(concurring). I concur in the, result, but write separately. In contrast to the majority, I believe that the trial court was correct when it concluded that the Private Security Guard Act of 19681 preempts the authority of local municipalities. The statute covers every aspect of private security guards and alarm systems. It makes no provision for separate municipal regulation of any aspect of the field.
Section 35 identifies the department of state police as the enforcing authority and the sanctions which are to be imposed when four or more false alarms occur within one year. The state police are authorized to require the owner or lessee to correct a faulty alarm system. MCL 338.1085; MSA *62218.185(35). Section 35 makes no provision for additional fines by a municipality which responds to false alarms. Rather, it sets forth the exclusive procedure to be followed if four or more false alarms occur in a year. It should be read as the full and exclusive remedy.
The majority concludes that local regulation does not interfere with the state regulatory scheme. However, competing regulations may mislead an owner or lessee into believing that compliance with one set of regulations relieves it of the responsibility to comply with the other. Furthermore, the explicit remedy is not a fine paid to the municipality, but correction of a defective system.
The applicable test is set forth in People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314, 322; 257 NW2d 902 (1977). I conclude that the pervasive regulatory scheme set forth in the Act and its subject matter, which is closely associated with the safety of our citizens, demand exclusive state regulation.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the city ordinance is impermissibly vague and violates due process.
MCL 338.1051 et seq.; MSA 18.185(1) et seq.