(concurring in result).
Under all of the circumstances of this case, it appears that the award of $20,-613.60 unto Mary Schumaker is equitable. We must be truly cognizant of SDCL 25-4-44 which vests a broad discretion in the trial court in the division of property. We have said so as recently as Moser v. Moser, 422 N.W.2d 594 (S.D.1988), and Storm v. Storm, 400 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1987). There must be a clear abuse of discretion for us to overturn these divisions of property under that broad statute. Having said that, which is not novel and is strictly old hat in this Court, I pass to a deeper consideration.
It is obvious that SDCL 25-4-44 requires a consideration of equity and circumstances of the parties. This is a general, vague statement and must be probed by the trial court, which should search deeply into equitable circumstances, when a decision is made. Precisely, this Court has accommodated such a probing in depth by setting up criteria for the trial courts to consider. Those criteria are: Duration of the marriage; value of the property; ages of the parties; their health and competency to earn a living; the individual contributions of the parties to the accumulation of the property; and the income-producing capacity of the parties’ individual assets. We have expressed that fault should not be considered. See very recent case of Baltzer v. Baltzer, 422 N.W.2d 584, 587 (S.D.1988), for a reannouncement of this criterion. It is because of one of these factors, the “individual contributions of the parties to the accumulation of the property,” that I write specially because I believe that there is a disparity of thought and practical application on the trial bench to that criteria. Should the property, to be divided, be limited to that property which has been accumulated through the joint efforts of the respective spouses?
Apparently, Balvin v. Balvin, 301 N.W.2d 678 (S.D.1981), instructs us that it is within the discretion of the trial court to include or not include property which was either inherited or brought into the marriage by one of the parties. In Buseman v. Buseman, 299 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (S.D.1980), this Court quoted a 1970 decision of ours, Swenson v. Swenson, 85 S.D. 320, 324, 181 N.W.2d 864, 866 (1970); therein, we stated: “We must follow the rule that ‘[w]hile the [trial] court may consider when and how the property was accumulated, it is not obligated to do so.’ ” (Brackets in original; emphasis supplied.) Therefore, it appears that a trial judge, after due reflection of when and how property was accumulated, may say to one of the litigants: “Your inherited property shall be set aside to you — or—the property you brought into the marriage shall be set aside unto you.”
My mind tells me that, perhaps, our Swenson, Buseman, and Balvin rule is too broad and comprehensive. It might well be fostering litigation that ordinarily would not result in our state, if this Court were more definitive. Perhaps the rule, if rule it is, should be changed on the specific criteria which I now address. Twice I have expressed my dissatisfaction with this broad-based criteria, for it creates an opportunity for an eager litigant to seize an inheritance of the other litigant which was probated through the latter litigant’s deceased parents. I muse: Why should a new wife, and in this case, a wife of three and one-half years, be able, theoretically, to *819share in either an inheritance of her new-won husband or her new-won husband’s efforts, which begot property for him, before he married her? Likewise, the rule applies in the other direction. Women who have inherited sizeable estates or have developed assets through their efforts prior to their divorce action at issue, should not fall prey to some man who eyes her property. Considering that women today occupy a far greater role in society, and do accrete more wealth than their counterparts of yesteryear, should not women be protected from having their inherited estates or their earned property taken from them in a divorce case? In Buseman, 299 N.W.2d at 810 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and in Laird v. Laird, 322 N.W.2d 254, 257 (S.D.1982) (Henderson, J., concurring specially), I expressed a general dissatisfaction with an approach of a rule which is so broad, that great inequity can befall either husband or wife. Where we have a very short marriage, should assets brought in by either spouse be engulfed in the overall valuation of the marital property? I think not. Fortunes should not be won at the altar followed by quick divorce.
We recently held in Henrichs v. Henrichs, 426 N.W.2d 569 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that a personal injury award could properly be considered as a marital asset, to be divided as marital property, though same was accreted but four years before the divorce action. Here, the parties were married on January 8, 1983, and separated in April 1986, or marriage cohabitation of three years and three months. Husband apparently brought approximately $26,000 to $27,000 in assets into this marriage. This writer appreciates that no rigid formula must be followed in the division of property. Bolenbaugh v. Bolenbaugh, 89 S.D. 639, 237 N.W.2d 12 (1975). In this case, the trial court received the husband’s Exhibit No. 1 as to valuations; the trial court relied very heavily in accepting this evidence. Here, the wife proffered very little, if any, evidence on valuations. One exception was a stipulation that the real estate consisting of the house, barn, and 40 acres of land was valued at $66,000.
There is no doubt that the husband was deeply involved in the family farm corporation, and his testimony that he really had no interest therein rings hollow. He obviously had an interest in the family farm corporation, though he held no stock therein. It is noted, by this writer, that the husband worked full time on this farm, with his father, and part time for UPS, while the wife continued working full time for Control Data. I note, in the record, that she often cooked for not only her husband but a hired man and occasionally did farm labor herself. Her wages were poured into general household expenses. Cash flow on a farm is usually very poor. It seems that money that husband did receive, he would pour back into the farming operation. She earned approximately $15,-000 a year at Control Data. She brought an automobile, household goods and effects, and $1,000 cash into the marriage. For her to now receive a cash award of $20,613.60 to be paid by husband for her share of an award of marital property, cannot be said to be a clear abuse of discretion. Thus, I can concur in the result.
However, language in this opinion is not in keeping with my past special concurrences; I am concerned with the theoretical concept that there should be an equitable division of property which has not been accumulated through the joint efforts of the respective spouses. The rule, developed by this Court through precedent, can lead to disastrous and disparate awards. Rather, I prefer that the rule be tilted towards a division of property which has been accumulated through the joint efforts of the respective spouses. Indeed, I agree that the “individual contributions of the parties to the accumulation of the property” should be considered, as we have said as recently in Baltzer, supra, but that is the beginning, not the end, of an equitable dilemma. The question is: How should these individual contributions of the parties to the accumulation of the property be considered? Should literally “everything” be thrown into the pot for a division? In my *820opinion, the trial courts must consider when and how the property was accumulated, and if it is obvious that one of the parties of the marriage would be unjustly enriched or has historically been uninvolved in the accumulation of a certain asset, before marriage, that asset should not go into the marital pot. This belief is founded upon a conviction that a man or woman may bestow his worldly wealth on his child without fear of a marriage court placing it in the hands of a stranger; likewise, it is founded upon a belief that the earnings and property derived from honest toil should remain the property of that person who begot it.