¶ 36. (concurring). I join both the majority opinion and the concurrence by Justice Bablitch. I write separately, however, to prevent any misunderstanding regarding the appropriate test for the constitutionality of restrictions on the rights of a probationer. The appropriate test is not the strict scrutiny test, as the majority correctly notes. Majority op. at ¶ 16 n.23. The proper test is " 'conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person's rehabilitation.'" Majority op. at ¶ 19.
¶ 37. I also wish to stress the fact that Oakley's nine children, rather than Oakley himself, are the real victims in this case. Given his history of refusing to pay child support, such failure may very well mean that *481Oakley's nine children will be raised in poverty. See majority op. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 9, 10. Even though "[w]e have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty," the law should do what it can to minimize the effects of poverty on children. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970). "From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders." Id. at 264-65.1
The usual methods of enforcing child support orders have proved to be totally unsuccessful with Oakley; therefore, extraordinary methods are required.
¶ 38. For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully concur.
¶ 39. I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this opinion.
The dissent's attempt to raise the spectre of a condition of probation potentially "coercive of abortion" intentionally obfuscates the real issue here. See dissenting op. of Justice ANN W. BRADLEY, joined by Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAM-SON and Justice DIANE S. SYKES at ¶ 62. What is at issue here is Oakley's wanton refusal to pay support for his nine children.