dissenting:
I respectfully DISSENT.
The bankruptcy court found that “gross annual income” means just that. I agree. Plainly read, the term “gross annual income” encompasses all income received by the person or married couple in question over the course of a year. The plain language of the statute must be the court’s determinant. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757, 112 S.Ct. 2242, 2246, 119 L.Ed.2d 519 (1992). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that in interpreting California statutes, a federal court may not omit or add to the plain meaning of the statute. In re Borba, 736 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir.1984).
California statutes are to be interpreted according to their plain meaning:
In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 1858. The statute in this case says “gross annual income.” Unless the statute defines the words in question, they “will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). An appropriate place to look for the common meaning is in the dictionary. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 105 S.Ct. 1138, 84 L.Ed.2d 138 (1985).
The Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988) defines, in relevant part, “gross” as “[exclusive of deductions” and “income” as “[mjoney or its equivalent received during a period of time in exchange for labor or services, from the sale of goods or property, or as profit from financial investments.” Using these common definitions I must interpret “gross annual income” in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 704.730(a)(3)(C) to mean all income received by the Debtors for the year, or parts thereof, in question.
The majority, apparently having determined that “gross annual income” was ambiguous, looked to the definitions of “gross income” and “annual gross income” in other statutes: the California Tax and Family Codes. These Codes differ. Under the Tax Code only the costs of goods sold are subtracted from gross receipts, while under the Family Code all business expenses are subtracted to determine “annual gross income.” Under the Tax Code the Debtors’ “gross income” exceeds $20,000. Under the Family Code it does not. The majority decided to employ the latter definition, noting that the exemption statutes are to be construed liberally. I would not rely on these other statutes.
In each of the statutes discussed by the majority the legislature provided direction for interpretation thereof, either directly by definition (Cal.Fam.Code § 4058(a)(2)) or indirectly by referring to federal statutes (Cal. Rev. & Tax.Code § 17071 providing that 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) applies to define gross income). The legislature is thus capable and willing to provide direction if it intends a result which may require a reading which is not apparent on the face of the statute. The fact that no direction was given in the exemption statute further supports the conclusion that the legislature intended a plain reading of the language.
As a practical matter, allowing business deductions and expenses to impact “gross annual income” introduces troublesome issues and opens the door for abuses which would be difficult for courts to monitor. For instance, the courts must decide whether deductions are to be made on a cash or accrual basis. Would a debtor be allowed to deduct *362an expense incurred prepetition which remained unpaid as of the filing? Common sense would suggest that a cash basis be used, but what of the retailer who has sold inventory but has not, as of the petition date, paid his or her wholesaler? Furthermore, sole proprietorships, such as Party Barn, could regulate the net “gross income” to the owners by giving inordinate bonuses and salaries to favored employees or attributing inappropriate expenses to the business.
Another consideration is whether the interpretation of the majority is in line with the goal of the legislation. Section 704.730(a)(3)(C) has two limitations. First, the debtor must be over 55 years of age. Second, the debtors must have a combined annual income of not more than $20,000. This is a very exclusionary statute. The group defined by these limitations undoubtedly consists primarily of senior citizens with modest incomes such as those receiving Social Security. The California legislature likely will be surprised to find this statute being applied to increase the homestead exemption of an entrepreneurial couple through whose hands passed $532,670 over the course of the tax year preceding the bankruptcy.
A plain reading of the statute is mandated and would avoid these unnecessary and complex issues. I would uphold the decision of the bankruptcy court and read “gross income” to mean all income received.