¶ 70. (dissenting in part, concurring in part). I disagree with the majority's conclusion that DeWitt did not make a valid settlement offer in this case. Majority op., ¶ 42. Instead, I agree with the court of appeals that DeWitt's offer of settlement was valid and permissible under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3). Nevertheless, I reach my conclusion based on the plain language of § 807.01(3) instead of the reasonableness test used by the court of appeals. See DeWitt Ross & Stevens v. Galaxy Gaming, 2003 WI App 190, ¶¶ 31-32, 267 Wis. 2d 233, 670 N.W.2d 74.1 also disagree with the majority of the court of appeals' analysis pertaining to interest. Id., ¶¶ 55-65.1 would allow the recovery of interest in accord with Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4), in addition to contract interest. Recognizing that the majority of this court does not address the interest issue, with respect to the remaining issues that it does address, however, I am in agreement.
*608¶ 71. The majority contends that the proper approach to determining whether Wis. Stat. § 807.01 permits such conditions as the 15-day deadline for payment is to "look to the language of the statute to interpret and apply its express provisions." Majority op., ¶ 35. Since nothing authorizes the placement of conditions on payment under § 807.01, the majority concludes that an offeror cannot impose conditions on payment. Id., ¶ 36. The majority rejects the reasonableness standard utilized by the court of appeals, and, instead, rejects its own earlier test and concludes that the applicable test for whether a particular condition may be included in a settlement offer is whether "the provision specifies a remedy that could be imposed by the court." Id., ¶ 42. Thus, because it concludes that a judge could not enter a judgment requiring the Companies to make payment in 15 days, the majority contends that DeWitt could not impose such condition itself. Id.
¶ 72. I agree with the court of appeals' approach to this issue with respect to its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3). Section 807.01(3) provides no express prohibition against the inclusion of a payment deadline in an offer of settlement. Section 807.01(3) simply provides that "the plaintiff may serve upon the defendant a written offer of settlement for the sum, or property, or to the effect therein specified, with costs." There is no bar contained within the plain language of the statute itself that would render DeWitt's settlement offer invalid.
¶ 73. Instead of the reasonableness test suggested by the court of appeals, I believe that the correct approach is to look to the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3). Section 807.01(3) provides, in relevant part, that " [i]f the offer of settlement is not accepted and the plaintiff recovers a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff shall recover double the amount of the *609taxable costs." Based on the statutory language, I disagree with the majority and conclude that conditions are not prohibited in offers of settlement. When a condition is present in a settlement offer and a judgment is later obtained in the case, a court should review whether the judgment obtained by a party is more favorable than the settlement offer including conditions, if any, therein. By applying the statutory language, I conclude that DeWitt made a valid settlement offer, since the judgment obtained was for more money and, therefore, was more favorable. It is possible that attaching certain types of conditions to a statutory settlement offer may result in a conclusion by a court that the judgment obtained is not in fact "more favorable" than the settlement offer for purposes of the statute. However, the 15-day condition on payment contained in the statutory settlement offer in this case does not render the settlement offer invalid under the statute; nor does it preclude a conclusion that the judgment obtained was more favorable than the settlement offer for purposes of § 807.01 (3) and (4).
¶ 74. Although I agree with the majority of the court of appeals' conclusion regarding the validity of the settlement offer, I strongly disagree with its conclusion regarding interest. The court of appeals stated that it was bound by its decisions in Upthegrove v. Lumbermans Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 2d 7, 447 N.W.2d 367 (Ct. App. 1989) and Erickson v. Gundersen, 183 Wis. 2d 106, 515 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1994) and, thus, concluded that the analyses set forth in those cases controlled the outcome here. DeWitt, 267 Wis. 2d 233, ¶ 62. Yet, as Judge Dykman points out in his dissent, those cases do not involve the issue presented here, namely whether allowing interest in accord with Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) in addition to contract interest is permissible. Id., ¶ 74.
*610¶ 75. Erickson was a case involving the issue of whether a litigant was entitled to both common law prejudgment interest and interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4). The question of contract interest in addition to § 807.01(4) interest was not discussed at all in Erickson, so that case is not helpful here. Upthegrove involved the issue of whether interest from § 807.01(4) and Wis. Stat. § 628.46 could be stacked one on top of the other. Upthegrove, 152 Wis. 2d 7 at 12-13. Whether two distinct statutory provisions regarding interest may be utilized presents an entirely different question than whether § 807.01(4) interest may be recovered along with contract interest. Those cases do not provide any guidance for the resolution of the issue presented here.
¶ 76. Most convincingly, the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) allows for the recovery of such interest, without any limitation concerning contract interest. Section 807.01(4) states, in relevant part:
If there is an offer of settlement by a party under this section which is not accepted and the party recovers a judgment which is greater than or equal to the amount specified in the offer of settlement, the party is entitled to interest at the annual rate of 12% on the amount recovered from the date of the offer of settlement until the amount is paid.
¶ 77. I, like Judge Dykman in his dissent, am not persuaded that silence in a statute means that a party is barred from recovering Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) interest in addition to contract interest. Such an approach —silence equals prohibition — appears illogical and contrary to the language of the statute.
*611¶ 78. Although I am in disagreement regarding the issue concerning a valid offer, I agree with the majority of this court on the remainder of the issues it discusses. More specifically, I agree that Southwest's guaranty to make "timely and full payment of all statements for services rendered and disbursements/expenses incurred on behalf of the Partnership" bound it to pay accrued interest as well. Majority op., ¶ 43. I also agree that DeWitt could charge the Companies interest retroactive to January 1, 1997, since the retainer letter's terms provided that interest would accrue if payment was not made within 20 days of receipt of the monthly statement. Id., ¶ 51. Finally, I agree that DeWitt could recover the costs of both a videographer and a court reporter taking the same deposition, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2). Id., ¶ 58.
¶ 79. In summary, I conclude that DeWitt made a valid settlement offer to the Companies. I further conclude that DeWitt was entitled to recover interest under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) in addition to the interest provided for in its contract with the Companies. I do agree, however, with the majority on the remainder of the issues it discusses.
¶ 80. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part.
¶ 81. I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES joins this dissent/concurrence.