OPINION
ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice.Appellant Brian Keith Edwards appeals from the judgment of his conviction of first-degree murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2004), in connection with the shooting death of Timothy Oliver. He argues that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of opinion testimony on a legal issue and by the submission of a jury instruction on an aggressor’s right to claim self-defense. We affirm.
*407In the early morning hours of January 28, 2004, Oliver was shot and killed in an exchange of gunfire with Edwards in the 2100 block of Elliot Avenue in South Minneapolis. Edwards was seated in the driver’s seat of a Dodge Caravan and Oliver was outside the vehicle by the front passenger window. Witnesses identified Edwards as the shooter. Police arrested and questioned Edwards several hours later. Edwards initially told the police that he was home asleep at the time of the shooting. Then he said he was in the back seat of the van and that the driver, somebody named “D,” was the shooter. Eventually, Edwards admitted he shot Oliver but told the police that Oliver shot first.
Edwards was indicted by grand jury for first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2004), and intentional drive-by-shooting murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3). At trial, the owner of the Dodge Caravan, Johnny Joshua, testified that he agreed to let Edwards use his vehicle in exchange for some crack cocaine. Later on, they picked up Edwards’ fianceé Satoeiaree Wilson and a friend, Roshawn Douglas. Wilson sat in the front passenger seat, Douglas in the second-row bench seat, and Joshua in the third-row bench seat. When Edwards drove down Franklin Avenue, he passed Cordale Moore and Oliver, who were walking to a friend’s house nearby. Wilson pointed them out to Edwards and identified Oliver as someone who had threatened to shoot her. Moore testified that Edwards “mean mugged” them (gave them an intimidating glance) and made a “wild right” at the corner. When Moore and Oliver reached the next block, Moore saw the van parked there, as though Edwards was watching them.
At 21st and Chicago, Oliver and Moore got into David Porter’s Ford Crown Victoria. Moore was in the front passenger seat and Oliver was in the back seat next to his aunt, Alice Jones. Eventually, the two vehicles met near the intersection of 21st and Elliot and stopped next to each other, at which point Edwards and Oliver exchanged words. The van owner heard Edwards say, in an urgent or angry voice, that he needed to talk to Oliver. Moore, who was in the Crown Victoria, heard Edwards speak in a normal voice. Jones, also in the Crown Victoria, heard Edwards say “something about spraying the mother -s.” Edwards then drove the van up Elliot and made a U-turn. He had a gun on his lap. The van owner saw Edwards put on his gloves; and he said, “Please don’t do this in my car.” 1
Moore and Jones (occupants of the Crown Victoria) and the van owner said that Porter backed the Crown Victoria into a driveway. Oliver got out of the Crown Victoria and walked to Moore’s Buick Regal that was parked on the street. He popped the hood, briefly went under the hood and closed it. Meanwhile, Edwards stopped the van next to the Buick Regal and said something like, “hurry up man, I need to talk to you” or yelled “come on.” None of the witnesses saw anything in Oliver’s hands as he approached the passenger side of the van. The van owner said that after a short conversation, Oliver stepped back, Edwards raised his gun, leaned over Wilson and fired at Oliver. Moore and Jones (who were in the Crown Victoria) said that after Edwards started shooting, Oliver stumbled back, pulled out a gun and returned fire as the van sped off. Jones testified that the van had no problem leaving the area. Moore, Porter *408and Jones picked Oliver up, placed him in the Crown Victoria and drove to the Hen-nepin County Medical Center where Oliver was pronounced dead. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to the chest.
One of the bullets penetrated the front passenger door of the van, wounding Wilson in the ankle. The van owner said that Edwards drove to St. Paul where they dropped Wilson off at a hospital. He said that Edwards worked out a story for Wilson to tell the police.
Other evidence at trial related to the homicide investigation during which the police recovered 11 discharged cartridge casings in the area of the shooting and a SigSauer 9 millimeter semiautomatic handgun, with a 13-plus-one capacity, from the Crown Victoria. The magazine was empty. The police found a .380 Lor-cin semiautomatic handgun, with a 14-plus-one capacity, lodged in a couch during the execution of a search warrant at Edwards’ apartment in St. Paul. The chamber was empty and the magazine contained 11 rounds. The police also located and processed the van, which had 12 bullet holes in the right front passenger door, one of which was just under the front passenger window and another in the area of the door handle. The majority of the bullet holes were in the lower half of the door. The forensic evidence indicated that the van was in motion when the “high-up” bullets struck the vehicle and were unlikely to hit the van’s occupants. Photographs of the crime scene indicated that the street had been plowed and pavement exposed.
Edwards testified on his own behalf and asserted that he acted in self-defense. He said that he shared an apartment in St. Paul with Wilson, that he sold drugs in South Minneapolis for a living and that Wilson sold drugs on the street for him. He said that some people were upset that he was cutting into their drug trade, that Wilson told him Oliver had been shooting at her and the word on the street was that Oliver wanted to shoot him, too.
Edwards said that he took a bus from St. Paul to the area in South Minneapolis where he normally sold his drugs, “rented” Joshua’s van and drove around the area trying to sell his drugs. It was cold, and he was wearing gloves the whole night. As was his routine, he had his gun on his lap with a bullet in the chamber. He explained that he had been the victim of a carjacking and had been seriously injured by gunfire, which caused permanent injury to his stomach and the loss of one leg. He said that, because of that experience and the fact that he carries large sums of cash, he always had a gun on his lap when he was in a motor vehicle.
Edwards disputed that he “mean mugged” or cast a threatening glance at Moore and Oliver, testifying instead that he stopped and asked Oliver if he could speak with him. Later, when the two vehicles stopped next to each other, Edwards again asked to speak with Oliver; and Oliver agreed. Edwards said that Oliver first came up to the front passenger window of the van, where Wilson was seated, said that he was going to put his gun away, walked over to the Buick Regal, went under the hood, closed it and returned to the van. Edwards asked Oliver why he (Oliver) wanted to shoot Wilson and him (Edwards). He then heard the sound of a gun being charged (which he acknowledged required the use of both hands), “grabbed [his own] gun, did like this (indicating) and pulled [the] trigger.” He stepped on the accelerator but his tires spun until the van jumped and he could drive off. Edwards said Oliver fired the first shot.
Edwards testified that he did not leave when he heard the sound of the gun being *409charged because he was afraid Oliver would shoot him in the back of his head. He admitted that he lied to the police but explained that he did not trust them. He acknowledged that he told the police that “[i]t was self-defense,” that he was trying to resolve “this issue” and that “[y]ou would not want to see your girlfriend out there getting hurt if she’s making money for you, now, would you?”
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of first-degree premeditated murder but guilty of first-degree intentional murder while committing a drive-by shooting. Judgment of conviction was entered and Edwards was sentenced to life in prison. This appeal followed.
I.
Edwards’ first claim of error is the admission of testimony by William James, a forensic scientist with the Minneapolis Police Department. James testified that he used “trajectory rods” (long wooden dowels) to connect the locations where each of Oliver’s bullets passed through two surfaces of the van that Edwards was driving. James testified that he could determine (1) “somewhat the distance, possibly, that somebody was standing from the vehicle,” (2) “whether or not the vehicle or the person, the shooter was in motion,” and (3) the “approximate angle and direction of those fired bullets.”
The disputed testimony arose on redirect examination by the state:
Q: Were any of those — well, and if the person who was firing the bullets, based on your analysis and you [sic] observations and your training, the person firing those bullets into the van were wanting to strike either the front passenger or the driver, were any of those bullets in the direction or the angle would be even remotely likely to hit those two individuals?
[Defense Attorney]: Objection, Your Honor. Calls for speculation. Lack of foundation.
[The Court]: Overruled. You can answer, if you can.
A: If I was intent on shooting the passenger or the driver, the bullets would be much higher, the bullet strikes would be much higher. They would be at least pointed towards, you know, the level of the window.
Because James was not testifying as an expert on this issue, the admissibility of his opinion was governed by Minn. R. Evid. 701:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinion or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Edwards argues that James’s testimony was not admissible because it was not helpful to the jury. He characterizes the testimony as James’s opinion on Oliver’s intent, and compares it to opinion testimony that we have held inadmissible in other cases. See State v. Chambers, 507 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn.1993) (holding that it was error to admit opinion testimony by a forensic pathologist on the question of intent); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 101-04 (Minn.1992) (holding that the district court properly excluded defendant’s proffered psychiatric testimony on the questions of intent and premeditation); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-31 (Minn.1982) (holding that it was reversible error to allow opinion testimony from a sexual assault counselor on whether the victim had “typical post-rape symptoms and behavior of rape victims” and on whether the victim was telling the truth). *410Edwards focuses on the prosecutor’s use of words in the question' — '“if the person who was firing the bullets * * * were wanting to strike”' — and words used by James in prefacing his answer' — “[i]f I was intent on shooting.”
The state concedes that the question was “perhaps inartfully phrased” but argues that Chambers, Provost, and Saldana are inapposite because James’s use of the word “intent” did not refer to his legal opinion on mens rea, but rather his factual opinion as to whether the bullets were likely to hit the vehicle’s occupants. The state says the issue is not whether Oliver wanted to shoot the occupants of the van, but whether he was “firing from a position in relation to the van that would enable him to take aim, or [if he was] falling down as he fired bullets into a moving van.”
We agree with the state’s characterization of the testimony. In context, it is apparent that the testimony related to the likelihood of Oliver’s shots hitting the vehicle’s occupants, not to Oliver’s intent when firing them. The apparent purpose of this testimony was to raise the inference that because the bullets were at angles and locations in the car that made them unlikely to hit the occupants, something (like a gunshot wound) interfered with Oliver’s aim. Although the question was poorly worded, admission of the testimony was not an abuse of discretion. See State v. Salazar, 289 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn.1980).
II.
Over Edwards’ objection, the district court instructed the jury on an aggressor’s right to a claim of self-defense. The court used CRIMJIG 7.07, which states:
If the defendant began or induced the incident that led to the necessity of using force in the defendant’s own defense, the right to stand the defendant’s ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available to him. Instead, the defendant must first have declined to carry on the affray and have honestly tried to escape from it, and must clearly and fairly have informed the adversary of a desire for peace and of abandonment of the contest. Only after the defendant has done that will the law justify the defendant in thereafter standing his ground and using force against the other person.
10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 7.07 (4th ed. 1999). Edwards argues that there was no basis in the evidence for submission of the instruction and that the instruction misstates the law.
Factual Basis for CRIMJIG 7.07. Edwards asserts that there was no evidence that he instigated anything more than a conversation. The decision to give a jury instruction is within the discretion of the district court. State v. Broulik, 606 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn.2000). But a party is entitled to a jury instruction if there is evidence to support it. State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 831-32 (Minn.1985). In evaluating whether a rational basis exists in the evidence for a jury instruction, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. See State v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 597 (Minn.2005).
Under Minn.Stat. § 609.065 (2004), “[t]he intentional taking of the life of another is not authorized * * * except when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death.”2 In addition, the ab*411sence of aggression or provocation by the actor is required before self-defense may be claimed. State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8,12 (Minn.1996). Further,
[t]he law does not permit or justify one who intends to commit an assault upon another to design in advance his own defense by instigating a quarrel or a combat with a view thereby to create a situation wherein the infliction of the intended injury will appear to have been done in self-defense.
State v. Love, 285 Minn. 444, 451, 173 N.W.2d 423, 427 (1970) (quoting trial court’s instructions). Nevertheless, if an aggressor withdraws from the conflict and communicates that withdrawal, expressly or impliedly, the right to claim self-defense is restored. Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn.1986).
Evidence indicating that Edwards was the initial aggressor included testimony that he was driving around with a charged semiautomatic handgun, ready to be fired, on his lap; that he was trying to resolve a drug-territory problem with Oliver; that he gave Oliver a threatening look and twice initiated contact; that when he put on gloves, the van owner “knew something was going to go down and it wasn’t right” and said, “God, please don’t let me get shot. * * * Please don’t do this in my car”; and that he called Oliver over to the van and shot Oliver before Oliver pulled out his handgun. This provided a rational basis for the jury to conclude that Edwards “began or induced the incident that led to the necessity of using force in the defendant’s own defense.” CRIMJIG 7.07.
Legal Accuracy of CRIMJIG 7.07. In instructing the jury on Edwards’ right to a claim of self-defense, the district court chose not to alter the language provided by CRIMJIG 7.07. We have stated that the district court has “considerable latitude in the selection of the language of a jury charge.” State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn.1997). But “jury instructions must not materially misstate the law.” State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn.1998). Edwards argues, and the dissent agrees, that the first sentence of CRIMJIG 7.07 materially misstates the law because the words “began or induced the incident” permitted the jury to find that he was the initial aggressor merely because he started a conversation with Oliver. Jury instructions are viewed in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately explained the law of the case. State v. Jones, 347 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn.1984).
CRIMJIG 7.07 was drawn from instructions on self-defense that we described, more than 35 years ago, as “fair, complete, logically arranged, and legally sound.” Love, 285 Minn, at 451, 173 N.W.2d at 427. In Love, a portion of the instructions read as follows:
Where a person seeks or induces a quarrel which leads to the necessity in his own defense of using force against his adversary, the right to stand his ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available to him, but, instead he first must decline to carry on the affray, must honestly endeavor to escape from it, and must fairly and clearly inform his adversary of his desire for peace and of his abandonment of the contest.
Id. at 451, 173 N.W.2d at 426. It is true that trial courts must use analytical precision in drafting instructions on self-defense *412and should modify pattern jury instructions when necessary. State v. Marquardt, 496 N.W.2d 806, 806 (Minn.1993) (stating that jury instructions on self-defense should have been modified to fit the contentions of the parties). But Edwards did not request that CRIMJIG 7.07 be modified or supplemented.
Contrary to Edwards’ suggestion, CRIMJIG 7.07 does not permit a jury to ground forfeiture of the defense simply on conversation. In the context of the instruction, the natural understanding of the word “incident” is that of a quarrel or conflict with potentially serious consequences. The instruction uses the words “affray” and “contest” interchangeably with “incident.” The instruction requires that the defendant have a “desire for peace” before the right of self-defense is restored. When read as a whole, the instruction contemplates conduct that is a good deal greater than mere conversation.
The dissent, in articulating concern over the pattern jury instruction, takes the position that the formulation of a forfeiture rule should focus on the legal justification of the victim’s response to the aggressor’s initial conduct. The Model Penal Code has a narrow forfeiture rule, holding an initial aggressor “accountable for his original unlawful use of force but not for his defense against a disproportionate return of force by his victim.” Model Penal Code § 3.04 cmt. 4(b) (1985). And Professor Robinson has proposed a culpability analysis that would assess the aggressor’s liability on the basis of the level of culpability shown in the earlier conduct of causing the conditions of his own defense. Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 Va. L.Rev. 1, 27 (1985). “There is, however, much authority, both common law and statutory, demanding that a person claiming self-defense be free from fault in bringing on the difficulty.” Model Penal Code § 3.04 cmt. 4(b) (footnotes omitted). Professor Dripps has observed that the law “appears to follow the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing model at least as often as it follows culpability analysis.” Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of. Blame, 56 Vand. L.Rev. 1383, 1413 (2003).
In general, justification as a defense focuses on the reasonableness of the actor’s beliefs and the necessity of his acts. Deadly force is justifiable only if the actor “reasonably believes that the other is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily harm upon him (and also that it is necessary to use deadly force to prevent it).” 2 Wayne R. LaPave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4(b) (2d ed. 2003); see also Minn.Stat. § 609.065. If the actor’s belief is reasonable, “he may be mistaken in his belief and still have the defense.” LaFave, supra, § 10.4(c). The Model Penal Code, however, allows the use of force on the actor’s belief but sets certain “limitations on the exculpation worked by an erroneous belief.” Model Penal Code § 3.04 cmt. 2(d). In that justification focuses on the actor’s beliefs and acts, we do not view the formulation of a forfeiture rule that focuses on the legal justification of a victim’s response to the aggressor’s acts as consistent with the policy choices of Minn.Stat. § 609.065.3
*413Nonetheless, even assuming CRIMJIG 7.07 as worded has the potential for misleading a jury, we believe any error in the submission of the instruction in this case was harmless. An error in jury instructions is harmless if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict. State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn.1992). Our review of the record convinces us that submission of CRIMJIG 7.07 was harmless because the verdict reflects that the elements of self-defense had not been satisfied.
Three conditions must occur to excuse or justify the use of deadly force under Minn.Stat. §§ 609.06, 609.065 (2004):
(1) The killing must have been done in the belief that it was necessary to avert death or grievous bodily harm.
(2) The judgment of the defendant as to the gravity of the peril to which he was exposed must have been reasonable under the circumstances.
(3) The defendant’s election to kill must have been such as a reasonable man would have made in light of the danger to be apprehended.
State v. Austin, 332 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn.1983) (quoting State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 254, 170 N.W.2d 104, 112 (1969)).4 There is a duty to retreat and avoid danger if reasonably possible. Austin, 332 N.W.2d at 24. The duty to retreat relates to the election to kill, making a killing unjustified if the danger was reasonably avoidable. Id. The justification that exonerates a defendant from criminal responsibility for the use of deadly force is limited by an objective standard where society would agree that the use of deadly force was necessary and a part of that objectivity analysis includes the duty to retreat if at all possible to avoid the harm. See Boyce, 284 Minn, at 255, 170 N.W.2d at 113 (stating that justification depends on the quality of a defendant’s “judgment with respect to the danger to be apprehended from others and the alternative methods by which the danger could have been avoided”).
Here, Edwards was in the driver’s seat of the van that was stopped in the middle of the street, the engine was running, nothing was blocking his exit, and Oliver was on foot outside. Forensic evidence indicated that Oliver was approximately 15 feet away from the van. Crime scene photographs indicated driving conditions were good and Edwards testified that he “busted a U-turn” on Elliot just before the shooting. In closing argument, the state focused not on the forfeiture of the right to claim self-defense but, rather, on the duty *414to retreat and avoid the danger; defense counsel argued that Edwards “had to kill or be killed”; and the jury was instructed on the duty to retreat.
A careful review of the evidence reflects that the central issues at trial were whether Edwards acted with premeditation or whether he acted as a reasonable person in using deadly force. Intent was not in serious dispute. That the evidence of aggression related to premeditation but the jury acquitted Edwards of premeditated murder, convicting him instead of the drive-by shooting offense, indicates the jury answered the latter question in the negative. Under the circumstances of this case, submission of the instruction on an aggressor’s right to a claim of self-defense was not prejudicial.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, PAUL H„ J., files concurring opinion. HANSON, J., dissents with opinion in which PAGE and MEYER, JJ., join.. A homicide investigator testified that a shooter puts on gloves to avoid contact with gun residue; but another investigator testified that the presence or absence of gun residue on a shooter's hands is meaningless.
. Minnesota Statutes § 609.065 provides:
The intentional taking of the life of anoth*411er is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a felony in the actor’s place of abode.
. Neither are our prior cases consistent with the formulation of a forfeiture rule that focuses on the legality of the victim’s response. See, e.g., Thompson, 544 N.W.2d at 12-3 (declining to reduce murder to manslaughter on theory of imperfect self-defense); State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Minn.1990) (stating that evidence suggesting the victim at times may have had the upper hand in the struggle with the initial aggressor was not a *413legally sufficient withdrawal); State v. Boitnott, 443 N.W.2d 527, 532-33 (Minn.1989) (holding that short break in armed trespasser's otherwise continuous stream of verbal threats and threatening gestures with his handgun did not constitute an actual or good faith effort to withdraw from the conflict); Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 272-73 (holding that armed robber who was holding five people at gunpoint at the time he was shot by liquor store owner and fell to the floor had not withdrawn from the crime).
. The burden is upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not justifiable. State v. Columbus, 258 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Minn.1977). Self-defense in Minnesota is regarded as a justification rather than an excuse. See id. at 124. While the term “legal justification" and "excuse” are often used interchangeably, they are distinct legal concepts. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 9-11 (1998); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L.Rev. 61, 65-67 (1984).