*748OPINION
KALITOWSKI, Judge.An officer stopped respondent’s vehicle on the basis of an informant’s tip, and respondent’s driver’s license was revoked pursuant to the implied consent law. Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1988). Respondent petitioned for judicial review and the trial court rescinded the revocation, holding that the officer did not have articulable grounds to make the stop. The Commissioner of Public Safety appeals. We reverse.
FACTS
Close to midnight on August 4, 1988, Officer Charles Schuveiller received a call from the dispatcher reporting a drunk driver at a Burger King restaurant. The informant, an employee of Burger King, described the color and make of the vehicle. As the officer arrived at the Burger King, a second call indicated that the vehicle was leaving the drive-through window. Schu-veiller saw the suspect vehicle pull away from the drive-through window, and stopped it. The officer obtained the name, address, and work and home telephone numbers of the informant after the seizure.
Respondent’s driver’s license was revoked pursuant to the implied consent law, and he petitioned for judicial review. After a hearing, the trial court rescinded the revocation concluding that the officer did not have articulable grounds to make an investigatory stop of respondent, because he had no information concerning the informant’s basis for concluding the driver was intoxicated and the officer observed no illegal driving conduct. The Commissioner of Public Safety appeals.
ISSUE
Did the informant’s tip give the officer sufficient information to reasonably suspect that the driver of the vehicle in question was under the influence?
ANALYSIS
An officer must have a specific and artic-ulable suspicion of a violation before a stop of a vehicle may be justified. Marben v. State, Department of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn.1980). The factual basis for the stop need not arise from the officer’s personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person. Id. (citations omitted). Information from a private citizen is presumed reliable. Id.
When an informant provides sufficient information so that he may be located and held accountable for providing false information, the officer is justified in assuming the caller is being truthful in so identifying himself. City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn.1988). In Shepherd, the caller identified himself as an attendant at a particular gas station. Id. Here, the caller was identified as an employee of a particular Burger King restaurant. As in Shepherd, the officer here subsequently identified the caller, which indicates the information as to the caller’s identity was adequate. Id. n. 1. Thus, this case does not involve an anonymous caller. Cf. Schwartz v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 422 N.W.2d 761, 762 (Minn.Ct.App.1988).
The informant described the color, make and location of the vehicle, and said the driver was drunk. The trial court here ruled that the officer did not have articula-ble grounds to stop respondent because he had no information as to the basis for the informant’s conclusion respondent was intoxicated, and he observed no illegal driving conduct. As an initial matter, we note that the trial court referred to a “possible drunk driver.” The record indicates the report was of a “drunk driver.” To the extent the trial court found otherwise, it was clearly erroneous. State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn.1983).
Stops based upon informant’s tips have been found valid upon a showing that there was a basis for the informant’s knowledge. In Marben, 294 N.W.2d at 699, the trooper could verify the trucker-informant was in close proximity to the suspect’s car. In State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn.1986), the police officer had a basis for thinking the informant had obtained her *749information in a reliable way, because she or the driver had seen the car in question drive through the red light. In Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d at 891, the facts suggested that the caller’s information was based on personal observation, because he was a gas station attendant who said the intoxicated driver had just left the station.
In contrast, in Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn.1985), nothing was known about the informant or what led him to believe the driver was possibly drunk. In Schwartz, 422 N.W.2d at 762, the police had no information about the informant except the location of the telephone booth from which the telephone call was made.
Shepherd, Marben and Davis are controlling. The informant here was an employee of Burger King, and there is reason to believe the informant based his conclusion on personal observations.
Respondent also argues that cases in which revocations were sustained involved either specific facts provided by the informant or observations of erratic driving by the police officer and that neither were present here. We do not find this persuasive. In Shepherd, the minimal corroboration was not determinative. Instead, the court focused on the fact that the informant had personally observed the alleged drunk driver.
Finally, it is in the interests of the public that citizens are encouraged to report suspected drunk drivers to authorities, so that they may be apprehended before an accident occurs. A layperson is qualified to give an opinion as to whether a person is under the influence, based upon observations of that person. See Trail v. Village of Elk River, 286 Minn. 380, 390-91, 175 N.W.2d 916, 922 (1970). If the tip is sufficient, officers are encouraged to investigate the suspect immediately, rather than to allow the suspect to drive so that the officer may observe the driving. Otherwise, the risk that the suspect will be involved in an accident increases, which is not in the public’s interest.
DECISION
The order of the trial court rescinding the revocation is reversed.
Reversed.