(dissenting). The estate of Chester W. *176Skinner commenced this action claiming that his death was the result of a defect in design of an on/ off switch manufactured by Square D Company, or a failure properly to insulate the switch, or a result of both such defect and failure.
The question presented is whether the estate produced sufficient evidence to resist Square D’s motion for summary disposition that contended the estate’s theory of causation was not reasonably inferable from the evidence. Square D in effect conceded, for the purposes of the motion, that the switch was defectively designed and not properly insulated.1
The circuit judge granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting.
I would hold that the estate produced sufficient evidence to require jury submission of the question whether Skinner’s death was caused by the defect in design and failure to insulate so in effect conceded.
I
Skinner was in the business of cleaning and finishing metal parts. He was electrocuted while working with a homemade tumbling machine activated by turning, from off to on, the Square D switch that he had installed between the machine and the outside source of power.
Skinner would place the parts to be cleaned in the tumbler’s metal drum and then turn on the power to spin the drum. After the parts had been spun for a period of time, Skinner would reverse the direction of the drum.
Skinner reversed the direction of the drum by unhooking, by hand, two of three alligator clips *177that connected electrical wires from the tumbling machine to the Square D on/off switch. Skinner would then reattach the clips to different ports on the tumbling machine, and turn the Square D switch from off to on to start the drum going in the reverse direction.
It was, as the Court of Appeals observed, imperative that the operator of the tumbling machine assure that the power was off before he touched the alligator clips. 195 Mich App 664; 491 NW2d 648 (1992).
On February 21, 1986, Skinner was working in the area of the tumbling machine. His wife, Doris L. Skinner, who commenced this action as personal representative of his estate, and her two sisters, all employees at Skinner’s shop, were working in an adjacent room when they heard Skinner cry for help. The women ran to the tumbling room to find Skinner in excruciating pain, with electricity flowing through his body, standing with his hands above his head and an alligator clip in each hand. As the women began to move toward Skinner, he warned them to stand back and not to touch him.
Skinner struggled to release his hands from the clips. He was able to free his left hand, and, with the left hand, pulled down the handle on the Square D on/off switch to move it to, or further to,2 the off position. Skinner then spun around, fell to the floor, and died.
ii
The estate’s theory of causation is that the *178defective on/off switch caused Chester Skinner’s death in the following manner. Skinner entered, or had been working in, the room containing the tumbling machine. The tumbling machine was not being operated immediately before Skinner touched or picked up the electrical wires. Before touching the wires, in accordance with his habit, he looked at the on/off switch.
The concededly3 defective on/off switch falsely indicated that it was in the off position,4 and thus that there was no electricity flowing through the wires. Relying on his reading of the on/off switch, Skinner touched the wires and suffered the excruciating electrical shock.
III
We agree with the majority5 that Square D’s motion for summary disposition, asserting that the estate’s theory of causation is not reasonably infer-able from the evidence, poses the question whether, as stated by the United States Supreme Court, "there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242, 250; 106 S Ct 2505; 91 L Ed 2d 202 (1986). The Court continued that the "standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict” that a "trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict;” "[i]f reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not be directed.” Id., pp 250-251.
*179The United States Supreme Court also observed that "the 'genuine issue’ summary judgment standard is 'very close’ to the 'reasonable jury’ directed verdict standard: 'The primary difference between the two motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted.’ ” Id., p 251.
This Court in Mulholland v DEC Int'l Corp, 432 Mich 395, 415; 443 NW2d 340 (1989), said that on a motion for directed verdict in a product liability case " 'the question is whether it is reasonable to infer from the evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the accident was probably caused by a defect attributable to the manufacturer. Questions of comparative probability are to be resolved by the trier of fact.’ ” Quoting Holloway v General Motors Corp (On Rehearing), 403 Mich 614, 622; 271 NW2d 777 (1978). The Court, in Mulholland, continued:
A plaintiff in a product liability action need not offer evidence which positively excludes every other possible cause. It is enough that the plaintiff establishes a logical sequence of cause and effect, notwithstanding the existence of other plausible theories, although other plausible theories may also have evidentiary support. Id., p 623. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, we examine the testimony and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.[6] [Id., pp 415-416.]
*180Although this Court has cautioned that "where all theories of causation rest only on conjecture, no jury question [is] presented,” Cummings v Grand Trunk W R Co, 372 Mich 695, 697; 127 NW2d 842 (1964), it has also emphasized that "'such cases are rare, and that rule should never be so extended as to result in a failure of justice, or in denying an injured person a right of action where there is room for balancing the probabilities, and for drawing reasonable inferences better supported upon one side than the other.’ ” Id., pp 697-698, quoting Schoepper v Hancock Chemical Co, 113 Mich 582, 586; 71 NW 1081 (1897) (emphasis added).7
Kaminski v Grand Trunk W R Co, 347 Mich 417; 79 NW2d 899 (1956), demonstrates how a court should decide whether "reasonable inferences” are "better supported upon one side than the other.” The Court in Kaminski, in holding that reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiff could be drawn *181from the evidence, contrasted the defendant’s theories of the accident with those advanced by the plaintiff. After scrutinizing the defendant’s theories, the Court concluded that "the trouble with the defendant’s 'other explanations’ is the comparative improbability thereof.” Id., p 427.
The majority quotes approvingly from Kaminski, but ignores the rule of Kaminski requiring scrutiny not only of the plaintiff’s theory, but also scrutiny of the defendant’s theory, and an assessment of the comparative probability or improbability of the competing theories. The majority in the instant case rejects plaintiff’s theory, in the abstract, without engaging in such comparative probability or improbability analysis.
This is not a "rare case” in which all theories of causation are "mere conjecture.” A comparison of the contrasting theories indicates that "reasonable inferences” are "better supported upon one side [plaintiff’s] than the other.”
iv
The plaintiff’s theory that Skinner touched the electrical wires after relying on the on/off switch that erroneously indicated the power was off both is the product of reasoned inferences from the evidence and is more probable than any other reasonable theory of causation.
The majority asserts that there are two "fatal flaws” in the plaintiff’s theory. First, "the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the wires were unhooked when Mr. Skinner began using the machine just before the accident.”8_
*182The majority ignores that there is substantial evidence that the tumbling machine was not operating when Skinner touched the wires.9 If the wires had been connected to the tumbler and had power been running through them, the tumbler would have been operating. Since there is substantial evidence that it was not operating, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude, without resorting to conjecture, that the electrified wires were not *183connected to the tumbler when Skinner touched them.10
Alternatively, if the wires were hooked up to the tumbling machine when Skinner touched them, the trier of fact could reasonably conclude — because of the evidence that the tumbler was not operating — that power was not flowing through the wires when Skinner touched them and removed them from the machine. If that was the case, then the situation would have been exactly the same as if the wires had been unhooked from the machine sometime before Skinner touched them just before the accident.
This brings us to the second "fatal flaw” highlighted by the majority when it states that the plaintiff failed to "offer any proof from which it rationally could be inferred how the machine would have been turned back on after the wires had been unhooked.”11
There are not an infinite number of ways in which the power could have been restored to the wires. Skinner could have purposely restored power to the wires and then forgotten that he had done so before touching them. Another person could have restored power to the wires before *184Skinner touched them. Skinner could have accidentally restored power to the wires as he was holding the wires (by falling on the switch), or some object could have fallen on the handle thereby turning the power on as Skinner was holding the wires.12
Taking the last possibility first, there is no evidence that any object with a mass great enough to move the on/off switch fell on the switch as Skinner was holding the wires. No witness reported finding such an object in the vicinity of the tumbler, and there does not appear to be a shelf above the on/off switch from which such an object could have fallen.
The evidence seems to clearly establish that Skinner did not fall on the switch. When the three women found Skinner, he was standing on a wooden pallet with his arms above his head.13 Surely, he could not have fallen on the switch and regained his balance while suffering a tremendous electrical shock — one that no doubt crippled his muscles.14
*185A theory that posits that something or someone restored power to the wires by falling on the switch can be discarded because the power was "on” when the switch was in the "up,” not the "down,” position.15 Any downward pressure on the switch would have turned the power off, not on.
That leaves only the possibilities that either Skinner16 or some other person restored power to the wires. Under both of these remaining explanations of how power was restored to the wires— either by Skinner accidentally before he touched or picked up the wires or by another person— Skinner would have had an opportunity to rely on the faulty on/off switch before touching the wires.
The dispositive question then becomes whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact whether Skinner relied on the on/off switch before touching the wires. I conclude that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence. The evidence consisted of the uncontradicted testimony of Violet Whiting that Skinner always looked at the on/off switch before he would touch the *186wires.17 A trier of fact could reasonably conclude from the habit evidence that Skinner looked at the on/off switch before he touched the wires and, thus, that he only touched the wires after satisfying himself that they were not energized.18
v
I also conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s grant of summary *187disposition against the plaintiff on the failure to insulate claim.
The plaintiff’s failure to insulate claim asserted that Skinner did not die from the initial shock, but instead died when he touched the uninsulated handle of the Square D on/off switch. The plaintiff claims that when Skinner touched the uninsulated handle of the on/off switch, the magnitude of the shock he was receiving increased, thereby killing him.
The Court of Appeals found this claim to be "disingenuous.” Id., p 670. The Court said that the plaintiff presented no evidence that could have established that it was only at the instant that Skinner touched the on/off switch that the shock became fatal. The Court stressed that even the plaintiff’s expert witness conceded that Skinner could have been electrocuted even if the on/off switch had been insulated and that Skinner could have been electrocuted before he reached for the on/off switch. The Court also emphasized that a pathologist "testified that Mr. Skinner had already completed the circuit by the time he grabbed for the switch, with the current entering his right hand and exiting through the balls of his feet.” Id.
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to advert to and consider the testimony of two expert witnesses for the plaintiff who testified that the magnitude of the shock that Skinner was receiving could have been increased when he grabbed the uninsulated handle of the Square D switch.19
*188The Court of Appeals also erred in failing to advert to and consider the nonexpert testimony of the women who found Skinner suffering from shock. Doris Skinner and Violet Whiting testified that when they ran into the room where the tumbling machine was located, they found Skinner conscious and in severe pain from the shock. As the women began to approach Skinner, he apparently recognized that the women would be in danger if they touched him as he was receiving the shock, and he warned them not to touch him.20 The women further testified that it was not until Skinner freed his left hand and grabbed the uninsulated handle that he lost consciousness and dropped to the ground.21
*189Although the testimony of the women conflicts with that of the defense expert witnesses who testified that Skinner was, in effect, "dead” before he touched the uninsulated handle, their testimony is nonetheless evidence that Skinner did not die from the initial shock. Skinner was able to think rationally and communicate while he was receiving the initial shock.
The law requires that all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. The testimony of the women who found Skinner and of the expert witnesses who opined that the uninsulated handle could have increased the magnitude of the shock that Skinner was receiving is sufficient to create a question for the trier of fact concerning whether the uninsulated handle contributed to Skinner’s death.
Griffin, J., took no part in the decision of this case.This concession was explicit with respect to the defective design and implicit with respect to the failure to insulate.
The estate’s expert witnesses testified that there was a phantom zone in which, although the switch appeared to be in an off position, it was not entirely off, and, thus, the switch could falsely indicate that the power was off. Again, for purposes of its motion for summary disposition, Square D conceded that the on/off switch was so defective.
See n 1 and accompanying text.
See n 2.
Ante, p 166, n 10.
The majority, ante, p 165, quotes approvingly the following from Mulholland:
" 'The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the *180result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.’ ” [Id., p 416, n 18, quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 41, p 269.]
In Kaminski v Grand Trunk W R Co, 347 Mich 417, 421; 79 NW2d 899 (1956), the Court said that a directed verdict on the issue of causation is appropriate only in unusual circumstances:
It is thus right to say that the trial judge’s immediate duty, motion for direction having been made with address to the rule of conjectural choice between equally plausible inferences, is to determine on favorable view of the inference plaintiff relies upon whether it stands equiponderant at best with such as is, or are, urged by the defendant. If the answer is affirmative, then and only then will the judge be justiffed in proceeding as moved. [Emphasis added.]
See also Emery v Chesapeake & O R Co, 372 Mich 663; 127 NW2d 826 (1964), quoting the statement in Schoepper v Hancock Chemical Co, supra, p 586, that cases in which the choice between theories of causation is mere conjecture are rare.
Ante, p 172.
Although the majority speaks of the absence of evidence that the wires were unhooked before Skinner began "using the machine just *182before the accident” (emphasis added), surely the majority means that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the wires were unhooked when Skinner ’’touched” them just before the accident.
There is no evidence that the machine itself was being operated just before the accident, and substantial evidence to the contrary. See n 9.
Although none of the deponents stated unequivocally that the tumbler was not operating at the time of the accident, a fair reading of the deposition testimony yields this conclusion. First, Doris Skinner testified that she did not believe that Chester Skinner had run the tumbler at all on the day of his death. She testified as follows:
Q. Do you know if he had been working on that machine [the tumbling machine] all day?
A. No, I don’t think he run it. Mostly, I think, he was welding because he had another machine he was working on. The man come [sic] and picked it up. It wasn’t completed.
Doris Skinner would almost surely have known if the machine had been running at the time of the accident. She testified as follows concerning the noise that the machine made when it was cleaning parts:
Q. When the tumbler was running, the one that your husband was injured on, was it a noisy machine?
A. When you put a ton of parts in a machine, it is noisy.
Q. Could you tell the difference in noise level when the machine stopped, when the motor stopped?
A. Well, if it is not running, you would know, yes.
Carl Jacobs, the only person besides Skinner to operate the tumbler machine, also testified that the machine made quite a bit of noise when it was operating.
There is no testimony that any of the women who were working in the room adjacent to the tumbler room heard the noise of the tumbler during the period immediately preceding the accident.
It is true that "the only record evidence pertaining to how the wires and clips were maintained indicated that they would probably have been connected.” Ante, p 172. The evidence referred to in the majority opinion is the testimony of Carl Jacobs to the effect that the wires were usually connected to the tumbler.
The record indicates, however, that the accident occurred at one of those unusual moments when the wires were unhooked. There was substantial evidence that the tumbler was not operating at the time of or immediately before the accident. The electrical wires must have been unhooked because they were electrified, and the tumbler was not running.
Ante, p 172.
Again, the majority misspeaks. The question is not whether it can be inferred "how the machine would have been turned back on after the wires had been unhooked” (emphasis added), but rather how the power would have been turned back on after the wires had been unhooked.
As the majority observes, there is no claim that the power could accidentally turn on without some force being applied to the on/off switch.
Beulah McBride testified during deposition concerning her discovery of Skinner:
Q. And what exactly did you see when you saw him?
A. He was standing with his hands up in the air like this.
Mr. Nolan [plaintiffs’ counsel]: You had both hands up over your head, so the record reflects. Go ahead.
Ms. Neilson [defense counsel]: Yeah. You can go ahead.
During the course of discovery, the defendant advanced theories of how the accident could have occurred. The defendant first hypothesized that Skinner was electrocuted when he attempted to unhook the wires from the tumbler while the power was on. It appears that this could not have happened simply because had the electrified wires been attached to the tumbler before Skinner touched them, the tumbler would have been operating. The unequivocal testimony of the three women who found Skinner, however, establishes that the turn-*185bier was not operating at the time of the accident or immediately before the accident. Violet Whiting also testified that Skinner always made sure that the power was off before he changed the wires on the machine. See n 17.
The defendants also suggested that Skinner may have grabbed the live wires as he fell to the ground. This theory, too, is refuted by the testimony of the women who found Skinner. They testified that Skinner was standing up with his hands above his head. It would not have been possible for Skinner to have grabbed the clips, received a tremendous shock, fallen, and then regained his balance and put his hands above his head.
The trier of fact could properly conclude that the power was "on” when the switch was in the "up” position because Violet Whiting and Beulah McBride both testified that Skinner pulled the switch down to shut off the power when he was being electrocuted.
To be sure, if Skinner had turned on the power and then had forgotten that he had done so, that would have been a lot of comparative negligence. But the issue on which summary disposition was granted was the absence of the requisite causal relationship.
Violet Whiting testified during deposition:
Q. Every time you saw him reverse the machine, did he always throw the switch to the off position and stop the machine before he took the wires?
A. Yes he did.
Q. Would he look at the switch to observe the switch to see if it was in an off position before he would touch the wires?
A. I think he always did.
Q. When you saw him, he always did?
A. Yes. He always made sure it was off. [Emphasis added.]
MRE 406 provides that evidence of habit is admissible to establish that, on a given occasion, an individual acted in conformity with a previous pattern of behavior.
This Court has said that "[t]here is general agreement that habit evidence is highly persuasive as proof of conduct on a particular occasion.” McKinstry v Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, PC, 428 Mich 167, 182, n 6; 405 NW2d 88 (1987).
The Court of Appeals has held that habit evidence is admissible to prove that a decedent acted in conformity with his previous behavior pattern. Hoffman v Rengo Oil Co, Inc, 20 Mich App 575; 174 NW2d 155 (1969); Kovacs v C & O R Co, 134 Mich App 514, 538; 351 NW2d 581 (1984).
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See Frase v Henry, 444 F2d 1228, 1232 (CA 10, 1971) (under Kansas law, evidence regarding specific driving practices of a decedent was admissible as tending to show that the deceased acted in conformity with past practice at the time of a fatal accident); Gardner v Geraghty, 98 Ill App 3d 10, 15-16; 423 NE2d 1321 (1981) (evidence of a decedent’s habit of carefully crossing streets was admissible as tending to show that the decedent was carefully crossing street at the time of the accident, at least where there is no eyewitness to the accident); State v Libby, 546 A2d 444, 449 (Me, 1988) (evidence of a decedent’s bathing habits in a criminal trial arising out of drowning in a bathtub was admissible as tending to show that the decedent would have avoided total immersion bathing).
Mr. James Dutton, an engineer for Square D, testified during deposition:
Q. [IJsn’t it true that you could be receiving a less substantial shock from the wires, and then touch this metal on the switch and increase the substance of the electrical shock by which you’re being given?
A. You could touch that handle, or any grounded surface, and the possibility of increasing it is there.
*188After testifying that the uninsulated handle was a secondary, not primary, cause of the electricity running through Skinner’s body, the pathologist was asked if the secondary cause would increase the magnitude of the shock that Skinner was receiving. He answered, "[s]ure.”
Beulah McBride testified during deposition that Skinner said, "don’t touch me,” when the women entered the room. Violet Whiting similarly testified that when the women entered the room Skinner said, "don’t touch me.”
Beulah McBride explained how Skinner struggled to free one hand, grabbed the uninsulated switch, and then slumped to the floor:
Q. And then what happened?
A. Well, he got one hand loose, his left hand. He reached over, and pushed on the switch, and he made a half turn and fell to the floor.
Violet Whiting similarly testified that Skinner was struggling to free himself from the clips and did not fall or lose consciousness until he touched the handle:
Q. Now, you indicated that you saw him reach for the switch; is that correct?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Could you see that yourself?
A. The switch?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, I could.
Q. Could you see the front of Mr. Skinner from where you were standing?
*189A. Well, he had his back to us, until he got loose, and then he turned around and he came down.