On September 19, 1984, Dennis Casteel was working at the Metromail Company in Mount Pleasant. When his shift ended at 3:00 a.m., he left in his vehicle and drove on Highway 34. Officer Paul Meyer, who was sitting at a local service station, observed Casteel’s vehicle and noticed a problem with Casteel’s taillight and muffler system. He pulled out behind Casteel’s vehicle, followed it to the intersection of Highway 218 and 34, through the intersection after the stop, and then pulled Casteel’s vehicle over in the parking lot of the Iowa State Liquor Store on East Washington Street at approximately 3:15 a.m. There, Officer Meyer discovered the vehicle also had no brake lights or turn signals. He then asked Cas-teel for his driver’s license. He took the license to his squad car to write a warning for equipment violations and ran a driver’s license check. That check revealed an outstanding warrant for Casteel’s arrest for the simple misdemeanor of fifth-degree theft. Officer Meyer then radioed for a backup unit and Casteel was arrested.
Officer Christopher Davis arrived on the scene as the backup unit and testified that when Casteel was advised of the theft warrant, he asked Casteel if he had $50.00 to pay his bond, and Casteel replied that he did not.
At that time, he advised Casteel of two options regarding his automobile: it would either have to be towed or an officer could drive it to the Henry County Law Enforcement Center. Given those options, Casteel agreed to let an officer drive it to the center. Casteel’s vehicle was driven to the law enforcement center and parked in an unenclosed cement parking lot south of the center and locked.
Later that morning, Officer Davis made a physical search of the vehicle while Officer Meyer made an inventory of the items therein. While conducting their inventory, the officers seized, from the locked glove compartment, a Comtrex cold capsule bottle which they believed held some marijuana seeds, a tin metal container with a lid which contained a leafy green substance, an electrical clamp with a leather string which they believed had marijuana residue on it, and a plastic prescription pill bottle.
A possession of a schedule I controlled substance (marijuana) charge was then filed against Casteel, and he was questioned about the seized items at approximately 6:30 a.m. Casteel was released from custody after appearing before the magistrate that morning at 9:30 a.m. The leafy green material seized from the tin container was tested and found to be marijuana.
Casteel filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, which the trial court overruled. Casteel filed a waiver of jury trial, and a bench trial commenced on April 10, 1985. The court found Casteel guilty as charged. He was sentenced to pay a $100 fine.
On appeal, Casteel contends that the im-poundment and the inventory search of his vehicle violated his fourth amendment rights and, therefore, any evidence seized should have been suppressed.
It is unquestioned that the inventory search of Casteel’s automobile was performed without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within *170carefully-drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Roth, 305 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 870, 102 S.Ct. 338, 70 L.Ed.2d 174 (1981). Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. “The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1007 (1976) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509-510, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2060, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 608 (1971)).
One established exception to the warrant requirement is the motor vehicle inventory. Applying the reasonableness standard, courts have consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369-73, 96 S.Ct. at 3097-99, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1005-07.
When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from potential danger, (citations omitted)
Id. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1005 (upheld inventory search as reasonable where police found marijuana in a plastic bag in the unlocked glove compartment of an impounded vehicle).
While Opperman did not precisely delineate the permissible scope of inventory searches, it does indicate that an inventory may not be conducted as a subterfuge for criminal investigation. Id. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 3100, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1008-09. “It is, of course, necessary that such inventories be conducted as an incident to the caretaking function of the police, in accordance with the established procedures, and not as a guise for a warrantless search.” State v. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 1984). Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained by law officers in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible as evidence at trial. Roth, 305 N.W.2d at 504.
Impoundment. The legal validity of an inventory search depends upon the lawfulness of the underlying impoundment. Roth, 305 N.W.2d at 504. The Iowa Supreme Court has explained the test for when impoundment is justified:
In the absence of statute or ordinance, there must be reasonable cause for the impoundment, (citations omitted). The burden of demonstrating the need to impound is on the State, (citations omitted). In formulating a reasonableness test, one authority states:
It is submitted that for an impoundment of an arrestee’s vehicle to be reasonable under the fourth amendment, the arresting officer should be required (i) to advise the arrested operator “that his vehicle will be taken to a police facility or private storage facility for safekeeping unless he directs the officer to dispose of it in some other lawful manner,” and (ii) to comply with any reasonable alternative disposition requested. Surely, the police should not be expected to undertake delivery of the auto to some distance point or to make any other disposition which would be more onerous than having the vehicle brought to the station. But if the driver asks that his car be left at the scene and the circumstances are such that it can be lawfully parked in the vicinity, then his wishes should be respected. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.3, at 559 (1978).
Kuster, 353 N.W.2d at 431-32. The court further noted that:
The common theme underlying these cases and others is that something more must be shown to justify impoundment of a car than that it would otherwise be left unattended. There must be a showing that some reasonable necessity prompted the impoundment. This is a *171salutary rule, for otherwise police would be authorized to freely stop a car for a minor traffic infraction, impound it and search it with impunity. Surely such a circumstance is not consonant with the Fourth Amendment. As the court in United States v. Edwards, 554 F.2d 1331, 1339 (5th Cir.1977), said: “The fourth amendment is not crushed by the four wheels of an automobile; automobiles do not work a forfeiture of privacy.”
Id. at 432 (quoting State v. McDaniel, 156 N.J. Super. 347, 358, 383 A.2d 1174, 1179 (1978)).
In Kuster, the defendant was arrested for terrorism in a tavern in downtown Stuart, Iowa. His pickup, which was locked and legally parked on a city street near the tavern, was impounded by the police and searched without a warrant. The court cited numerous factors in determining that the impoundment was unreasonable. These included that the defendant was not near his vehicle when he was arrested; the vehicle was locked, legally parked, and presented no danger to the public; there was no evidence the vehicle was in danger of theft or vandalism; no effort was made by the police to allow the defendant to provide for the care of the vehicle and no inquiry was made of him as to what he wanted to have done with the vehicle; and the police department had no established policy regarding impoundment and motor vehicle inventories. Id. at 432.
Several of these factors are also weighty in the case at bar. The record reveals that Casteel was pulled over by Officer Meyer for suspected equipment violations at approximately 3:15 a.m. Casteel parked in the Iowa State Liquor Store parking lot where an old horse trailer had been parked for several months. This was a parking lot open to the public and Casteel’s car was obviously not obstructing traffic, otherwise presenting a danger to the public, or a nuisance. There was also no evidence that the vehicle itself was in danger of theft or vandalism. No effort was made by the police to allow Casteel to provide for the care of his vehicle and no inquiry was made of him as to what he wanted to have done with the vehicle. Casteel was told that his automobile would either be towed or an officer could drive it to the Henry County Law Enforcement Center. There is also no suggestion of intoxication or any other reason why Casteel was not capable of making a choice regarding safe disposition of his automobile. The officers had no suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, contained contraband, or was involved in the commission of a crime so that its retention as evidence was necessary. Furthermore, the Standard Operating Procedures of the Mount Pleasant Police Department do not mandate impoundment if the arrestee’s vehicle can be “otherwise cared for to avoid liability.” This case is devoid of the factors commonly found to justify impoundment. See e.g. LaFave § 7.3(c) at 533-60 (vehicle removed from public highway, abandoned, illegally parked, disabled danger to traffic, stolen or criminal evidence, or driver incapacitated).
We conclude under these circumstances the impoundment was unreasonable. Cas-teel’s vehicle could have been left in the parking lot until it was determined whether his absence would be extended, or his wife or brothers residing in Mount Pleasant could have retrieved it. “Such alternative means of disposition serve not only to protect the arrestee’s possessory and privacy interests in the vehicle but also to relieve the police of continuing responsibility for the car and its contents, and thus are to be preferred over impoundment when one such alternative has been requested by a properly-advised arrestee and can reasonably be accomplished under the circumstances.” LaFave, § 7.3(c) at 560.
Our decision is in accord with other jurisdictions which have determined that no substantial necessity for impoundment exists where the defendant’s vehicle is legally parked in an off-street parking area. United States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir.1984) (improper impoundment where car was parked in parking lot of a club); Weed v. Wainwright, 325 So.2d 44, *17245 (Fla.App.1976) (impoundment improper where arrestee’s car parked in store parking lot); Dunkum v. State, 138 Ga.App. 321, 325, 226 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1976) (im-poundment improper where arrestee’s automobile parked in the parking lot of an unused nightclub); State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 626-27, 539 P.2d 294, 301 (1975) (no legal justification for impounding car where alternative to impoundment exists); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 38-39, 327 A.2d 516, 527 (1974) (necessity for impounding car not demonstrated where car was in public parking lot at time of arrest); State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, 11-13, 397 A.2d 1050, 1053-55 (1979) (impoundment improper since car could have been safely locked at scene of arrest); Kelly v. State, 607 P.2d 706, 708 (Okla.Crim.1980) (im-poundment improper where car parked in parking lot of business establishment); State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or.App. 595, 599-600, 613 P.2d 44, 46 (1980) (impoundment improper where car was in restaurant parking lot); Rodriguez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.App.1982) (impoundment improper where no showing it was illegally parked in an alley).
Because we find that the impoundment of Casteel’s vehicle was unreasonable, the inventory search of the vehicle was unlawful and evidence obtained as a result thereof should have been suppressed.
Inventory. Even were we to find that the impoundment was reasonable, we would conclude that the inventory search exceeded its permissible scope. In Roth, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that locked and unlocked car trunks and glove compartments are within the permissible scope of inventory searches. The court explained its rationale as follows:
To exclude these kinds of compartments from the scope of inventory searches would clearly thwart the first stated objective of protecting the property itself while it is in custody. It is a meritless argument to say that the owner of the car was satisfied with the security offered by these compartments because the storage of a vehicle at a police storage yard for an indeterminate length of time was not likely to be the sort of circumstances the owner had in mind in storing valuables in the car. Even more clearly, the second purpose for these searches, protection of the police against claims of loss, is not served if police do not inventory the entire contents of the vehicle. Police cannot reasonably be expected to defend against claims of loss, whether legitimate or false, reasonable or unreasonable, if they are not permitted to catalog what they took into custody. Moreover, a car owner inclined to make a false claim could be expected to base the claim on property missing from an area the police were not permitted to search. Finally, the third purpose, protection of the police from potential danger, can only be served by allowing police to inventory the contents of automobile trunks and other compartments. Whether the potential danger is a weapon which, if stolen, could pose a serious safety threat, explosives or even a leaking spare gasoline container threatening to ignite the vehicle, it can be averted only by permitting police to discover these before the potential harm materializes.
Roth, 305 N.W.2d at 506 (quoting State v. Prober, 98 Wis.2d 345, 354-55, 297 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (1980)). The court, however, recognized that an inventory search may not extend to all closed or sealed, locked or unlocked containers, found within the automobile’s compartments.
In recognizing that there is a greater expectation of privacy in closed or sealed containers found inside a vehicle than there is in a vehicle itself, we are balancing the need of the government (here, those relating to inventory searches) against the right of people to be free of warrantless intrusions into their personal effects. The balance tips in favor of the privacy of personal effects because the purpose of an inventory can be adequately served by inventorying a container as a closed unit. It is thereby secure from theft, and exposure to claims of loss is *173reduced. But see: State v. McDougal, 68 Wis.2d [399] at 415-16, 228 N.W.2d 671 (R. Hansen, J., dissenting). Therefore, in conducting an inventory search of a vehicle, police officials may not open or search the contents of closed containers which could alternatively be removed from the vehicle and inventoried as a unit.
Roth, 305 N.W.2d at 507 (quoting Prober, 297 N.W.2d at 7). The right to search an automobile does not carry with it the right to search everything found within it. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-63, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2592, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 244 (1979). In Roth, police officers found marijuana in a brown paper bag in the locked trunk of the defendant’s automobile. The court determined that a person who placed items in a sack could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in doing so. Id. at 507-08. Therefore, it found the inventory search to be proper. Id.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals phrases the test in terms of whether the governmental interests in performing an inventory search are better served by itemizing the contents of a container or by storing the container as a unit. United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200, 1202 (8th Cir.1979). In Bloomfield, the court concluded that a knapsack should have been inventoried as a unit rather than opened and itemized. It relied on the fact that the knapsack was securely closed so that there was no danger of anything falling out. Id. at 1202, 1203. “In this way the knapsack, which is locked up as a whole in police headquarters, has never been opened and its contents have never been reshuffled and replaced. To our minds, this would minimize the possibility of loss and the possibility of false claims against police by the owner.” Id. at 1202; see also People v. Counterman, 556 P.2d 481, 485 (Colo.1976) (legitimate purpose of inventory could have been fully accomplished by merely noting the item as a sealed knapsack rather than examining contents); State v. Jewell, 338 So.2d 633, 639 (La.1976) (opening Excedrin bottle and examining contents was inconsistent with purpose and permissible scope of a true inventory search); State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 156, 622 P.2d 1218, 1226 (1980) (legitimate purpose behind inventory search could have been effectuated by inventorying toiletry kit as a unit).
In the case at bar, while the Comtrex bottle and tin box were themselves in plain view once the glove compartment was opened, their contents were not evident but were securely sealed within. The outward appearance of these containers did not indicate to the police that they held dangerous instrumentalities. We conclude that the safekeeping purpose of the inventory could have been fully accomplished by noting the containers as a Comtrex bottle and a tin box.
We believe that our holding is consistent with Roth. A brown paper bag is a disposable, unsealable container of insubstantial construction. By contrast, the pill bottle and tin box here at issue are hard, securely-closed containers which prevent articles stored within from falling out.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the inventory search exceeded its permissible scope and the evidence resulting therefrom should have been suppressed.
REVERSED.
SACKETT, J., concurs.
DONIELSON, P.J., dissents.