obtains information through the unauthorized practice of law." Majority at ¶ 30.
¶ 33. As a preliminary matter, I conclude that it is improper to apply a sanction to the State when a violation of WlS. Stat. § 757.30(1), the unauthorized practice of law, has not been proven at trial. Second, prosecution is not solely within the discretion of the district attorney as the majority opinion asserts. The John Doe statute, WlS. Stat. § 968.26,2 requires a judge *558to examine a complainant in a John Doe petition under oath, as well as any witnesses produced by that complainant, "once a John Doe complainant has shown that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has been committed." Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 615, 571 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1997). It is possible that the assistant district attorney who invited Matthews to participate in the John Doe proceeding that formed the basis for testimony used later in Noble's perjury trial will refuse to file a complaint against Matthews. If so, Noble, her attorney or any other concerned citizen could file a John Doe petition with the circuit court alleging "objective, factual assertions sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed" by Matthews. Id. at 623, 571 N.W.2d at 391. The circuit court would then question witnesses, review the evidence presented and determine whether to issue a complaint and a warrant for Matthews's arrest. As the supreme court instructed, "The John Doe procedure we adopt today gives citizens access to an impartial and neutral jurist for review of their criminal complaints." Id. at 624, 571 N.W.2d at 392. Therefore, there are more than the two choices of suppression or no consequences for Matthews's conduct at the John Doe that the majority's opinion presents.
¶ 34. Third, the sanction of suppression of evidence obtained through the John Doe proceeding is *559contrary to long-standing precedent, initially set forth by the supreme court in Ware v. State, 201 Wis. 425, 230 N.W. 80 (1930), and reaffirmed many times thereafter, most recently by this court in Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999).
¶ 35. In Ware, a woman had been convicted of adultery based on her diary, which her husband had stolen and turned over to police for her prosecution. The supreme court refused to exclude the diary as evidence of her crime, even though it agreed the diary had been wrongfully obtained. It explained, "[t]he doctrine of the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained should be confined strictly to those cases where the procuring of the evidence has violated some constitutional right of the defendant." Ware, 201 Wis. at 427, 230 N.W. at 81. In State v. Mieritz, 193 Wis. 2d 571, 534 N.W.2d 632 ( Ct. App. 1995), a police officer's role in the cocaine purchase used to convict Mieritz was held to have been improper, but the evidence was not excluded because the officer's actions violated none of Mieritz's constitutional rights. Id. at 574, 534 N.W.2d at 633. Furthermore, the Ware rule, that suppression is not available as a sanction unless a constitutional violation has occurred, is also applied in civil proceedings. Peckham, 229 Wis. 2d at 787, 601 N.W.2d at 292 (citations omitted). "In summary,.. . the exclusionary rule is applicable in civil and criminal proceedings only where the evidence sought to be excluded was obtained in violation of a constitutional right or a statute that specifically requires suppression of wrongfully or illegally obtained evidence as a sanction." Id. (citations omitted). While the majority opinion tries to get around this clear precedent with obiter dicta from State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982), and from State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, *560546 N.W.2d 406 (1996), I cannot. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority chooses to characterize what it does as an exclusion of evidence, but without an evidentiary objection, this *557is not an exclusion, it is a suppression. See Ware v. State, 201 Wis. 425, 427, 230 N.W. 80, 81 (1930).
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.26 states in relevant part:
*558If a person complains to a judge that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has been committed within his or her jurisdiction, the judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by him or her. ... If it appears probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed and who committed it, the complaint may be reduced to writing and signed and verified; and thereupon a warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused.